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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This report looks at the role of door-to-door selling in Victoria’s evolving retail energy market, the 
consumer detriment associated with it, and the policy approaches – both existing and potential – 
that may minimise detriment without compromising energy market objectives. 
Consumer detriment – nature and extent 
Since the introduction of Full Retail Contestability to Victoria’s retail energy market a decade ago, 
unsolicited door-to-door energy selling has emerged and expanded, playing a major role in the 
transformation of the market. Today, Victoria’s retail energy market has the highest switching rate of 
any in the world. Nearly all retailers operating in Victoria use door-to-door selling to drive this 
switching activity, and it is estimated that door-to-door sales account for just over half of all customer 
switching. 
As energy door-to-door selling has grown, however, so too has concern about the ways in which 
this sales channel can cause consumers – particularly vulnerable consumers – financial and non-
financial detriment. In terms of non-financial detriment, the time loss and the annoyance that results 
when uninterested consumers are interrupted by a door-to-door sales call is often fairly minor, but it 
is also pervasive. This probably accounts, in large part, for the negative community perceptions of 
door-to-door selling. Should a sales agent conduct themselves poorly, or where the consumer is 
vulnerable, this non-financial detriment can be much greater.  
For consumers who agree to switch at the door, the aim is typically to save money. However, there 
is real cause for doubt that most consumers make a saving when they accept a door-to-door sales 
offer. In the UK, a 2008 study found that just under half of those switching at the door were 
actually made financially worse off by the change. This may be because door-to-door selling 
creates a ‘situational monopoly’: an environment in which the consumer is reliant on the information 
provided by only one supplier and cannot ‘shop around’ to find the best deal. Where the product 
or service offered involves complex terms and conditions, optimal decision-making may be even 
less likely.  
In Victoria, we know that some of the retailers with the most extensive door-to-door sales activity 
also tend to have the market’s more expensive offers. In the absence of any research, however, we 
simply do not know what proportion of consumers switching door-to-door incur financial detriment. 
This lack of data is a major gap in our understanding of both door-to-door selling and, more 
broadly, the functioning of our retail energy market. For this reason CUAC is recommending that the 
Victorian Government commission research to fill this critical evidence gap. 
Door-to-door sales misconduct such as pressure sales, misleading claims and exploitation of 
consumer vulnerability can all exacerbate consumer detriment. The extent of such misconduct has 
been a major issue of contention between consumer groups, industry, policymakers and regulators. 
Industry has tended to claim that complaint numbers are low when considered in relation to the 
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extent of door-to-door sales activity. Consumer groups, on the other hand, have pointed to 
consistent feedback from their clients and members, and argued that many consumers do not 
complain. Again, CUAC is recommending research to address this important evidence gap on the 
extent of misconduct, and to provide a baseline against which the effectiveness of our policy 
approaches can be measured.  
Consumer law 
The Australian Consumer Law prohibits certain types of business conduct, such as harassing or 
misleading consumers and exploiting their vulnerability, that can occur both in door-to-door sales 
and other environments. At the same time, recognising the particular risk of consumer detriment in 
the door-to-door sales environment, governments have tended to subject door-to-door sales to 
additional requirements over and above those in general consumer law. Of relevance to door-to-
door energy sales in Victoria, these include the Australian Consumer Law’s unsolicited consumer 
agreement provisions and the Code of Conduct for Marketing Retail Energy in Victoria. Additional 
consumer protections applicable to energy door-to-door sales include, most importantly, the 
provision of a ten business day cooling-off period and requirements on sales agents to disclose their 
identity and purpose, and to leave when requested. To improve consumers’ capacity to make 
appropriate decisions, there are also special provisions relating to the agreement information that 
must be provided to consumers in a door-to-door sales situation. 
Throughout 2012, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission has prioritised 
enforcement of the Australian Consumer Law in relation to energy door-to-door sales, filing 
proceedings against energy retailers and the door-to-door sales companies they had engaged. In 
September 2012, the Federal Court found that Neighbourhood Energy had breached the 
Australian Consumer Law unsolicited consumer agreement provisions, as well as its prohibition on 
misleading or deceptive conduct. Neighbourhood Energy and its door-to-door selling contractor, 
Australian Green Credits, were ordered by consent to pay penalties totalling $1 million. Another 
case has been brought against AGL Energy, but, at the time of writing, was yet to be decided. 
The ACCC v Neighbourhood Energy decision tested the scope of the Australian Consumer Law 
unsolicited consumer agreement provisions. It demonstrated that energy door-to-door sellers can 
face penalties for misleading and deceptive conduct and for failing to respect requests to leave – 
including those conveyed via Do Not Knock stickers. While it remains to be seen whether the 
ACCC’s enforcement action will translate to improved compliance on the part of energy retailers, 
the case was widely reported and seen as a landmark. CUAC has recommended that the ACCC 
solidify these gains by maintaining its focus on enforcement and testing of the ACL in relation to 
door-to-door energy sales. 
In contrast to the ACCC’s active enforcement, Victoria’s Essential Services Commission has taken a 
‘light-handed’ approach to promoting compliance with its Energy Marketing Code. Despite 
ongoing breaches as evidenced by retailer self-reporting and regulatory audits, the ESC has at no 
time used its statutory powers to enforce compliance with requirements relating to the information 
that must be provided to consumers at the door.  
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Retailers have now had a number of years to familiarise themselves with these requirements, and 
have been repeatedly asked to comply voluntarily. It is crucial that consumers making switching 
decisions on the basis of door-to-door sales presentations are given clear, truthful and 
comprehensive information about the offer they are considering. CUAC is therefore recommending 
that the ESC take stronger enforcement action should retailers fail to comply, within the agreed 
timeframes, with administrative undertakings made following the most recent round of regulatory 
audits. We are also recommending more timely publication of audit results and evidence of 
subsequent corrective action.  
Consumer-centred approaches 
One group of approaches to minimising the consumer detriment associated with door-to-door selling 
can be categorised as consumer-centred. These approaches equip and rely upon consumers to 
protect themselves from any misconduct or detriment. Primary among this group are consumer 
education and information initiatives, which have been a mainstay of policy approaches to door-to-
door sales. Consumer education and information initiatives aim to give consumers the knowledge, 
skills and confidence to participate effectively in increasingly complex and information-intensive 
markets. A range of regulatory and consumer bodies undertake consumer education activities, 
and/or produce consumer information resources relating to door-to-door sales.  
There are some good examples of consumer information resources in Victoria, including non-text 
materials and documents in community languages. For vulnerable consumers, these resources will 
often be best delivered in a face-to-face context, and the report recommends that Consumer Affairs 
Victoria support such activities. Even so, the limits of consumer education and information in relation 
to door-to-door sales must also be acknowledged. Information provided to consumers will not 
necessarily be taken notice of and understood, particularly where information is dense or complex, 
and by consumers who have poor literacy skills. Where information is seen and understood, it may 
be difficult to translate into action. Hence, complementary policy approaches are needed to tackle 
misconduct at its source.   
Another set of consumer-centred policy approaches aim to minimise detriment, including relatively 
minor but pervasive non-financial detriment, by allowing consumers to opt-out of any interaction with 
door-to-door sales agents. Existing and potential opt-out mechanisms include Do Not Knock and 
other No Canvassing signs and stickers; excluded zones such as the UK’s No Cold Calling Zones, 
and No Contact lists and registers.  
While Do Not Knock stickers now have unambiguous legal status, CUAC is not convinced that they 
represent the most efficient and effective opt-out mechanism for consumers. At the Federal level, the 
possible introduction of a Do Not Knock Register – similar to the Do Not Call Registers already in 
place in Australia and around the world – has recently been debated but, at the time of writing, 
seemed unlikely to go ahead. This is disappointing. The immense popularity of Australia’s Do Not 
Call Register shows that consumers are strongly supportive of initiatives that allow them to avoid 
intrusive marketing practices. A Do Not Knock register would provide a very simple mechanism for 
doing so, and would efficiently and appropriately allocate costs to retailers rather than consumer 
groups and government. 
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Both Victoria’s Energy Marketing Code and the National Energy Customer Framework require 
individual retailers to maintain No Contact lists to which consumers who do not wish to be 
marketed to can request to be added. While CUAC supports the intent of these provisions, they are 
unpublicised, unnecessarily complex (since a consumer must request addition to each retailer’s list 
separately), and probably ineffective. CUAC is recommending that the ESC develop an online tool, 
hosted on its Your Choice website, that would allow consumers to request addition to retailers’ No 
Contact lists via a single, centralised form. This tool would transform existing No Contact list 
provisions into a potentially effective opt-out mechanism.    
Self-regulatory and voluntarist approaches 
A final set of approaches to minimising consumer detriment from door-to-door sales relies upon 
industry, either collectively or at the individual business level, to manage its own behaviour in the 
interests of consumers. These self-regulatory and voluntarist approaches sit side-by-side with 
legislative and consumer-centred approaches. 
Voluntary industry codes of conduct began proliferating in the 1990s, and the report discusses two 
examples of their use in relation to energy door-to-door sales. Australia’s Energy Assured scheme 
began operation in January 2012. While its effectiveness has yet to be demonstrated, its design 
has a number, although not all, of the features that characterise potentially effective voluntary codes. 
More information about the operation of Energy Assured should be made publicly available, but the 
information that is available suggests that the scheme is being implemented as planned. Having 
reviewed the evidence about voluntary codes of conduct and Energy Assured specifically, CUAC 
concludes that the scheme has some strengths in comparison to the UK’s Energy Sure Code of 
Practice, and has the potential to be effective. We recommend that the ACCC only re-authorise the 
Energy Assured Scheme should this effectiveness be realised and convincingly demonstrated.  
In the UK, the consumer organisation Consumer Focus in 2011 launched a successful campaign 
calling on energy retailers to voluntarily agree to bring an end to door-to-door selling. Citing 
consumer surveys showing widespread dislike of door-to-door selling, Consumer Focus argued that 
the practice was eroding the reputation of energy retailers, and encouraged them to replace door-
to-door selling with alternative ways of providing information and advice to consumers. Consumer 
Focus’ campaign enjoyed strong support from consumer groups, the media and politicians, and 
within one year, the UK’s major ‘big six’ retailers had agreed to cease unsolicited door-to-door 
sales.  
In CUAC’s assessment, the different conditions in Victoria mean that a similar call on retailers to 
entirely abandon door-to-door sales is unlikely to be successful. Nonetheless, we recommend that 
the Energy Retailers Association of Australia takes a leadership role in encouraging and supporting 
retailers to develop innovative marketing and sales methods that are better aligned with consumers’ 
preferences, and which support effective consumer decision making. Such a shift in focus would, 
we believe, help to improve both competition and consumers’ trust in retailers and the retail energy 
market.   
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List of recommendations 
At the time of writing, the timing of Victoria’s transition to the National Energy Customer Framework 
was still unknown. Hence, the report and its recommendations have been written primarily with 
regard to the current regulatory framework for retail energy in Victoria. However, a number of the 
below recommendations directed at the Victorian Government and the Essential Services 
Commission are equally relevant at the national level and should be taken into consideration by the 
equivalent national bodies. 
Recommendation 1 
That the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission develop a consumer survey which 
accurately measures the extent of door-to-door selling problems. This survey should: 
 use a random sampling methodology with a sample large enough to allow separate 
analysis of key jurisdictions and of energy door-to-door sales specifically; 
 be designed to give a snapshot of the ‘average’ door-to-door sales interaction; 
 seek to determine the extent to which consumers who have had a negative experience 
lodge a complaint, and to whom; and 
 be re-administered periodically so that changes may be observed. 
Recommendation 2 
That the Victorian Government commission research assessing the financial outcomes of consumer 
switching decisions made via door-to-door sales and other major switching channels. 
Recommendation 3 
That the ACCC maintain its focus on enforcement and testing of the ACL unsolicited consumer 
agreement provisions, including in the energy sector.  
Recommendation 4 
That the Essential Services Commission ensure that results from regulatory audits and evidence of 
subsequent corrective action be made publicly available on the ESC website within three months of 
their completion. 
Recommendation 5 
That, should retailers have failed to comply with administrative undertakings arising from 2010-11 
regulatory audits within the specified timelines, the Essential Services Commission use its statutory 
powers to enforce compliance with Energy Marketing Code and Guideline 19 requirements. 
Recommendation 6 
That the Victorian Government and the Essential Services Commission closely monitor consumer 
impacts during the widespread introduction of flexible pricing in 2013. Should this monitoring 
show that consumers are experiencing increased detriment from the door-to-door sale of flexible 
pricing offers, the Energy Marketing Code should be reviewed and protections enhanced.    
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Recommendation 7 
That Consumer Affairs Victoria and the Essential Services Commission support community and 
consumer organisations to provide targeted, face-to-face education and information on door-to-door 
sales to vulnerable consumers. 
Recommendation 8 
That the Essential Services Commission improves the effectiveness of No Contact list requirements in 
the Energy Marketing Code by developing of an online tool through which consumers can request 
to be added to retailers’ No Contact lists. This facility should be hosted on the ESC’s Your Choice 
website.   
Recommendation 9 
That the Energy Assured scheme increases transparency and accountability by making more 
detailed information about the scheme’s implementation and operation publicly available at regular 
intervals. This should include de-identified information about: 
 any warning notices issued and sanctions applied; 
 independent audit results; 
 complaint levels; and 
 numbers of agents de-registered and in ‘suspended’ and ‘development’ status. 
Recommendation 10 
That the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission only re-authorise the Energy Assured 
scheme if there is convincing evidence that it has been effective in producing public benefit through 
the reduction of energy door-to-door misselling and associated consumer detriment.  
Recommendation 11 
That, in an effort to move away from door-to-door selling, the Energy Retailers Association of 
Australia take a leadership role encouraging and supporting its members to develop alternative, 
innovative sales and marketing approaches that are better aligned with consumer preferences. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
For several decades, the practice of door-to-door selling has been an issue that receives special 
attention in consumer policy and consumer law. This report looks at door-to-door selling in the 
Victorian retail energy market, examining its role and evolution, its consequences for consumers, 
and the policy approaches that may minimise detriment without compromising energy market 
objectives.  
About the research 
The 2002 introduction of competition into Victoria’s energy retail market saw the emergence and 
growth of door-to-door selling in this industry. As the practice has expanded, consumer and 
community organisations have heard numerous complaints about door-to-door selling misconduct, 
particularly in relation to vulnerable consumer groups, and have raised concerns about door-to-door 
sales practices. A number of research reports have investigated the consumer experience of door-to-
door selling, documenting instances of misconduct as well as community attitudes towards this sales 
channel.   
Based on feedback from the consumer and community organisations represented on our Reference 
Group,† the Consumer Utilities Advocacy Centre Ltd (CUAC) identified door-to-door selling as an 
area for ongoing research and advocacy in our 2011–12 Work Plan. Given that a number of 
research projects, including previous CUAC work, have focused on describing consumer 
experiences of the practice, CUAC decided, with this project, to turn its attention instead to the 
question of what can be done to minimise the consumer detriment associated with door-to-door 
selling.   
Aim 
With this research project, CUAC’s aim was to evaluate the range of potential policy approaches 
to door-to-door selling, identifying those approaches most likely to be effective in minimising the 
detriment to Victorian consumers that arises from the use of door-to-door selling of retail energy. 
Based on this evaluation of effectiveness, and incorporating consideration of the implications for 
energy market competition, we developed a set of recommendations which, if implemented, should 
support wider energy market objectives while minimising the consumer detriment that can result from 
door-to-door sales. 
This project therefore relates in the main to steps four and five of the consumer policymaking 
process, as described by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 
its Consumer Policy Toolkit:1 
1. Define the consumer problem and its source 
2. Measure consumer detriment 
                                                          
† The CUAC Reference Group is a consultative body that advises CUAC on grassroots consumer issues. 
1 Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation (2010) Consumer Policy Toolkit, OECD: Paris, p. 114. 
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3. Determine whether consumer detriment warrants a policy action 
4. Set policy objective and identify the range of policy actions 
5. Evaluate options and select a policy action 
6. Develop a policy review process to evaluate the effectiveness of a policy. 
Design 
This report is based on the findings of a desktop review, guided in part by information gathered in 
meetings with key policy informants. 
Meetings 
Early in the project, CUAC arranged meetings with key policy informants to guide the desktop 
review and provide information about the effectiveness of different policy approaches. A meeting 
was held with Anne Whitehouse, Chief Executive Officer of the industry self-regulatory scheme 
Energy Assured. From Consumer Affairs Victoria (CAV), CUAC also met with Ruth Herbert, Acting 
Manager, Planning and Monitoring, Brian Wearne, General Manager, Planning, Monitoring and 
Assessment and Gina Papas, Senior Policy Advisor. 
Literature Review 
The project involved a comprehensive desktop review of door-to-door selling practice and policy 
approaches over time, both in Australia and overseas. This review aimed to identify the range of 
policy approaches to door-to-door selling, the effectiveness of those approaches and, to some 
extent, the drivers of policy change in this area. The review also highlighted patterns or 
commonalities in the practice of door-to-door selling and the extent and nature of misconduct in 
different jurisdictions and sectors.  
Energy door-to-door selling was the focus of the review, meaning that most discussion of policy 
approaches overseas is drawn from the United Kingdom (UK), which also has a competitive retail 
energy market and, until recently, extensive door-to-door energy sales activity. However, given that 
all door-to-door selling shares some salient characteristics, and given the relative rarity of 
competitive retail energy markets and, consequently, energy door-to-door selling, the review 
included door-to-door selling of all types. Since many of the policy approaches applied to door-to-
door selling are also tools of consumer policy in other areas, the literature review also incorporated 
research and policy documents examining the effectiveness of these approaches more broadly, or 
in other contexts. 
The desktop review took in relevant sources of a range of types including:  
 government policy documents, regulation and legislation  
 academic research from economics, law, social/public policy, sociology and marketing 
fields 
 program evaluations and policy reviews 
 consumer information and education materials 
 consumer and other non-government organisation documents and publications 
 media releases and news reports 
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 case law 
 consumer complaints data 
 performance, compliance and audit reports. 
A comprehensive bibliography can be found at the end of this report. 
Report  
The remainder of this report is organised into four chapters. Chapter 2 provides the context for the 
rest of the report, explaining door-to-door selling and describing its role and evolution in the 
Victorian retail energy market. It includes an overview of the theory and evidence about consumer 
detriment associated with door-to-door energy sales in Victoria.  
The remainder of the report deals with a range of potential policy approaches to door-to-door 
selling, discussing the rationale behind each approach, examples of their use and any evidence of 
their effectiveness. Based on this analysis, CUAC also sets out its proposals for an improved policy 
approach to energy door-to-door selling aimed at minimising consumer detriment while supporting 
competition through effective, informed consumer participation in the retail energy market.  
For convenience, this discussion is grouped into three chapters, although this division is to some 
extent artificial: there are substantial areas of overlap within and between these broad categories. 
Chapter 3 deals with consumer law, discussing provisions within the Australian Consumer Law 
(ACL), the National Energy Customer Framework (NECF) and the Code of Conduct for Marketing 
Retail Energy in Victoria (the Energy Marketing Code). This chapter covers general bans of certain 
kinds of business behaviour including pressure sales and unconscionable conduct, as well as door-
to-door or energy-specific protections relating to, for example, cooling-off periods and information 
about the agreement. Prohibition of door-to-door sales across economies or in specific sectors is 
also discussed. Chapter 4, on consumer-centred approaches, discusses the range of measures that 
rely on consumers to protect themselves from potential detriment, covering: education and 
awareness initiatives; Do Not Knock stickers and signs; No Contact lists and registers and excluded 
zones. Chapter 5 addresses industry self-regulatory schemes and unilateral voluntary action.  
Finally, Chapter 6 offers some concluding thoughts about the future of door-to-door selling in the 
Victorian retail energy market. 
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2. CONTEXT 
Door-to-door selling, a form of direct selling in which a sales agent travels from house to house 
attempting to sell a product, has played a major role in the development of Victoria’s competitive 
retail energy market. After a decade of customer choice, door-to-door selling remains a major sales 
channel, used by nearly all retailers to build or maintain market share.  
The growth of door-to-door energy sales, however, has been accompanied by growing concern 
about the potential for consumer detriment, both financial and non-financial. In particular, consumer 
and community groups, policymakers and regulators have been concerned about the potential for 
detriment to vulnerable consumers. Despite this concern, there have been few efforts to collect 
reliable, representative data about the extent of detriment, creating a barrier to policy action to 
minimise detriment and hindering understanding of the effectiveness of measures already in place. 
What is door-to-door selling? 
Door-to-door selling is a distinctive form of direct selling in which a sales agent travels from house to 
house (or business to business), attempting to sell a product or service face-to-face. While some 
forms of door-to-door selling include prior contact to secure an appointment, energy door-to-door 
selling in Victoria currently takes the form of unsolicited doorknocking.  
Door-to-door selling is the oldest form of direct selling: selling that takes place away from a fixed 
retail location and generally initiated by the seller. However, while door-to-door shares common 
features with other forms of direct selling, there are also important differences. In contrast to newer 
forms of direct selling (party plans and network marketing) which generally focus on low-value 
consumer products, contemporary door-to-door sales tend to involve larger, one-off purchases of a 
good or service. Door-to-door sales transactions therefore typically constitute a serious purchasing 
decision on the part of the consumer.2  
The different nature of the services and products sold door-to-door and through other forms of direct 
selling has shaped both the structure of the high and low value direct selling industries and the types 
of sales techniques that are employed.3 Most direct selling is done part-time or sporadically by 
female sales agents who on-sell items they have taken legal title to, choosing their own level of 
activity and commitment.4 In contrast, door-to-door sales agents are predominantly male, tend to 
work full-time equivalent or longer hours, and are generally paid a commission for each sale, often 
as their only earnings.5  
Interestingly, while door-to-door selling is a type of direct selling, direct selling industry associations 
usually focus largely or wholly on party plan selling and network marketing. As reported by Frost 
                                                          
2 Bone, John (2006) The Hard Sell: An Ethnographic Study of the Direct Selling Industry, Ashgate: Aldershot, p. 7. 
3 Ibid p. 8. 
4 Frost and Sullivan (2012) Research into the Door-to-Door Sales Industry in Australia, Frost & Sullivan, p. 21; Bone (2006) The 
Hard Sell, p. 4. 
5
 Frost and Sullivan (2012) Research into the Door-to-Door Sales Industry, p. 21; Bone (2006) The Hard Sell, p. 6-9. 
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and Sullivan in their recent study of the door-to-door selling industry for the Australian Competition 
and Consumer Commission (ACCC), the Direct Selling Association of Australia currently has no 
members involved (to its knowledge) in unsolicited door-to-door selling.6 The same is true of the UK 
Direct Selling Association.7 UK sociologist John Bone suggests that the non-recognition of door-to-
door sellers by direct selling associations may relate to the greater aggression of this form of direct 
selling and the public perception of ‘unscrupulous and shady practices.’8 
Door-to-door selling in the Victorian retail energy market 
Door-to-door selling has played a major role in the transformation of the Victorian retail energy 
market over the past decade – itself a part of a broader, global shift towards a more competitive 
market environment with accompanying growth in the range and complexity of available products 
and services. One component of this broader change has been the introduction of competition into 
markets for essential services, including energy, that were formerly supplied by state-owned, 
integrated monopoly businesses.  
In its 2008 Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework, the Productivity Commission (PC) 
suggested that this change had brought with it productivity gains and consumer benefit, while also 
creating challenges in terms of high switching costs, complexity, and ensuring access to essential 
services for vulnerable and disadvantaged consumers.9 Before liberalisation, energy consumers 
were required to make few, if any, decisions. Contrastingly, energy consumers today face a 
complex marketplace characterised by a diversity of retailers offering a range of often complicated 
products that can be difficult to compare.10 It is in this environment that door-to-door selling has 
come to be a major mechanism by which consumers make decisions about their energy supply.  
Development of the Victorian retail energy market 
The move towards energy market liberalisation in Australia began in earnest in the early 1990s. A 
1991 Industry Commission report recommended major reforms to energy generation and 
distribution. This was closely followed, in 1992, by the report of the wide-ranging Committee of 
Inquiry into a National Competition Policy for Australia (the Hilmer Review). The Hilmer Review 
went even further, recommending reform across the energy sector including both wholesale and 
retail.   
Victoria was the first jurisdiction to begin implementation of such reforms. In preparation for 
privatisation, the early 1990s saw the corporatisation and structural separation of energy 
businesses, alongside the development of a new regulatory regime. The sector was progressively 
privatised throughout the latter part of the decade, beginning with generation and transmission and 
ending with retail. Initially, retail was split into five businesses, each operating in a separate 
distribution network area.11  
                                                          
6
 Frost and Sullivan (2012) Research into the Door-to-Door Sales Industry, p. 21. 
7
 Bone (2006) The Hard Sell, p. 5. 
8 Ibid p. 9. 
9 Australian Government Productivity Commission (2008) Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework, Volume 2 – Chapters 
and Appendixes, Commonwealth of Australia: Canberra, p. 7. 
10 OECD (2010) Consumer Policy Toolkit, p. 16-17. 
11 Australian Energy Regulator (2007) State of the Energy Market 2007, Commonwealth of Australia: Canberra, p. 173. 
 17 
Full retail contestability and the emerging role of door-to-door selling 
Subsequently, the retail sector was opened to competition and new entrants, including both new 
retailers and those already established in other states, joined Victoria’s ‘host’ retailers. By 2002, full 
retail contestability (FRC) was in place, with industrial, business and residential customers able to 
choose among retailers and offers (although retail price regulation remained in place).  
While customers were able to choose, however, few were inclined to pro-actively exercise this 
choice. Instead, retailers began directly approaching customers. Table 1, below, shows that in the 
first year of FRC, customers were far more likely to be approached by a retailer with an offer than 
to contact the retailer themselves. While the frequency of both activities increased markedly over the 
next five years, the overall ratio remained roughly similar.   
Table 1: Residential customer perceptions of competition, Victoria 
Indicator 2002 2004 2007 
Customers aware of choice n/a 90% 94% 
Customers receiving at least one retail offer 17% 33% 73% 
Customers approaching retailers about taking out market contracts 3% 8% 10% 
Source: Australian Energy Regulator (2008) State of the Energy Market 2008, Commonwealth of Australia: Canberra, p. 185. 
In this newly competitive environment, door-to-door selling immediately emerged as an important 
means by which incumbent retailers sought to maintain market share and new entrants attempted to 
gain a foothold in the market. Energy and Water Ombudsman (Victoria) (EWOV) data show that 
door-to-door sales (and associated complaints) have been a feature of the market since the earliest 
days of FRC.12  
Effective competition 
By 2006, Victoria’s small customer switching rate – that is, the proportion of small customers who 
changed retailer during the year – had reached 23 per cent, 13 with this figure remaining steady 
the following year.14 This switching activity led to an increase in the customer base of new entrant 
retailers, which more than doubled their combined small customer market share from five per cent to 
13 per cent between 2004 and 2006.15 By June 2007, the new entrants had captured one fifth 
of the small customer market.16 On the basis of this comparatively high level of switching, in 2006 
Finnish think-tank VaasaEMG classified Victoria’s energy market (along with Great Britain’s) as the 
world’s ‘hottest.’17 
Under the 2004 Australian Energy Market Agreement, Australian governments had agreed to 
review and remove retail price caps once ‘effective competition’ was achieved in states and 
territories’ retail markets. The Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC) was tasked with the 
                                                          
12 Energy and Water Ombudsman (Victoria) (2002), Annual Report 2002, EWOV: Melbourne, p. 7-8. 
13 AER (2007) State of the Energy Market 2007, p. 185. 
14 Australian Energy Regulator (2008) State of the Energy Market 2008, Commonwealth of Australia: Canberra, p. 183. 
15 AER (2007) State of the Energy Market 2007, p. 173. 
16 AER (2008) State of the Energy Market 2008, p. 171. 
17 AER (2007) State of the Energy Market 2007, p. 185. 
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role of assessing competition effectiveness in each jurisdiction, with Victoria the first to be assessed. 
In 2007, the AEMC conducted its Review of the Effectiveness of Competition in the Electricity and 
Gas Retail Markets – Victoria, finding that competition in Victoria was indeed effective. In coming 
to this finding, the AEMC placed a striking and heavy emphasis on the critical role of door-to-door 
selling, along with telesales.  
The Review identified two key areas of evidence supporting the Commission’s conclusion that 
effective competition was in place; both related to door-to-door selling activity. Firstly, it argued that 
evidence about customer behaviour – namely, that customers demonstrated ‘a clear willingness to 
participate in the competitive retail market if approach directly by a retailer’18 [emphasis added] – 
supported its conclusion. Secondly, the AEMC held up evidence of strong retailer rivalry, primarily 
in the form of ‘vigorous marketing rivalry,’ as a marker of competition effectiveness.19 In a retailer 
survey conducted for the AEMC review, door-to-door selling was the only sales and marketing 
channel that both host and incumbent retailers rated as ‘highly effective’ in attracting residential 
customers.20 
In foregrounding the role of door-to-door selling and telesales in this way, the AEMC was explicit in 
its reasoning. Energy, the Commission argued, was a ‘relatively low involvement’ and 
undifferentiated product and consumers were uninterested in searching for the best deal or 
analysing the market.21 Indeed, its customer survey, conducted as part of the review, found that 
many customers lacked a strong interest in energy and ‘in the absence of an active approach to 
marketing by retailers, are unlikely to be motivated to search for superior energy contract prices and 
conditions.’22 
The AEMC’s finding that effective competition was in place cleared the way for retail price 
deregulation, which was legislated for in September 2008 and implemented in January 2009. The 
removal of price controls created greater scope for differentiation and therefore market activity. It 
appears that price deregulation also created more opportunities for errors and disputes to occur. In 
the 2008-09 financial year (including the first six months of price deregulation), EWOV energy 
case numbers jumped an astonishing 54 per cent over 2007-08 figures, the largest year-on-year 
increase in EWOV’s operation.23  
The Victorian retail energy market today 
Today, Victoria’s retail energy market is still widely considered to be the world’s most competitive, 
largely on the basis of its comparatively high switching rate. The 2012 VaasaETT World Energy 
Retail Market Rankings Report classified Victoria’s retail energy market as ‘super hot,’ describing it 
as ‘the most active market of all time.’24 In 2010-11 there were 4.4 million electricity and gas 
                                                          
18 Australian Energy Market Commission (2007), Review of the Effectiveness of Competition in Electricity and Gas Retail Markets 
in Victoria – First Final Report, AEMC: Sydney, p. ix. 
19 Ibid p. ix.  
20 Ibid, p. 65-66. 
21 AEMC (2007) Review of the Effectiveness of Competition, p. viii. 
22 Ibid, p. 6. 
23 CUAC analysis of EWOV Annual Reports from 2001-present. 
24 Lewis, Phillip E. et al (2012) World Energy Retail Market Rankings 2012, VaasaETT: Helsinki, p. 2. 
 19 
customers in Victoria, of whom approximately 1 million changed retailer during that year.25 New 
entrants’ small customer market share had also increased further, reaching 30 per cent in mid 
2010.26 
Prevalence of door-to-door selling 
The Victorian energy market has seen significant change since the 2007 AEMC Review of 
Competition Effectiveness and retail price deregulation, including the growth of third-party switching 
sites. Nonetheless, door-to-door selling continues to be a critical driver of switching activity, and 
therefore a central plank of retail competition. Based on registration figures from Energy Assured, in 
October 2012 there were approximately 1,181 registered sales agents selling energy door-to-door 
in Victoria.27 A recent estimate is that 55 per cent of residential energy sales occur through the 
door-to-door channel.28 Considered in another way, energy accounts for around three quarters of 
all door-to-door sales in Australia.29 
By and large, retailers continue to see door-to-door sales as a necessity, with almost all energy 
retailers operating in Victoria continuing to use the channel.  All but two second-tier retailers rely at 
least partially on door-to-door sales to win customers. The exceptions to this rule are Click Energy 
and Dodo Power and Gas, and for both of these avoiding door-to-door appears to be a deliberate 
strategy flowing directly from their overall business model. Click Energy operates online and 
therefore eschews door-to-door selling. Dodo Power and Gas has used its own public disavowal of 
door-to-door selling as a marketing strategy, capitalising on community dissatisfaction by running 
television advertisements parodying door-to-door sales practices and encouraging consumers to 
‘”say no to door-knockers!”’30  
Interestingly, although door-to-door sales are often presented as being particularly crucial to second-
tier retailers who would otherwise struggle to gain a ‘critical mass’ of customers,31 this sales channel 
is also utilised by all three of Victoria’s tier one (incumbent) retailers. Indeed, these large retailers 
(Origin Energy, AGL Energy and TRUenergy†) also engage, via third parties, some of the state’s 
biggest door-to-door salesforces and smaller marketing companies.32 Origin Energy, with 24 per 
cent residential customer market share,33 has combined the use of door-to-door sales with efforts to 
insulate its customers from the marketing efforts of other retailers by distributing Do Not Knock 
stickers to its existing customers (Appendix A).  
  
                                                          
25 Essential Services Commission (2012f) 2010-11 Compliance Report: Energy Retail Businesses - April 2012, ESC: Melbourne, 
p. 7. 
26 Australian Energy Regulator (2011a) State of the Energy Market 2011, Commonwealth of Australia: Canberra, p. 106. 
27 Frost and Sullivan (2012) Research into the Door-to-Door Sales Industry, p. 31. 
28 Ibid, p. 26. 
29 Ibid, p. 25. 
30 Dodo Power and Gas, ‘Dodo Backs ACCC Action And Says “No” to Door Knockers,’ Media Release, 17 May 2012. 
31 Frost and Sullivan (2012) Research into the Door-to-Door Sales Industry, p. 28. 
† In a recent change, TRUenergy is now EnergyAustralia. However, because most of the evidence we have used refers to 
TRUenergy, we have also referred to TRUenergy throughout the report. 
32 Advice to CUAC from Anne Whitehouse, CEO, Energy Assured, 21 September 2012. 
33 CUAC calculation based on figures in ESC (2012d) Energy Retailers Comparative Performance Report – Pricing: 2011-12, 
ESC: Melbourne, p. 11. 
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Table 2: Use of door-to-door sales by retailers operating in Victoria  
Using door-to-door sales Not using door-to-door sales 
 AGL Energy (including PowerDirect) 
 Australian Power and Gas 
 Lumo Energy 
 Neighbourhood Energy 
 Origin Energy 
 Red Energy 
 Simply Energy 
 TRUenergy 
 Momentum Energy 
 Energy Australia 
 Dodo Power and Gas 
 Click Energy 
Source: Advice to CUAC from Anne Whitehouse, CEO, Energy Assured, 21 September 2012. 
This level of door-to-door selling activity means that the experience of door-to-door sales is a 
common one for consumers. In their 2012 report, Frost & Sullivan estimate that an average of 
around 2.8 per cent of Australian households are doorknocked by sales agents (in any sector) each 
day, totalling an average of approximately eight visits† per household, per year. They note that in 
Victoria and NSW this average will be higher due to vigorous energy sales activity in those 
states.34 These figures accord with those in a 2011 CUAC survey of around 300 Victorian 
consumers, which also found that energy door-to-door selling was a common experience. Of the 
sample, 81 per cent reported having been approached by an energy door-to-door sales agent 
while at home at least once – most often between three and five times – during the previous two 
years.35  
Industry structure  
With the exception of Red Energy, which maintains an in-house sales force, energy retailers 
outsource the door-to-door selling function. Frost & Sullivan estimate that there are around 35 
companies providing door-to-door selling services in Australia, many operating across states, and a 
number with offices in Victoria.36 These companies often offer door-to-door selling as one of a 
range of marketing and selling services.37 Contracts with door-to-door selling companies typically 
set out Key Performance Indicators and cover a two-year period.38 Door-to-door selling companies 
and the trader tend to work closely together, with the trader providing training and marketing 
materials, determining geographical areas to be targeted and managing verification calls.39  
Door-to-door sales agents are typically independent contractors who are paid on a commission-only 
basis. They are often engaged through a third party sub-contractor rather than the marketing 
company itself.40 Less commonly, sales agents are employed full-time or part-time and receive 
                                                          
† Elsewhere in the report it is estimated that a potential customer is present at home for roughly 45% of these visits. 
34 Frost and Sullivan (2012) Research into the Door-to-Door Sales Industry, p.13. 
35 Consumer Utilities Advocacy Centre (2012) The consumer experience of door-to-door energy sales in Victoria: Findings from a 
CUAC survey – CUAC Policy Issues Paper, February 2012, CUAC: Melbourne, p.1. 
36 Frost and Sullivan (2012) Research into the Door-to-Door Sales Industry, p. 35, 44. 
37 Ibid, p. 41. 
38 Ibid, p. 42. 
39 Ibid, p. 41. 
40 Ibid, p. 43. 
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commissions on top of a base salary, or are engaged through and paid by a labour hire 
company.41 
Future trends 
In their study of Australia’s door-to-door selling industry, Frost & Sullivan conclude that energy market 
trends and the restriction of alternative sales channels (namely telesales) will continue to stimulate 
door-to-door sales activity.42 The wide-scale introduction of flexible (time-of-use) retail pricing from 
July 2013 may also spur further increases in market activity, including door-to-door sales, in 
Victoria. Flexible pricing offers will be more complex for consumers to understand and have the 
potential to cause financial detriment and bill shock if selected inappropriately. Hence, door-to-door 
selling of these products can be expected to present new challenges.  
Door-to-door selling and consumer detriment 
The emergence and growth of door-to-door selling in Victoria’s retail energy market has been 
accompanied by increasing concern about associated consumer detriment. Consumer vulnerability 
can be heightened in the door-to-door sales context43 and hence, door-to-door selling is generally 
considered to carry a higher risk of consumer detriment than other types of transaction.44 
Types of detriment 
The detriment that can accompany door-to-door sales is both financial and non-financial, and can 
accrue both to consumers who make a purchase and to those who are exposed to the sales 
practice but do not conclude a transaction. Table 3, below, summarises the main types of financial 
and non-financial detriment that can be associated with door-to-door sales practices.  
Table 3: Types of detriment associated with door-to-door sales 
Financial Non-financial 
 Inappropriate offer leading to: 
o Paying more than necessary for service 
and/or 
o Paying more than previously for service 
 Exit fees 
 Time loss arising from: 
o Sending sales agents away 
o Listening to unwanted sales presentations 
o Making a complaint  
o Reversing a wrongful transfer or cancelling 
a legitimate but unwanted contract during 
cooling-off period 
 Stress and annoyance arising from same factors 
listed above 
Financial detriment 
Energy consumers who switch most often do so with the aim of obtaining a lower price,45 and 
ideally, a consumer who accepts a door-to-door sales offer will benefit financially from this 
switching decision. This outcome, however, is not guaranteed: door-to-door sales can also cause 
                                                          
41 Ibid, p. 41 
42 Ibid, p. 45-6 and 78. 
43 OECD, Consumer Policy Toolkit, p. 55.  
44 Frost and Sullivan (2012) Research into the Door-to-Door Sales Industry, p. 17. 
45 Consumer Utilities Advocacy Centre (2011a) Improving energy market competition through consumer participation, CUAC: 
Melbourne, p. 64; AEMC (2007) Review of the Effectiveness of Competition, p. 98. 
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financial detriment where an inappropriate offer is selected. This may see a consumer paying more 
than necessary, or more than previously, for energy supply. A customer accepting a door-to-door 
sales offer may also be charged an exit or termination fee by their existing supplier, potentially 
compounding this financial loss, or outweighing any savings from a switch. 
Quality information is crucial to good consumer choices in any market, and limited or deceptive 
information can lead to decisions which cause financial detriment.46 This issue is pertinent to door-
to-door selling because of the particular information environment it creates. Door-to-door selling 
precludes comparative shopping, creating a ‘temporary’ or ‘situational’ monopoly in which the 
customer is reliant on information provided by the sales agent and the seller has a unique 
opportunity to influence a consumer’s decision.47 Hence, there have been reports of cases48 where 
goods have been sold door-to-door at prices more than twice as high as those for comparable 
goods in retail stores – a phenomenon most easily interpreted as ‘a monopoly rent, earned by a 
supplier due to the particular selling procedure’ used.49 
The essential nature of energy may mean that in contrast to some goods and services sold door-to-
door, the majority of consumers have some sense of how much it should cost,† making such 
monopoly rents unlikely in the sector. Nevertheless, without access to more complete information 
including the offers of other suppliers, it would seem that energy consumers in a door-to-door sales 
situation are less likely to select a deal that is the most appropriate for their circumstances. This will 
be the case even if the information provided by the sales agent is accurate and understood by the 
consumer. If misleading or deceptive information is given (such as false claims that a special 
discount will be applied), the potential for detriment arising from the situational monopoly of door-to-
door sales is even greater.   
In its report on the door-to-door selling industry, Frost & Sullivan suggest that potential for financial 
detriment in the information environment of door-to-door sales is arguably increased with goods or 
services that require ‘special technical understanding’ or involve complex contracts and ongoing 
financial commitment.50 This is certainly true of retail energy products, the complexity of which can 
be expected to intensify when Victoria sees the wider introduction of flexible pricing in 2013. 
Non-financial detriment 
Types of non-financial detriment associated with door-to-door sales include time loss and emotional 
costs such as annoyance and stress. In contrast to financial detriment from door-to-door sales, which 
has the potential to arise only where an offer is accepted, non-financial detriment can be incurred 
regardless of whether or not a sale is concluded, at most stages of the door-to-door sales ‘pipeline.’ 
                                                          
46 OECD (2010) Consumer Policy Toolkit, p. 37. 
47 Duggan, Anthony (1973) ‘The Cooling Off Period in Victorian Door-to-Door Sales Regulation,’ Melbourne University Law Review 
9, p. 134; OECD (2010) Consumer Policy Toolkit, p. 89. 
48 See, for example: Office of Fair Trading (UK) (2004) Doorstep selling: A report on the market study, OFT: London, p. 9. 
49 Rekaiti, Pamaria and Roger Van den Bergh (2000) ‘Cooling-off Periods in the Consumer Laws of the EC Member States – A 
Comparative Law and Economics Approach,’ Journal of Consumer Policy 23, p. 378-9. 
† Although this is likely to be conceptualised in terms of quarterly bills rather than, for example, cents per kilowatt hour. 
50 Frost and Sullivan (2012) Research into the Door-to-Door Sales Industry, p.17. 
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Figure 1: Door-to-door sales pipeline 
  
Source: Adapted from Frost and Sullivan (2012) Research into the door-to-door sales industry, p. 48. 
Those consumers who come to the door but decline to listen to a sales presentation, for example, 
will lose some time dealing with the sales agent, and may find this interruption annoying or 
intrusive. Those who listen to a presentation but do not make a purchase are likely to spend more 
time on the interaction, and, particularly if the sales agent has used high pressure sales techniques, 
may find the experience distressing or annoying, as might a consumer who accepts the offer. If, at 
any of these points, the consumer decides to make a complaint about a sales agent’s behaviour, 
this will mean additional time loss. 
It is noteworthy that a consumer’s experience of non-financial detriment may be largely or entirely 
involuntary. Discussing policy responses to intrusive telesales in the USA, Redmond argues that most 
consumers would not knowingly answer a telesales call and that therefore telesales ‘differs 
fundamentally’ from types of marketing to which exposure is voluntary.51 This involuntary exposure 
similarly characterises unsolicited door-to-door selling.  
Misconduct 
The likelihood that a door-to-door sales interaction will cause detriment increases if the sales agent 
employs pressure selling tactics or makes misleading or deceptive claims.  
Door-to-door selling has a number of intrinsic features that mean many consumers feel pressured to 
buy. Firstly, door-to-door selling inseparably links the functions of promotion and sale, thereby 
generating an ‘emphasis on the need to persuade.’52 Secondly, the industry’s employment and 
payment practices encourage pressure sales. Both historically and in the present, sales agents in the 
door-to-door sales industry are most often independent contractors who are paid either wholly or 
partly on a commission basis, meaning that their income is dependent upon their success in 
persuading consumers to purchase. Hence, door-to-door sales agents employ a range of specific 
sales tactics and influencing techniques, documented in a number of studies,53 that can be very 
                                                          
51 Redmond, William H. (2005) ‘Intrusive Promotion as Market Failure: How Should Society Impact Marketing?,’ Journal of 
Macromarketing 25(1), p. 20. 
52 Duggan (1973) ‘The Cooling Off Period,’p . 134.  
53 See, for example: OFT (UK) (2004) Doorstep selling; Bone (2006) The Hard Sell; Frost and Sullivan (2012) Research into the 
door-to-door sales industry. 
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effective in securing sales.54 The use of such techniques may amount to harassment, coercion or 
unconscionable conduct prohibited under the ACL, but it is important to note that sales techniques 
may cause consumers to feel pressured or uncomfortable without being illegal.  
The fact that door-to-door sales occur within consumers’ homes may amplify the perception of 
pressure for consumers. The home is an environment that differs in important ways from ordinary 
retail environments. While consumers can fairly easily depart a retail store, they cannot leave their 
homes and instead must ask the sales agent to leave. Homes also have a particular psychological 
significance. For occupants, a transaction within the home feels less impersonal than one in a shop 
environment, while for skilled sales agents, information gleaned from the home surroundings is often 
used to identify the seller with the consumer, mimicking similarity to create trust.55  
Unsurprisingly then, research has tended to find that consumers report greater feelings of pressure in 
door-to-door as compared to other selling environments. A large 2011 Consumer Focus (UK) survey 
asked consumers in which of a range of sales channels they felt most under pressure to buy: 44 per 
cent identified door-to-door sales as the highest-pressure environment, followed by 27 per cent 
nominating telesales and 22 face-to-face street sales.56 Similarly, an earlier customer survey 
conducted by the UK Office of Fair Trading (OFT) found that 34 per cent of surveyed consumers 
who had made door-to-door purchases felt under pressure when buying, while 85 per cent of 
consumers who would not purchase door-to-door felt that it involved more pressure than buying in 
other settings.57 The OFT concluded that ‘the combination of the home environment and face-to face 
interaction with a sales person creates a setting that is intrinsically different from other selling 
situations.’58  
The same features of door-to-door selling that encourage pressure sales – namely the need to 
persuade and the commission pay structure – also create the conditions in which misleading and 
deceptive conduct can occur. Similarly, another corollary of selling in the home is that, unlike a 
retail space, sales agents are not subject to any direct supervision or monitoring from managers or 
other staff. This lack of oversight opens the door for sales agents to make deceptive or misleading 
claims in order to make a sale.  
In their 2007 report on consumer experiences, the Consumer Action Law Centre (Consumer Action) 
and the Financial and Consumer Rights Council (FCRC) argued that door-to-door selling, particularly 
where commissions are paid, ‘inherently involves high pressure sales tactics.’59 Certainly, there are 
always strong incentives for sales agents to employ pressure sales techniques, and to provide 
misleading information. This has been acknowledged by the ACCC which, in a recent 
determination regarding a self-regulatory scheme on door-to-door energy sales, noted that 
                                                          
54 OFT (UK) (2004) Doorstep selling, p. 8. 
55 Ibid, p. 33, 49. 
56 Consumer Focus (UK) (2011a) The end of the road: Energy consumers’ experiences with doorstep sellers, Consumer Focus: 
London. 
57 OFT (UK) (2004) Doorstep selling, p. 33. 
58 Ibid, p. 34. 
59 Consumer Action Law Centre and the Financial and Consumer Rights Council (2007) Coercion and harassment at the door: 
Consumer experiences with energy direct marketers, CALC: Melbourne, p. 2. 
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commission-based sales create a conflict of interest that can result in conduct that causes detriment 
to consumers.60 
Vulnerable consumers 
Although consumers can be vulnerable to detriment at some times and in some contexts – such as in 
the door-to-door sales environment – for some consumers, vulnerability is more persistent. While 
cautioning that care must be taken to avoid over-generalising, the OECD identifies the groups in 
Figure 2 as potentially vulnerable (or disadvantaged). In many cases, compared to other 
consumers, those in these groups will be at a greater risk of detriment in a door-to-door sales 
environment.  
Figure 2: Vulnerable or disadvantaged consumer groups 
 Targets of discrimination (e.g. racial, ethnic or gender) 
 Low education or literacy levels 
 Language limitations. This concerns an individual’s inability to speak, read, or write in the language of normal 
communication in a given country. 
 Immigrants and other outsiders who do not have local knowledge (e.g. about consumer rights) and therefore 
may not be able to function effectively in the marketplace. 
 Impaired vision, hearing, or mobility. 
 Learning difficulties or cognitive impairment, such as dementia. 
 Restricted mobility. Access to markets may be limited to persons without adequate transport.  
 Restricted means of communication. This concerns lack of access to telephone or, for example, internet services. 
 Geographical remoteness. 
 Unemployment. 
 Low income. Low income is frequently correlated with other types of vulnerability, such as being unemployed, 
retired, not working in order to care for a child or sick relative, or being otherwise unable to work. Low income 
could increase the impact of adverse events, as could limited savings or wealth.  
Source: OECD (2010) Consumer Policy Toolkit, p. 55-56. 
The experiences of vulnerable consumers with energy door-to-door sales have been documented in 
a number of consumer and community organisation reports in recent years. Consumer Action and 
FCRC’s 2007 report on consumer experiences collated 28 case studies from consumers who had 
sought assistance from a financial counsellor, several of whom were elderly, from non-English 
speaking backgrounds, or had poor literacy and numeracy skills.61 The report argued that in many 
cases, vulnerable consumers were unable to meaningfully consent to energy market contracts 
because they struggled with the complex nature of the transaction.62  
In 2009, the Footscray Community Legal Centre (FCLC) published case study research into African 
migrants’ experiences with the contestable energy market. This report identified door-to-door selling 
                                                          
60 ACCC (2011c) Determination: Applications for authorisation lodged by Energy Assured Limited in respect of a scheme to self 
regulate door to door energy sales, Public Register No. C2010/970, ACCC: Canberra, p. 21. 
61 CALC & FCRC (2007) Coercion and harassment at the door, p. 23-27. 
62 Ibid, p.29. 
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and telesales as one of two major issues facing this group of consumers.63 Like Consumer Action 
and the FCRC, the FCLC argued that many vulnerable consumers, including many refugees and 
new migrants, very elderly persons and those with an intellectual disability, were incapable of 
giving explicit informed consent in direct selling situations.64 FCLC clients from the African 
communities were particularly susceptible to misleading claims (such as that the door-to-door seller 
was from the government) and, if they spoke very little English, found it difficult to communicate with 
utility companies.65 For such consumers unable to cope with aggressive selling practices, the 
outcome was often frequent transfers, ‘confusion as to the identity of the intended or preferred 
supplier, multiple accounts and bills and significant debts.’66 
More recently, a 2011 CUAC research project investigated the experiences of Victorian Aboriginal 
consumers of energy and water, primarily through discussion groups held with Aboriginal 
consumers, service providers and advocates. CUAC heard that, for cultural and historical reasons, 
many Aboriginal people are reluctant to assert themselves and tend to agree with propositions put 
to them – this was referred to as ‘the yeah, yeah, yeah factor.’ Some Aboriginal consumers’ low 
literacy and numeracy skills also meant they were unable to understand complex energy market 
contracts. Such factors made Aboriginal consumers particularly vulnerable to door-to-door energy 
sales practices, about which participants in the research repeatedly expressed their frustration. 
Many recounted stories of Aboriginal consumers accepting offers that they did not understand and 
that were not in their interests. Others described instances of intimidating sales practices and 
agents’ refusal to leave when asked.67  
Assessing the extent of consumer detriment 
Because there are different ways in which door-to-door sales can lead to different types of consumer 
detriment, assessing its extent requires various types of data. In most cases, however, firm data is 
not available. Instead, policymakers, consumer advocates and other stakeholders have had to 
make inferences about the level of detriment based on imperfect information such as complaints 
data. 
Measuring financial detriment 
While complaints data gives some sense of the extent of detriment resulting from misleading and 
deceptive conduct, pressure sales and transfer without consent, they shed very little light on the 
financial consequences of door-to-door sales switching decisions for consumers. Hence, it is 
unknown to what extent consumers who switch in this environment benefit or otherwise from those 
decisions.  
It is noteworthy, however, that those retailers with the most extensive door-to-door sales activity also 
tend to be the retailers with more expensive market offers. Victoria’s three largest electricity retailers 
(AGL, Origin and TRUenergy) have some of the largest door-to-door sales forces. At the same time, 
                                                          
63 Footscray Community Legal Centre and the Financial Counselling Service Inc. (2009) The African Consumer Experience of the 
Contestable Energy Market in the West of Melbourne, FCLC: Melbourne, p. 10. 
64 Ibid, p. 10. 
65 Ibid, p. 8. 
66 Ibid, p. 10. 
67 Consumer Utilities Advocacy Centre (2011b) Wein, Paen, Ya Ang Gim: Victorian Aboriginal Experiences of Energy and 
Water, CUAC: Melbourne, p. 105. 
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according to the Essential Services Commission (ESC), although the discounted market offers of 
Origin are occasionally the cheapest, AGL and TRUenergy discounted market offers are among the 
most expensive of all retailers.68 Dodo Power & Gas, one of only two retailers that does not sell 
door-to-door, most often had the lowest prices.69 Consumers switching door-to-door may 
nonetheless make savings by, for example, accessing a special discount or moving from a standing 
to a market offer. Nonetheless, it seems likely that many consumers who make switching decisions 
in the door-to-door sales environment are doing so without the comprehensive information that might 
facilitate them making the best choice for their circumstances.  
While not assessing the actual financial impact of door-to-door switching decisions, CUAC’s 2011 
consumer survey investigated consumers’ subjective evaluations of switching decisions. The survey 
found that switchers who had accepted a door-to-door sales or telesales offer tended to be less 
confident than ‘proactive’ switchers (who had sought out an offer) in having chosen the best deal 
for their circumstances. Several respondents also commented on the difficulty of making a 
considered decision in the door-to-door sales environment, comparing it unfavourably to other 
approaches.70 Similarly, a 2012 CHOICE survey of 1,020 Australian energy consumers found that 
55 per cent of those who switched in response to a direct selling offer (telesales or door-to-door 
selling) were not confident that they had made the best choice, compared to 48 per cent of 
switchers as a whole.71 In a 2012 Consumer Action survey of 1,014 consumers, one-third of those 
who had made a purchase at the door later thought it was a bad deal.72    
Overseas, research has highlighted the potential for door-to-door sales to result in financial detriment 
for a large proportion of consumers. A study by the UK energy regulator Ofgem in 2008 found that 
‘as many as one third of switchers’ in the market were not achieving a price reduction, with the 
proportion even higher for customers switching as a result of a direct sales approach. According to 
the research, 42 per cent of electricity customers and 48 per cent of gas customers who switched 
supplier in response to a direct sales offer were actually made financially worse off by the 
change.73 This was despite the fact that 80 per cent of those consumers had switched on the basis 
of claims that the new supplier would be less expensive than the existing supplier.74 
While no analogous research has been conducted in Victoria or other Australian jurisdictions, this 
finding certainly gives cause for doubt that all Victorian consumers in similar circumstances are 
necessarily moving onto a better deal, let alone the best deal, via their door-to-door sales 
transactions. Reliable data about the financial outcomes of door-to-door sales switching decisions 
would contribute enormously to our understanding of both door-to-door energy sales and the 
functioning of the retail energy market more broadly.  
                                                          
68 Essential Services Commission (2012c) Energy Retailers Comparative Performance Report – Pricing: 2011-12, ESC: 
Melbourne, p. 50. 
69 Ibid, p. 50. 
70 CUAC (2012) The consumer experience of door-to-door energy sales. 
71 CHOICE (2012a) ‘Energy Retailers’ Marketing Tactics,’ CHOICE website. 
72 Consumer Action Law Centre (2012b) Door-to-Door Sales: Consumer Views, CALC: Melbourne, p. 2. 
73 Ofgem (2008) Energy Supply Probe – Initial Findings Report, Ofgem: London, p. 7.  
74 Ofgem (2009) Energy Supply Probe – Proposed Retail Market Remedies, Ofgem: London, p. 22. 
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Measuring non-financial detriment 
As noted above, non-financial detriment can be incurred at most stages of the door-to-door sales 
pipeline, and the possibility of non-financial detriment is not restricted only to customers who switch 
at the door. To CUAC’s knowledge, no research has attempted to measure the amount of consumer 
time lost in sending sales agents away and listening to unwanted sales pitches, nor to rate the 
precise level of annoyance or distress experienced.  
Data about community opinions on door-to-door selling is, however, an appropriate proxy measure 
for this type of relatively minor non-financial detriment. If consumers dislike door-to-door sales, this 
presumably reflects some experience of detriment. Several consumer surveys, in Australia and 
overseas, have asked consumers about their general perceptions of, and attitudes towards, door-to-
door selling generally or energy door-to-door sales in particular.  
In CUAC’s own 2011 consumer survey, respondents who had been approached by a door-to-door 
sales agent at least once in the previous two years were asked to evaluate their overall experience. 
Nearly three-quarters of respondents described the experience as ‘somewhat negative’ (36%) or 
‘very negative’ (37%). Only eight per cent reported a ‘somewhat positive’ (7%) or ‘very positive’ 
(1%) experience, and the remainder (19%) described it as ‘neutral’.75 In a similar result, a Consumer 
Action survey of 1,014 consumers in January 2012 found that 77 per cent stated unequivocally 
that they had a negative opinion of unsolicited door-to-door sales while only three per cent reported 
positive views.76  
Remarkably similar consumer views have been reported in the UK. Consumer Focus’ 2011 survey 
of 1,008 consumers across Great Britain found that only three per cent of consumers had a positive 
view of any type of door-to-door sales, down from nine per cent in an earlier (2009) survey. With 
regard to energy specifically, four per cent of consumers had a positive view while 79 per cent 
reported negative views.77 
Consumer regulators may be tempted to minimise or dismiss negative consumer views towards 
door-to-door selling, seeing low-level detriment in the form of annoyance and time-loss as an 
insignificant issue. However, it should be remembered that this type of detriment, while fairly minor, 
is also pervasive. Discussing potential policy approaches to intrusive telesales in the United States, 
Redmond canvasses one unusual possibility: the creation of a ‘market for annoyance.’ In doing so, 
he argues that theoretically: 
The cost per annoyed individual is approximated by the amount of money that would just serve 
to induce the nonconsumer [i.e. one who does not make a purchase] to answer a call that he 
or she knew to be from a telemarketer. This could range from a fraction of a dollar for 
someone with little else to do up to several dollars for someone preoccupied with, say, dinner 
or a movie.78 
Estimating an average amount of 75 cents and a ratio of annoyed individuals to purchasers of 
1:99, Redmond suggests that a market for telesales annoyance is probably infeasible because 
                                                          
75 CUAC (2012) The consumer experience of door-to-door energy sales, p. 4. 
76 CALC (2012b) Door-to-Door Sales, p. 1. 
77 Consumer Focus (UK) (2011a) The end of the road, p. 3. 
78 Redmond (2005) ‘Intrusive Promotion as Market Failure,’ p. 19. 
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under his assumptions, no efficient market exists.79 Although CUAC is certainly not suggesting the 
creation of a market for door-to-door sales annoyance rights, we believe that particularly when 
considering the cost of different policy approaches to minimising such detriment, policy makers 
should bear in mind that pervasive, low-level detriment from unwanted door-to-door sales is not 
costless, and many consumers would likely be willing to pay a small amount to avoid it. 
Assessing the extent of misconduct 
As noted above, the potential for serious detriment to arise from a door-to-door sales interaction is 
greater where sales agents make misleading or deceptive claims or apply very high-pressure sales 
techniques. Hence, some measure of the extent of such misconduct would add greatly to our 
understanding of consumer detriment and energy door-to-door sales.   
One way of measuring some of the detriment from door-to-door selling is to examine related 
consumer complaints data, including EWOV case numbers. As noted above, EWOV began 
receiving cases about door-to-door selling activity with the introduction of FRC in 2002. 
Unfortunately, EWOV’s reporting on these cases does not allow door-to-door selling cases to be 
separately identified. These cases are spread across the ‘Transfer’ and ‘Market 
conduct’/’Marketing’ categories, both of which also include cases unrelated to door-to-door selling. 
EWOV case categories and sub-categories have changed over time, as have the distinctions 
between different types of ‘case’ (complaints, enquiries, etc.) and the reporting of ‘cases’ versus 
‘issues’. Nonetheless, an analysis of EWOV data does allow some insight into the nature, extent 
and trajectory of door-to-door related complaints. Table 4 below summarises EWOV Annual Report 
data and commentary relating to door-to-door selling for the ten year period 2002 to 2011. 
  
                                                          
79 Ibid, p. 19. 
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Table 4: Door-to-door related EWOV cases and commentary, 2002 to 2011 
Year Cases Commentary 
2002  38 electricity Market Conduct 
cases 
 217 Transfer cases 
 Allegations of door-to-door pressure sales, false claims, 
failure to inform of cooling-off rights, failure to identify 
retailer represented, and failure to disclose prices, fees 
and charges. 
2003  448 energy Market Conduct cases 
 1201 energy Transfer cases 
 Systemic compliance issues relating to FRC include energy 
retailers’ marketing practices. 
2004  405 energy Market Conduct cases 
(of which 200 Door-to-Door Sales) 
 1338 energy Transfer cases 
 Transfer without explicit informed consent the most 
common FRC-related case issue, with marketing to non-
account holders also occurring. 
2005  2,129 energy Transfer cases 
 855 energy Market Conduct cases 
(of which 470 Door-to-Door Sales) 
 EWOV market cases prompted an investigation into 
misleading and deceptive conduct and pressure sales, 
leading to a retailer’s enforceable undertaking to CAV. 
 Marketing to non-account holders a systemic issue. 
2006  2,143 energy Transfer cases 
 1,055 Marketing cases (of which 
389 Door to Door Sales) 
 5 per cent of cases were about sales and marketing, 
including pressure sales, transfer without consent, 
misleading and deceptive conduct and information 
provision. 
2007  1,549 energy Marketing issues (of 
which 778 Door-to-Door sales) 
 2,662 energy Transfer cases 
 Door-to-door sales remained the marketing issue 
generating the most complaints. 
 Door-to-door complaints included: selling to non-account 
holders and vulnerable consumers; customers asked to 
sign a document, unaware it was a contract; sales agents 
saying or implying they were from government or 
linesmen; and customers agreeing to receive more 
information but being transferred.  
2008  1,089 Marketing issues  
 3,056 Transfer issues (data no 
longer linked to specific 
sales/marketing channels) 
 Potential compliance issues including misleading 
information; excessive pressure; selling to non-account 
holders; no explicit informed consent; transfers proceeding 
despite cancellation during the cooling-off period. 
2009  8,858 Transfer issues (of which 
2,062 Without Consent, 923 
Cooling-Off Rights) 
 2,610 Marketing issues 
- 
2010  8,488 Transfer issues (of which 
1,093 Without Consent, 992 
Cooling Off Rights) 
 3,451 Marketing issues 
- 
2011  10,761 Transfer issues (including 
1052 Without Consent, 734 
Cooling Off Rights) 
  2,624 Marketing [main] issues 
 Identified four systemic issues related to door-to-door: 
o Marked increase in marketing complaints 
(S1/2010/46) 
o Significant increase in transfers in error cases 
(SI/2010/48) 
o Cooling-off requests not actioned (SI/2010/47) 
o Using misinformation about advanced (smart) meters 
to gain sales (SI/2010/43, SI/2010/44, 
SI/2011/11) 
Source: CUAC analysis of 2002-2011 EWOV Annual Reports 
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Table 4 suggests that door-to-door related cases have grown significantly over time (as have energy 
cases more generally). It also demonstrates a consistent pattern of consumer complaints of pressure 
sales, misleading and deceptive conduct and account transfer without explicit informed consent. 
These issues have, at a number of different times over the period, been categorised by EWOV as 
‘systemic.’† 
Similarly, performance data reported by the ESC, which regulates retail energy in Victoria, has 
revealed similar energy door-to-door selling problems. In its 2010-11 Compliance Report: Energy 
Retail Businesses, the ESC identified various breaches of the Energy Marketing Code as one of 
three key areas of concern that year.80 Among the related breaches were more than 750 
investigated instances in which ‘sales agents misled customers, allegedly fabricated consent to 
contracts or otherwise improperly engaged customers.’81 The Commission also received complaints 
about sales agents ignoring Do Not Knock stickers and failing to provide the required offer 
summaries.82  
Referring to these sources of data as well as internal complaints, energy industry players have 
argued that complaint numbers are low when considered in relation to the extent of door-to-door 
selling activity and related transfers. It is important to consider, however, the rate at which 
consumers who have had a negative experience of door-to-door selling lodge complaints with 
EWOV. Unfortunately, the data on this is limited.    
A 2011 CUAC survey found that only eight per cent of respondents reporting a negative 
experience of energy door-to-door selling had made a complaint – and most often these were 
made to the energy retailer itself, rather than to EWOV. Those who had cause to complain, but did 
not, reported thinking that the complaint would make no difference (47%), that they did not know 
who to complain to (34%), that the matter was not important enough (29%) and that they were too 
busy or did not get around to it (20%).83 While the results of this relatively small-scale survey should 
be interpreted with some caution, the findings do suggest that EWOV cases and complaints 
capture only a very small proportion of consumers’ negative door-to-door selling experiences. 
Similarly, the 2007 Consumer Action and FCRC report detailing 28 door-to-door sales case 
studies, most involving serious misconduct, noted that fewer than one third of those cases resulted in 
an EWOV complaint. The report argued that a ‘seemingly low’ level of complaints was masking 
‘widespread’ misconduct.84 While CUAC agrees that this is likely to be the case, reliable, 
representative data on this critical issue simply has not been collected. 
CUAC’s 2011 survey did seek to assess the likelihood that any given energy door-to-door sales 
interaction would involve certain types of misleading and high-pressure sales tactics by asking 
respondents about their most recent interaction with an energy door-to-door sales agent (Table 5).   
                                                          
† Defined by EWOV as ‘an issue, problem or change in company policy or practice that affects, or has the potential to affect, a 
number of customers.’ See: Energy and Water Ombudsman (Victoria) (2011) Annual Report 2011, EWOV: Melbourne, p. 18. 
80 ESC (2012f) 2010-11 Compliance Report, p. 6. 
81 Ibid, p. 7. 
82 Ibid, p. 59. 
83 CUAC (2012) The consumer experience of door-to-door energy sales, p. 4. 
84 CALC & FCRC (2007) Coercion and harassment at the door, p. 8-9. 
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Table 5: Reported incidence of certain misleading and pressure sales tactics (n=266) 
Sales agent tactic Incidence 
Said whole area was changing to a different energy company 31% 
Initially said that they had knocked for a reason other than to sell energy 26% 
Did not leave when asked 24% 
Did not state company they were representing 18% 
Said the customer 'had to change' energy company 16% 
Said they were from the government 14% 
Source: CUAC analysis of 2011 survey data.  
Table 5 shows that respondents reported substantial use of misleading and pressure sales tactics by 
sales agents in their most recent interaction, ranging from a low of 14 per cent of agents making 
the misleading claim they were ‘from the government,’ up to nearly one third reportedly claiming 
that ‘the whole area was changing to a different energy company.’ Given the relatively small 
sample size,85 these results should be seen as indicative only. A larger, Computer Assisted 
Telephone Interviewing (CATI) consumer survey using a random sampling methodology would allow 
for more definitive conclusions to be reached. Nevertheless, these results certainly suggest that there 
is room for doubt of claims that misconduct is rare and isolated.  
Discussion and recommendations 
Speaking largely with reference to the European Union (EU) and UK, UK academic Howells argues 
that consumer policy: 
...seems to be often determined without significant background research and debate. The 
process is dominated by non-specialist civil servants consulting with interested parties. 
Academics have a marginal role... Despite the recent practice of developing consumer 
strategies at the national and European level there are few signs of a coordinated research 
programme to underpin these initiatives.86  
Making reference to 2004 OFT research into door-to-door selling which commissioned a 
psychologist to identify and analyse sales techniques, Howells argues that such efforts ‘should be 
welcomed and encouraged, but they remain patchy exceptions to a general dearth of research and 
evidence-based law reform.’87 
While the ACCC’s recent commissioning of research into the door-to-door sales industry in Australia 
has added substantially to the evidence-base for policy, CUAC has found a similar dearth of 
research and evidence on door-to-door selling and related policy in Australia. In conducting 
desktop research for this report, we found it surprisingly difficult to locate any publicly available 
evidence of the serious evaluation of any of the policy approaches discussed. Often, explicit 
                                                          
85 For full details of the survey methodology, see Appendix A in CUAC (2011a) Improving energy market competition.  
86 Howells, Geraint (2005) ‘The Potential and Limits of Consumer Empowerment by Information,’ Journal of Law and Society, 
32(3), p. 369. 
87 Ibid, p. 370. 
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statements of the rationale underlying the selection of any particular approach over another were 
also absent.  
Extent of misconduct 
Related to this, there has been little apparent effort from regulators or consumer policy makers to 
seriously grapple with the issue of door-to-door selling misconduct. For instance, despite a lack of 
reliable, representative data allowing conclusions to be drawn either way, the assumption has often 
been made that misconduct is isolated, with evidence from case studies and consumer reports 
dismissed as merely anecdotal. While case studies and similar types of evidence do not allow for 
an assessment of the extent of misconduct, they do not constitute evidence that misconduct is 
limited. 
To remedy the uncertainty and lack of data to inform policymaking, CUAC sees an immediate need 
for a well-designed consumer survey to be conducted, with the aim of offering a representative 
picture of the average door-to-door sales interaction. In other words, the survey must seek to 
determine the likelihood that any one door-to-door sales interaction will involve misconduct of 
different types, rather than simply eliciting overall impressions and attitudes. 
This type of evidence would serve three important purposes. Firstly, it would help policymakers to 
determine whether more needs to be done to address door-to-door sales misconduct, or whether 
misconduct is indeed isolated to ‘rogue’ sales agents. Secondly, it would provide baseline data 
against which the effectiveness of current policy approaches can be evaluated in future. Thirdly, it 
would facilitate monitoring of door-to-door sales issues as other jurisdictions undergo major 
transitions in retail energy markets. In line with its current priority focus on door-to-door selling and its 
Australia-wide jurisdiction, we believe that the ACCC would be best-placed to develop such a 
survey. 
Recommendation 1 
That the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission develop a consumer survey which 
accurately measures the extent of door-to-door selling problems. This survey should: 
 use a random sampling methodology with a sample large enough to allow separate 
analysis of key jurisdictions and of energy door-to-door sales specifically; 
 be designed to give a snapshot of the ‘average’ door-to-door sales interaction; 
 seek to determine the extent to which consumers who have had a negative experience 
lodge a complaint, and to whom; and 
 be re-administered periodically so that changes may be observed. 
Financial detriment & the role of door-to-door selling in the retail energy 
market 
Door-to-door selling has played a major role in the development of Victoria’s competitive retail 
energy market. Given the importance of the door-to-door sales channel to the market’s high 
switching rates, policymakers and regulators have, unsurprisingly, been reluctant to restrict use of 
the channel.  
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However, those with responsibility for promoting effective competition in Victoria’s retail energy 
market need better intelligence about the financial outcomes of switching decisions made door-to-
door. If these decisions are not making most consumers better off – and there is at least cause for 
doubt on this point – then this switching activity will not drive lower prices or better services. As 
discussed in this chapter, in 2008 the UK regulator Ofgem, as part of its Energy Supply Probe, 
conducted research into the financial outcomes of door-to-door switching decisions. When this 
research revealed that just under half of customers who switched supplier in response to a direct 
sales approach ended up on a worse deal, Ofgem was prompted to introduce new reforms aimed 
at improving consumers’ access to simple, accurate information in the door-to-door sales 
environment.  
In CUAC’s view, the absence of any similar research in Victoria and other Australian jurisdictions is 
a major impediment to our understanding of not only of energy door-to-door selling, but also – 
given the importance of door-to-door sales as a switching channel – of the effective functioning of 
the retail energy market more generally. Such research would be a complex undertaking requiring 
careful design and strong research expertise, but would provide valuable evidence for energy 
policy development.  
CUAC is therefore recommending that the Victorian Government commission a study of the financial 
outcomes of switching decisions made via door-to-door sales and other major switching channels, 
with the findings of this research used to support efforts to assist and improve consumer decision-
making. Findings should also be of interest to the AEMC as it reviews competition effectiveness in 
other states. 
Recommendation 2 
That the Victorian Government commission research assessing the financial outcomes of consumer 
switching decisions made via door-to-door sales and other major switching channels. 
Minimising consumer detriment from door-to-door sales 
The negative impacts of intrusive marketing practices such as door-to-door selling can be seen as an 
externality – that is, a behaviour which ‘has impacts on a party that was not involved in an 
economic decision and whose interests were not taken into account.’88 Consumer annoyance and 
instances of door-to-door sales misconduct can generate ‘reputational issues’ for energy retailers.89 
Negative community attitudes towards door-to-door sales, as discussed above, are probably one 
contributor to consumers’ poor perceptions of energy retailers more generally. Nonetheless, perhaps 
in part due to the essential nature of energy services, it would appear that widespread consumer 
dislike of door-to-door sales does not create sufficient competitive pressure for energy retailers to 
either substantially improve or abandon door-to-door sales practices. 
  
                                                          
88 OECD (2010) Consumer Policy Toolkit, p. 32. 
89 Frost and Sullivan (2012) Research into the door-to-door sales industry, p. 39. 
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Despite some crucial evidence gaps, CUAC believes there is sufficient evidence of continuing 
consumer detriment arising from energy door-to-door sales to warrant a re-examination of current 
policy approaches, as well as consideration of alternatives that may be effective. This is the theme 
of the remainder of the report.  
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3. CONSUMER LAW 
Door-to-door sales in Victoria, as in other Australian and international jurisdictions, are subject to 
general consumer law. In addition, in recognition of the heightened risk of consumer detriment, 
governments have tended to subject door-to-door sales (along with other types of unsolicited 
consumer agreement) to regulation over and above general consumer law. This chapter begins with 
an overview of the legislation and regulation relevant to energy door-to-door sales in Victoria. It then 
goes on to discuss general consumer law protections relevant to energy door-to-door sales, 
including general bans on misleading and deceptive conduct, pressure sales and unconscionable 
conduct, as well as more specific protections relating to cooling-off rights and disclosure 
requirements. It ends with a brief discussion of prohibition responses to door-to-door selling. 
Legal and regulatory framework for energy door-to-door 
sales in Victoria 
At the time of writing, energy door-to-door selling in Victoria comes under the provisions of both the 
ACL and Victoria’s Energy Marketing Code, with the latter likely to be superseded by the NECF in 
the near future. 
Australian Consumer Law  
The ACL is a single, national law on consumer protection and fair trading. With its commencement 
on 1 January, 2011, the ACL replaced a variety of national and State and Territory laws, creating 
a single set of business obligations and responsibilities and standardising protections and rights for 
consumers throughout Australia. At the Commonwealth level it is contained in a schedule to the 
Competition and Consumer Act 2010.  
The ACL includes general bans on a range of behaviours of relevance to door-to-door selling, 
including provisions prohibiting unconscionable and misleading and deceptive conduct. In addition 
to these general provisions, the ACL includes a number of particular protections intended to address 
identified forms of business conduct. Among those are protections that apply specifically to 
unsolicited consumer agreements including door-to-door selling, telephone sales and other types of 
direct selling that occur outside of a retail environment. This national regime for unsolicited 
consumer agreements replaces previous State and Territory laws on door-to-door sales.  
Contraventions of the ACL in relation to unsolicited consumer agreements are subject to criminal 
fines and civil pecuniary penalties, each of up to $50,000 for a body corporate and $10,000 for 
a person other than a body corporate. Further to this, dealers contravening the provisions may be 
subject to injunctions, damages, compensatory orders, non-punitive orders and adverse publicity 
orders, disqualification orders, redress for non-parties and public warning notices.90  
                                                          
90 Commonwealth of Australia (2010b) The Australian Consumer Law – A guide to provisions, Commonwealth of Australia: ACT, 
p. 20-25. 
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Compliance  
Compliance and enforcement of the ACL is based on a ‘one law, multiple regulators’ model, 
meaning that it is enforced in all jurisdictions by the relevant consumer regulators, who coordinate 
their activities via the Standing Committee of Officials of Consumer Affairs.91 In Victoria, 
compliance and enforcement is the responsibility of the state-based CAV. Federal regulators the 
ACCC and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) (with regard to financial 
services) also have a role in ACL compliance and enforcement.  
ACL regulators aim to promote compliance via awareness, providing information and advice to 
consumers and traders about their rights and responsibilities and avenues for redress.92 A range of 
escalating enforcement options, including civil, administrative and criminal enforcement remedies, 
are also available to regulators where a trader fails to comply with the ACL.  
Accordingly, CAV’s compliance and enforcement policy emphasises voluntary compliance via 
trader and consumer engagement and education. Beyond that, CAV has a range of civil, 
administrative and criminal enforcement remedies at its disposal. Enforcement actions include: 
 dispute resolution, formal written warnings and trader meetings 
 public naming, infringement notices, and adverse publicity orders 
 enforceable undertakings and other administrative remedies such as disciplinary action, 
injunctions, asset freezing orders, cease trading injunctions and criminal prosecution.93 
The ACCC is Australia’s peak consumer protection and competition agency. In aiming to promote 
compliance with the law, the ACCC uses three enforcement strategies, set out in its Compliance 
and Enforcement Policy: 
• enforcement of the law, including resolution of possible contraventions both 
administratively and by litigation 
• encouraging compliance with the law by educating and informing consumers and 
businesses about their rights and responsibilities under the Competition and Consumer 
Act 2010. 
• working with other agencies to implement these strategies.94 
The ACCC has ‘wide-ranging’ powers to investigate unscrupulous sales tactics and ‘can compel 
people and businesses to give information, obtain search warrants, issue public warning and 
infringement notices, accept court enforceable undertakings, and conduct litigation or refer criminal 
matters to the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions.’95 The ACCC regularly reviews its 
compliance and enforcement priorities. At the time of writing, consumer protection in the energy 
                                                          
91 Commonwealth of Australia (2010e) Compliance and Enforcement: How regulators enforce the Australian Consumer Law, 
Commonwealth of Australia: Canberra, p. 5. 
92 Ibid, p. 7. 
93 Consumer Affairs Victoria (2012a) ‘Compliance and enforcement policy,’ CAV website. 
94 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2012b) Compliance and enforcement policy, ACCC: Canberra, p. 4. 
95 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2012d) Submission to the House of Representatives Standing Committee on 
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sector was one of the identified priority areas.96 Recent ACCC enforcement activity in this area is 
discussed in detail later in this chapter. 
Code of Conduct for Marketing Retail Energy in Victoria 
Energy door-to-door sales in Victoria are also regulated by the ESC. The Energy Marketing Code, 
last amended on 1 January 2009, sets out standards and conditions for the marketing of energy to 
domestic and small business consumers in Victoria. The Energy Marketing Code supplements and 
does not limit any rights under Commonwealth or State law. When Victoria transitions to the NECF, 
this will supersede the Energy Marketing Code. Energy retailers are required to comply with the 
Energy Marketing Code, along with all other laws, codes, and guidelines, as a condition of their 
retail licenses. 
Compliance  
The ESC sets out its approach to monitoring and enforcing energy businesses’ compliance with 
regulatory obligations in its Compliance Policy Statement for Victorian Energy Businesses.97 
According to this Policy Statement, the ESC’s overall approach focuses on encouraging a culture of 
voluntary compliance.98 Businesses are required to undertake regulatory compliance audits, report 
on their compliance, and notify the Commission of material breaches, and the ESC also monitors 
complaints and other data through liaison with the EWOV and CAV.  
In relation to the Energy Marketing Code, the ESC’s Compliance Reporting Manual identifies the 
following Type 1, 2 and 3 obligations on which reporting is required (Table 6). 
                                                          
96 ACCC (2012b) Compliance and Enforcement Policy, p. 3. 
97 Essential Services Commission (2012a) Compliance Policy Statement for Victorian Energy Businesses – January 2012, ESC: 
Melbourne.  
98 Ibid, p. 7. 
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Table 6: Type 1, 2 and 3 regulatory obligations in the Energy Marketing Code 
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 
Retailers must not mislead consumers, 
provide certain information to 
consumers and allow a cooling off 
period.  
The Retailer's obligations in relation 
to the conduct of marketing 
representatives and the provision of 
offer information to consumers. 
(Clause 3.2 to 3.6) 
Times at which retailers may contact 
consumers, information to be 
provided to consumers, requirements 
to keep No Contact lists and 
observe them, requirement to 
observe No Canvassing signs. 
(Clause 2.1 to 2.3) 
 
Marketing representatives must 
receive adequate training and testing 
on specified matters.  
Copies of training records and 
manuals to be retained for at least 
one year following training and 
made available for independent 
audit as required. (Clause 1) 
Retailer must obtain explicit informed 
consent (EIC) of consumer and the 
rules regarding sales to minors and 
authorised consumers. (Clause 4.1 
and 4.3) 
Retailers shall have a dispute 
resolution process complying with 
Australian Standards and refer 
complainants to EWOV.  
(Clause 7) 
Content of personal visit and 
telephone contact records, and 
retention for audit. (Clause 2.4 and 
2.5) 
 
Retailers must abide by the Privacy 
Act 1988 and not misrepresent their 
intentions as market research and not 
selling. Retailers must comply with 
the National Privacy Principles and 
any relevant guidelines issued by the 
Commission. (Clause 6) 
 
 Information  
Retailers must provide consumers 
with information in plain English 
(Clause 3.1) 
 
Source: ESC (2012b) Compliance Reporting Manual - Energy Retail Businesses, ESC: Melbourne, p. 9, 11, 16. 
Type 1 obligations are those for which non-compliance would have a ‘critical’ impact on consumers 
that increases over time if not quickly rectified. Such breaches must be reported immediately. Type 
2 obligations are reported on a six-monthly basis and are those obligations for which: 
 non-compliance would seriously impact on consumers, and/or 
 the obligation is new, or has not been complied with in previous years, and/or 
 the impact of non-compliance increases over time. 
All other obligations are categorised as Type 3, with breaches to be reported annually.99 
ESC responses to non-compliance begin with co-operative approaches before escalating up the 
‘enforcement pyramid’ (Figure 3) if less punitive options fail. 
                                                          
99 ESC (2012b) Compliance Reporting Manual, p. 5. 
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Figure 3: ESC enforcement pyramid for regulation of Victorian energy businesses 
 
Source: ESC (2012a) Compliance Policy Statement, p. 19. 
Should the less formal administrative options at the bottom of the pyramid fail to rectify non-
compliance, under s. 53 of the Essential Services Commission Act 2001 (Vic), the ESC is able to 
issue enforcement orders for non-trivial contraventions of ESC codes, including the Energy 
Marketing Code. Failure to comply with a provisional order, a final order or an undertaking to 
comply is an offence for which the person is liable to a penalty of up to 5,000 penalty units,† plus 
a further penalty of up to 500 penalty units for each additional day of contravention. The 
Commission may also apply to the Supreme Court for an injunction or declaration in respect of an 
enforcement order. It may vary a licence or appoint an administrator. At the tip of the enforcement 
pyramid, the ESC has the power to revoke a retail license.  
Although the ESC has a range of statutory enforcement powers, it appears that these are used 
rarely, if at all. CUAC reviewed the Commission’s Annual Reports for 2007–08 to 2011–12 and 
found no references to any energy enforcement activity using statutory powers during that five year 
period.  
National Energy Customer Framework 
The NECF, comprised of the National Energy Retail Law, National Energy Retail Rules and 
National Energy Retail Regulations, sets out key protections and obligations for energy businesses 
                                                          
† Approximately $704,200 in the 2012/13 financial year. 
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and customers in the National Energy Market (NEM). The NECF contains specific provisions 
relating to the marketing activities of energy retailers, set out in Part 2, Division 10 of the National 
Energy Retail Rules. These industry-specific provisions complement the generic consumer protections 
in the ACL.  
The NECF aims to streamline energy consumer protection regulation nationally. To date, it has 
commenced for customers in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) and Tasmania (for electricity 
customers). Victoria has not yet confirmed a start date for the NECF and hence, at the time of 
writing, regulation remains the responsibility of the state-based ESC.  
In jurisdictions where the NECF has commenced, the Australian Energy Regulator (AER), which is 
part of the ACCC, is responsible for monitoring and enforcing compliance. The AER’s Statement of 
Approach to compliance and enforcement describes how the AER will approach its compliance 
and enforcement responsibilities.100 The AER has also developed Compliance Procedures and 
Guidelines, setting out how and when energy businesses must report on compliance to the AER.  
General consumer law protections 
Door-to-door sales in Victoria, as in other Australian and international jurisdictions, are subject to 
general consumer law, which tends to prohibit certain types of unfair business conduct.  
Australian Consumer Law 
A range of business behaviours are subject to a general ban under the ACL. Prior to this, the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and State and Territory Fair Trading Acts also included prohibitions on 
unconscionable conduct, harassment and undue pressure, and misleading or deceptive conduct. 
These prohibitions are relevant to door-to-door sales but also have a more general application. In its 
2008 Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework, the PC noted that these consumer 
protection provisions are particularly important in protecting vulnerable and disadvantaged 
consumers, who are more likely to be the targets of such conduct.101  
Victoria’s Energy Marketing Code does not repeat these prohibitions but requires retailers to ensure 
sales agents comply with all applicable laws relating to misleading, deceptive or unconscionable 
conduct, undue pressure, harassment and coercion. They must also provide sales agents with 
training on these matters. 
Misleading or deceptive conduct 
Under Sections 18 and 19 of the ACL, it is unlawful for businesses to make statements or omissions 
in trade or commerce that are misleading or deceptive, or that would be likely to mislead or 
deceive. The ACL thus retains a general prohibition on misleading and deceptive conduct that 
existed in the Trade Practices Act and in all State and Territory Fair Trading Acts.   
                                                          
100 Australian Energy Regulator (2011b) Statement of approach: compliance with the National Energy Retail Law, Retail Rules and 
Retail Regulations, Commonwealth of Australia: Melbourne.  
101 PC (2008) Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework, p. 296. 
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Unconscionable conduct 
Under Part 2–2, Sections 20–22 of the ACL, a business must not act unconscionably while selling 
or supplying goods or services. ‘Unconscionable conduct’ refers to a statement or action so 
unreasonable that it defies good conscience. In the door-to-door sales context, unconscionable 
conduct might involve actions or statements that exploit a consumer’s vulnerability, such as false 
statements to a low-income consumer about the costs of a contract, or not properly explaining the 
conditions of a contract to a consumer who does not speak English. High-pressure tactics, such as a 
refusal to take ‘no’ for an answer, may also constitute unconscionable conduct.102 In substance, 
ACL unconscionable conduct provisions are the same as those found previously in the Trade 
Practices Act 1974.103 
Harassment and coercion 
ACL prohibits certain ‘unfair practices’ in trade and commerce, with provision based on protections 
formerly found in Part V of the Trade Practices Act as well as State and Territory Laws. Under 
section 50 of the ACL, it is unlawful to use physical force, coerce or unduly harass someone about 
supply of goods or services. Undue harassment is defined as unnecessary or excessive contact or 
communication with a person, to the point where that person feels intimidated, tired or 
demoralised. Coercion involves actual or threatened force that restricts another person’s choice or 
freedom to act. In the door-to-door energy sales context, for example, claims that power will be cut 
off unless the customer changes supplier could be considered coercion.104 
Compliance and enforcement 
Unconscionable conduct provisions in the Trade Practices Act s51AB were successfully used in 
relation to door-to-door selling in the case Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Lux 
Pty Ltd (2004) FCA 926.105 The Federal Court found that Lux engaged in unconscionable conduct 
in contravention of s51AB of the Trade Practices Act in its sale of a vacuum cleaner to a clearly 
vulnerable† consumer. The ACCC also alleged that Lux had engaged in undue harassment or 
coercion, but the court did not find that this was so. Lux Pty Ltd appealed the decision but the 
appeal was later dismissed by consent. In a mediated outcome, a declaration was made that Lux 
and its agent had engaged in unconscionable conduct. Lux was ordered to reformulate its trade 
practices compliance program. Lux agreed to pay ACCC costs to an agreed sum, and refunded 
the consumer the $945 purchase price of the vacuum cleaner.106 
This case offered further clarification of the types of conduct that might be regarded as 
unconscionable. It also enabled the ACCC to publicise the case thereby demonstrating that it was 
                                                          
102 Commonwealth of Australia (2010d) Avoiding unfair business practices: A guide for businesses and legal practitioners – An 
Australian Consumer Law Guide, Commonwealth of Australia: Canberra, p.12. 
103 Commonwealth of Australia (2010b) The ACL – A guide to provisions, p. 5. 
104 Commonwealth of Australia (2010f) Sales practices: A guide for business and legal practitioners, Commonwealth of Australia: 
Canberra, p. 25. 
105 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Lux Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 926 (16 July 2004). 
† The consumer was substantially illiterate and incapable of understanding commercial matters in any depth. 
106 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2005) Lux Appeal against unconscionable conduct dismissed, Media 
Release, 24 February 2005.  
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actively enforcing the prohibition on unconscionable conduct.107 It would appear, however, that 
these outcomes were insufficient to ensure compliance and deter future unconscionable conduct by 
Lux. In May 2012, the ACCC again filed proceedings in the Federal Court against Lux Distributors 
Pty Ltd,† again alleging unconscionable conduct in relation to the sale of vacuum cleaners. The 
ACCC alleged that between 2009 and 2011, Lux engaged in unconscionable conduct in its door-
to-door sales of vacuum cleaners to five elderly consumers, contravening the Trade Practices Act 
and the ACL. It was alleged that a Lux sales agent visited consumers offering a free ‘vacuum 
cleaner maintenance check,’ then subjecting the consumers to unfair and pressuring sales tactics.108 
The ACCC sought declarations, injunctions, pecuniary penalties, implementation of a trade 
practices compliance program and costs. The outcome of the case was not yet available at the 
time of writing. 
In a more recent case, ACCC v Neighbourhood Energy Pty Ltd and Australian Greens Credits Pty 
Ltd (2012) FCA VID268/2012, the Federal Court found that, in addition to multiple breaches of 
the unsolicited consumer agreement provisions, Neighbourhood Energy and its contractor Australian 
Green Credits breached section 18 of the ACL prohibiting misleading or deceptive conduct. On 
two occasions, consumers were falsely told that the sales agents were not asking them to change 
suppliers, that the consumer was being overcharged by their current supplier, or that the customer 
had been zoned incorrectly. This case is discussed in more detail below.  
Vulnerable consumers 
While some enforcement action has been taken, there are limitations on generic legislation in 
meeting the needs of vulnerable and disadvantaged consumers. Firstly, such consumers often lack 
the capacity to complain to consumer regulators. Should they do so, and should litigation result, 
they are also likely to have difficulties presenting evidence in court. The PC highlighted this issue in 
its Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework. Quoting a submission from Legal Aid 
Queensland, the PC noted: 
Such general provisions require recourse to litigation where the facts about the description of 
the product or service will invariably be in dispute, there is a written document which supports 
the trader rather than the consumer, and our clients, because of their vulnerabilities (eg: 
psychological problems) face difficulty if the case is determined solely on the basis of their 
credibility as a witness.109 
Hence, vulnerable consumers face not only increased risk of detriment while ‘the nature of their 
vulnerability restricts their ability to access justice.’110 This highlights the need for complementary 
policy approaches to protecting vulnerable consumers. 
                                                          
107 Sharpe, Michelle and Christine Parker (2006) Working Paper – the ACCC Compliance and Enforcement Project: Assessment 
of the impact of ACCC regulatory enforcement action in unconscionable conduct cases, University of Melbourne: Melbourne, p. 
50.  
† Lux Distributors was formed in 2007 via a merger of Lux Australia and Appliance Direct, which had been the sole Australian 
distributor of Lux Vacuum Cleaners from 2004. See: Lux Australia (2012) ‘A Brief History,’ Lux Australia website. 
108 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2012a) ‘ACCC alleges unconscionable conduct by vacuum cleaner 
retailer,’ Media Release,10  May 2012. 
109 PC (2008) Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework, p. 296-7. 
110 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2007) Submission to Productivity Commission Review of Australia’s 
Consumer Policy Framework, PC: Melbourne, p. 86. 
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Specific consumer protections 
While general bans in consumer law provide important protections for consumers in the door-to-
door sales setting, the particular features of door-to-door sales have also seen governments develop 
special rules specifically for this and related settings. Prior to commencement of the ACL, for 
instance, all states and territories had introduced specific regulations on door-to-door selling, either 
with Fair Trading Acts, or through separate legislation.111 Such specific protections are now 
contained in the ACL and apply to all unsolicited consumer agreements. Internationally, too, door-
to-door sales have been subject to specific regulation. 
Key protections included in such regulations typically include cooling-off rights, obligations to 
disclose identity and the purpose of the visit, and a requirement to leave upon request. Another set 
of obligations relate to the information that must be provided before and after an agreement is 
signed. These provisions target multiple types of detriment that can be associated with door-to-door 
sales, and have also in many cases been developed with special attention to the needs of 
vulnerable consumers.112  
Cooling-off periods 
A cooling-off period is a specified period of time during which a consumer may, without penalty, 
cancel a contract they have agreed to. Governments have mandated cooling-off periods for a 
range of agreement types, typically transactions involving significant amounts of money, and/or 
those likely to involve high-pressure sales tactics, including door-to-door sales.113 A related measure 
is a right to a period of deliberation during which the consumer is not able to accept the offer and 
conclude the contract. 
Today a widely used consumer protection tool, cooling-off periods were initially developed in the 
1960s with exclusive or primary application to door-to-door sales. Following a recommendation of 
the 1962 Final Report of the Committee on Consumer Protection (the Molony Report), England 
legislated a cooling-off period with the Hire Purchase Act in 1964. This Act was established with 
specific reference to ‘overbearing’ and deceptive sales agents.114 In Australia, Victoria’s Door-to-
Door (Sales) Act 1963 introduced a five day cooling-off period for some types of unsolicited door-
to-door sale. Soon afterwards, a number of states in the USA adopted cooling-off period laws, 
many of which targeted door-to-door sales.115  
Dual rationale 
Cooling-off periods have both a consumer protection and an economic rationale. Firstly, in 
recognition of the unequal bargaining position of consumers and sellers, particularly where specific 
sales tactics are used, they have been designed to strengthen the position of consumers, protecting 
them against manipulations and abuses.116 A cooling-off period provides an avenue for consumers 
                                                          
111 PC (2008) Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework, p. 297. 
112 Ibid, p. 297. 
113 OECD (2010) Consumer Policy Toolkit, p. 89. 
114 Sovern, Jeff (2012) Cooling-Off Periods, St John’s School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, St John’s University 
School of Law: New York, p. 3. 
115 Ibid, p. 2-3. 
116 Rekaiti & Van den Bergh (2000) ‘Cooling-off Periods in EC Member States,’ p. 373. 
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who have been subject to pressure sales, deception or harassment and who have therefore entered 
into contracts that they otherwise would not have accepted. At the same time, the threat of 
rescission is expected to provide an incentive for good behaviour on the part of the seller.117  
Secondly, cooling-off periods have been justified as efficiency-enhancing tools which provide a 
remedy in cases of situational monopoly and informational asymmetry. For a consumer who has 
made a decision based on the information provided by only one supplier in a door-to-door sales 
situation, a cooling-off period allows an opportunity to both deliberate on the information supplied 
and to compare it to alternative offers, potentially cancelling the contract in favour of a preferred 
offer. Although this is sometimes presented as a modern interpretation and rationale of the cooling-
off period,118 the need to provide an opportunity for comparative shopping was also emphasised 
by early proponents.119 The possibility that consumers will cancel an agreement after finding a 
better offer is again intended to incentivise sellers to set correct prices and disclose information 
about the quality and value of the product or service.120 
Cooling-off provisions applicable to door-to-door energy sales in Victoria 
The ACL contains express consumer rights in relation to the termination of unsolicited consumer 
agreements, namely provision of a ‘cooling off’ period of ten business days during which the 
consumer may cancel the agreement. In situations where the dealer has breached certain 
obligations, the consumer may terminate the agreement during a longer period – either three or six 
months depending on which obligations were contravened. 
The ACL also sets out obligations on sellers to inform consumers of their cooling-off rights. Prior to 
making an agreement, dealers must give the consumer certain information including information 
about their cooling-off rights and how to exercise them. After an (in-person) unsolicited consumer 
agreement has been made, dealers are required to provide the consumer with a copy of the 
agreement after it has been signed by the consumer. The front page of the agreement document 
must include set text which informs the consumer of their right to terminate the agreement in the 
cooling-off period and alerts them to an attached document with information about additional rights 
to terminate the agreement. This front page must be signed and dated by the consumer. 
Cooling-off provisions internationally 
In 2011 the EU Consumer Rights Directive (EU Directive 2011/83) was adopted by Member 
States in the EU Council of Ministers. The Directive brings together and amends requirements in 
earlier directives on distance selling and door-to-door selling, including the Doorstep Selling 
Directive (85/557/EEC). The Consumer Rights Directive must be implemented by member states 
by 13 December 2013 for entry into force before 13 June 2014. The Consumer Rights Directive 
will result in a lengthened cooling-off period of 14 calendar days, doubling the minimum seven-day 
cooling-off period that was provided under the previous Doorstep Selling Directive. Where the seller 
                                                          
117 Sovern (2012) Cooling-Off Periods, p. 4, 30. 
118 Rekaiti & Van den Bergh (2000) ‘Cooling-off Periods in EC Member States.’ 
119 See: Sovern (2012) Cooling-Off Periods, p. 5. 
120 Rekaiti & Van den Bergh (2000) ‘Cooling-off Periods in EC Member States,’ p. 381. 
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fails to clearly inform the customer about the withdrawal right, the cooling-off period is extended to 
a year.121  
In the USA, the 1971 Trade Regulation Rule put in place a federally mandated three-day cooling-
off period for most door-to-door sales, whether solicited or unsolicited. Sellers are required to 
provide written notices advising of this right.  
It is noteworthy that the length of cooling-off periods varies substantially between different 
jurisdictions. While there appears to be no research evidence comparing the effectiveness of 
different cooling-off period lengths, the ten business day period provided for in the ACL would seem 
to strike an appropriate balance between allowing sufficient time for consideration and minimising 
the costs of doing business. 
Take-up and effectiveness 
As Sovern argues in a paper on the effectiveness of cooling-off periods, the various rationales for 
the use of cooling-off periods rest on the assumption that some proportion of consumers will actually 
exercise their cooling-off rights, cancelling agreements they have made. If, in contrast, consumers 
do not make use of their cooling-off rights, these provisions seem unlikely to either deter seller 
misconduct or to offer an effective consumer remedy where misconduct has occurred.122  
In the USA, some studies have sought to assess the extent to which consumers exercise their cooling-
off rights. In the 1960s, a consumer survey found that a one-day cooling-off period was rarely used 
and that it benefitted consumers very little.123 In 1981, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
sponsored consumer and business surveys on the three-day cooling off period that had been 
introduced with the 1971 Trade Regulation Rule. With 1,400 respondents, the consumer survey 
found that despite fairly high awareness of cooling-off provisions, not one had cancelled a contract 
during a cooling-off period. The small proportion of surveyed consumers who were dissatisfied with 
their purchase reported failing to take action because they were not dissatisfied enough, because it 
was ‘too much trouble’, ‘wouldn’t do any good,’ or they ‘didn’t want to offend the salesperson.’124 
The survey of door-to-door selling company executives similarly found very low reported rates of 
cancellation.  
More recently, Sovern’s 2010 survey of businesses subject to the three-day cooling-off rule found 
low reported cancellation rates: 35 per cent of businesses reported no cancellations at all; 29 per 
cent reported cancellations of fewer than one per cent; and a further eight per cent reported a 
cancellation rate of between one and two per cent. Sovern argued that these rescission rates were 
so low as to raise ‘serious questions about the effectiveness of cooling-off periods.’125  
                                                          
121 Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament  and of the Council of 25 October 2011, on consumer rights, amending 
Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council 
Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council. 
122 Sovern (2012) Cooling-Off Periods, p. 13. 
123 Ibid, p. 14. 
124 Ibid, p. 14-15. 
125 Ibid, p. 18. 
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That few consumers apparently actively exercise cooling-off rights should not be taken to mean that 
consumers are necessarily confident about the benefits of the agreement they have entered into. As 
the OECD notes in its Consumer Policy Toolkit: 
[The] level of comfort provided by a cooling-off period could result in consumers not taking 
sufficient time to properly assess their decisions prior to purchase; they may feel obliged to 
continue despite the opportunity to reconsider.126  
In its 2007 submission to the PC’s Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework, the ACCC 
similarly noted that consumers may not use cooling-off periods to examine the terms of a contract, 
and that cooling-off periods may in fact have the perverse effect of encouraging a consumer to pay 
less attention to the terms of a contract at the time of signing.127 Although there is in fact little firm 
evidence about the benefits and drawbacks of cooling-off periods,128 research has found that 
consumers who purchase an item with a right to withdraw may overestimate the likelihood that they 
will use that right.129 Similarly, referring to findings in the field of behavioural economics, Sovern 
suggests that consumers may fail to exercise cooling-off rights due to the tendency to risk-aversion 
when facing possible losses, the status quo effect (customer inertia), and cognitive dissonance.130  
Interestingly, however, specific conditions in the Victorian retail energy market seem to have resulted 
in substantially higher rescission rates following door-to-door sales than those found in US studies. 
Cooling-off rights are apparently used frequently due to active ‘win-back’ attempts by incumbent 
retailers. In this process, the incumbent retailer receives notice of the impending transfer and makes 
contact with the customer, offering another deal. According to one estimate, these win-back 
approaches induce just under a quarter of customers to cancel the door-to-door sales contract within 
the cooling-off period.131 While the absence of data about the consequences of these decisions 
makes it impossible to draw firm conclusions, this competitive process of door-to-door offer followed 
by the incumbent’s ‘win-back’ attempt seems likely to result in positive outcomes for that cohort of 
consumers. 
Although cooling-off provisions spur potentially beneficial competition in the Victorian energy 
market, it would seem unlikely that many consumers unilaterally and proactively take the opportunity 
to compare offers and cancel contracts. That energy is a ‘low-engagement’ product is widely cited 
as the rationale for heavy reliance on the door-to-door sales channel. If this is the case, it seems 
unrealistic to expect that energy consumers who have accepted a door-to-door sales offer will then 
develop a high level engagement, using the cooling-off period to carefully analyse the accepted 
offer and compare it to alternatives. Nevertheless, overall, cooling-off provisions are probably 
somewhat effective at mitigating the situational monopoly effects of door-to-door energy sales in 
Victoria because they facilitate win-back attempts. 
                                                          
126 OECD (2010) Consumer Policy Toolkit, p. 89. 
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128 Ibid, p. 83. 
129 Sovern (2012) Cooling-Off Periods, p. 26 
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Disclosure of purpose and identity and ceasing to negotiate on request 
Another set of door-to-door selling-specific obligations require sellers to disclose their identity and the 
purpose of their visit and to respect customers’ requests to end the negotiation. Such requirements 
are contained in the ACL, as well as in the industry-specific NECF and Energy Marketing Code.  
Taken together, these requirements are intended to enable the consumer to end unwanted door-to-
door sales interactions quickly, minimising time loss and annoyance. Disclosure of the retailer’s 
name and contact details should also facilitate the consumer making a complaint about an agent’s 
conduct, if necessary. 
Australian Consumer Law 
Requirements on dealers to disclose their identity and the purpose of their visit, and to cease 
negotiations upon request, are set out in Sections 74 and 75 of ACL and are part of the unsolicited 
consumer agreement provisions. 
Figure 4: Australian Consumer Law, Sections 74 and 75 
74   Disclosing purpose and identity  
A dealer who calls on a person for the purpose of negotiating an unsolicited consumer agreement, or for 
an incidental or related purpose, must, as soon as practicable and in any event before starting to 
negotiate:  
(a)  clearly advise the person that the dealer's purpose is to seek the person's agreement to a 
supply of the goods or services concerned; and  
(b)  clearly advise the person that the dealer is obliged to leave the premises immediately on 
request; and  
 (c)  provide to the person such information relating to the dealer's identity as is prescribed by the 
regulations.  
Note:          A pecuniary penalty may be imposed for a contravention of this section.  
75   Ceasing to negotiate on request  
 (1)  A dealer who calls on a person at any premises for the purpose of negotiating an unsolicited 
consumer agreement, or for an incidental or related purpose, must leave the premises immediately on the 
request of:  
 (a)  the occupier of the premises, or any person acting with the actual or apparent authority of 
the occupier; or  
(b)  the person (the prospective consumer ) with whom the negotiations are being conducted.  
Note:          A pecuniary penalty may be imposed for a contravention of this subsection.  
 
Before beginning negotiations, dealers must clearly advise of their purpose for calling and provide 
specified information about their identity, including their name and the address of the supplier. They 
must respect requests to leave and are also required to inform the consumer that they can ask the 
dealer to leave. 
Energy Marketing Code and NECF 
Similarly, Victoria’s Energy Marketing Code requires that sales agents ‘at all times’ identify 
themselves to a consumer. Specifically, they must use best endeavours to provide their name, any 
relevant identification number, the name of the retailer represented, contact details to enable the 
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consumer to contact the retailer, and advice as to the purpose of the contact. The sales agent is 
also required to wear an identification badge displaying their name and photograph and the name 
of the retailer represented. The Energy Marketing Code does not explicitly state that sales agents 
must leave immediately upon request,† but does require that retailers respect No Canvassing signs 
and maintain No Contact lists. 
The NECF, currently applicable in the ACT and Tasmania only, also includes rules relating to 
customers who indicate they do not wish to be subject to door-to-door sales (along with some other 
forms of direct marketing). Retailers are obligated to ensure that a No Contact list is created and 
maintained. The rules also specify that retail marketers must comply with any signs (such as Do Not 
Knock stickers) at a person’s premises indicating that canvassing is not permitted. 
Compliance and enforcement 
There is evidence that some sales agents are failing to comply with requirements that they identify 
themselves and the retailer represented, disclose the purpose of their visit, and obey requests to 
leave. In the April to June 2012 quarter, for example, EWOV received 35 ‘Other’ marketing cases, 
mostly related to unwanted door-to-door and telesales activity. This included cases in which the 
sales agent was alleged to have ignored Do Not Knock stickers.132  
The ESC’s 2010-11 Compliance Report on Energy Retail Businesses also identifies some examples 
of non-compliance, based on retailer self-report. In 2010-11, reported ‘Type 2’ breaches of Energy 
Marketing Code requirements that sales agents identify themselves and disclose the purpose for 
their visit were:  
 Sales agents for Energy Australia and Simply Energy refused to show identification badges 
upon request to 14 consumers 
 Sales agents for Energy Australia ignored No Canvassing signs at the premises of seven 
consumers 
 Sales agents for Lumo Energy failed to take notice of one customer’s Do Not Knock sign. 
Retailers reported that the sales agents involved were re-trained and sometimes warned, and the 
ESC took no further enforcement action.133 
In 2012 the ACCC signalled its intention to prioritise action in a number of areas relevant to 
energy door-to-door sales, including vulnerable consumers and the energy industry. It also 
announced that it would make full use of the profound changes in the ACL, including a focus on 
enforcement.134 In 2011 the ACCC and the AER wrote jointly to energy retailers, reminding them 
of the legal obligations in relation to door-to-door selling and advising them of the ACCC’s plan to 
                                                          
† Interestingly, one 2009 ESC document suggests that customers should ‘consider making a complaint’ where ‘a sales agent 
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focus on energy door-to-door sales. On 27 March 2012, the ACCC filed two separate 
proceedings against energy retailers (Neighbourhood Energy and AGL) and the door-to-door sales 
companies they had engaged. 
In the first case to be decided, ACCC v Neighbourhood Energy (27 September 2012), the 
Federal Court found that Neighbourhood Energy and Australian Green Credits engaged in multiple 
breaches of the unsolicited consumer agreement provisions of the ACL (sections 74(a), 74(b), 74(c) 
and 75(1)(a)). While selling Neighbourhood Energy products door-to-door in 2011, some 
contractors did not always clearly advise consumers that they were obliged to leave the premises 
immediately upon request. On two instances they failed to leave upon consumers’ verbal requests 
and through the display of Do Not Knock signs. On three occasions they did not clearly advise the 
purpose of their visit. Finally, while the contractors carried identification badges, these did not 
display all of the details required on the front of the badge.135  
Neighbourhood Energy was ordered by consent to pay a pecuniary penalty of $850,000, while 
their former door-to-door selling contractor Australian Green Credits faced a penalty of $150,000. 
Both parties also contributed towards the ACCC’s costs. The Federal Court also granted injunctions 
restraining Neighbourhood Energy and Australian Green Credits from engaging in similar conduct 
for two years and ordered corrective advertising and the establishment or maintenance of 
compliance programs.  
The ACCC v Neighbourhood Energy case was highly significant as it offered the first test of the 
ACL unsolicited consumer agreement provisions. Prior to the court’s decision, the ACCC stated that 
the litigation would test the scope and application of the ACL in relation to door-to-door selling, 
commenting in its submission to an inquiry on the Do No Knock Register Bill 2012, that it was ‘too 
early to say whether or not the ACL unsolicited selling provisions’ would be interpreted by the 
Courts in a manner that would ‘ensure that the law provides adequate protection for consumers.’136  
Following the decision, ACCC chairman Rod Sims argued that it would have a ‘profound effect’ on 
consumer protection by reinforcing door-to-door sellers’ obligations to identify themselves, explain 
why they are visiting, and leave when requested. Importantly, the orders confirmed that display of a 
Do Not Knock sign constitutes a request under section 75(1) (a) that the door-to-door seller leave the 
premises, resolving any ambiguity about the signs’ legal status.  
While it is still too early to evaluate whether the ACCC’s enforcement actions on door-to-door sales 
will contribute to increased compliance with the ACL unsolicited consumer agreement provisions, 
the ACCC’s activity and its outcomes is being widely reported and reflected in business and legal 
advice. For example, describing the pecuniary penalties ordered as ‘significant’, the Australian 
Government Solicitor suggested that the ACCC v Neighbourhood Energy decision should ‘serve as 
a warning ...that [door-to-door sellers] need to be stringent in ensuring compliance with ACL 
requirements.’137 The decision generated substantial media coverage138 and was widely reported 
                                                          
135 Australian Government Solicitor (2012) ‘Federal Court decision on unwanted doorknocking,’ Express Law – fast track 
information for clients, 4 October 2012. 
136 Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia House of Representatives Standing Committee on Social Policy and Legal Affairs 
(2012) Advisory Report: Do Not Knock Register Bill 2012, Parliament of Australia: Canberra, p. 14. 
137 Australian Government Solicitor, (2012) ‘Federal Court decision.’ 
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in industry and legal publications.139 It was also welcomed by consumer groups as a ‘landmark’ 
decision.140  
Information about the agreement 
Energy door-to-door sales in Victoria are also subject to a range of disclosure requirements relating 
to the agreement and its specific terms and conditions. Under the ACL, where unsolicited 
agreements are made in person, dealers are required to provide the consumer with a copy of the 
agreement immediately after it has been signed by the consumer. This document must clearly state 
the full terms of the agreement and the total price payable or how it will be calculated.  
More detailed requirements specific to Victorian energy contracts are contained in the Energy 
Marketing Code. Before entering into a contract, the customer must be provided with details of all 
applicable prices, charges, tariffs and service levels that will apply, inclusive of all costs including 
GST. Additionally, for market contracts, the consumer must be provided with information about 
(among other things): 
 the type and frequency of bills and bill payment methods; 
 rights to cancel the contract, and any charges that apply for doing so; 
 all relevant information about any difference between the contract’s terms and conditions 
and requirements in the Energy Retail Code; and 
 the full terms of the contract including the period of the contract. 
All of this information must be provided in ‘plain English’ and be designed to be ‘readily understood 
by consumers,’ and the consumer must be given a reasonable opportunity to consider this 
information before entering into the contract. Door-to-door sales agents are also bound by the 
requirement in the ESC’s Guideline 19 – Energy Price and Product Disclosure that a written Offer 
Summary be provided on request by a customer and when providing a customer with the terms or 
information about the terms of any new retail contract.141 In addition, on or before the second 
business day after the relevant date in respect of a contract, the retailer must provide the consumer 
with a copy of the contract (or another document evidencing the contract) setting out the tariff to be 
charged and all of the contract’s terms and conditions.  
The NECF Energy Marketing Rules, which may apply in Victoria in the near future, also include 
additional disclosure obligations specific to energy market contracts, which go beyond those set out 
in the ACL. Under the Rule, retail marketers are required to provide customers with additional 
information about: 
                                                                                                                                                                             
138 See, for example: Collier, Karen, ‘Court imposes $1 million penalty for doorknockers who harass households’, Herald Sun, 28 
September 2012; Morgan, Elysse and Michael Janda, ‘ACCC silences the knockers with million-dollar win’, ABC news, 28 
September 2012; Climate Spectator, ‘Energy retailers feel sting of $1m fines for illegal doorknocking’ 1 October 2012. 
139 See, for example: Addisons (2012) October 2012 Direct Selling Update, Addisons: Sydney; EnergyCareer, ‘ACCC hails win 
against door salespeople’, EnergyCareer website, 1 October 2012. 
140 CHOICE (2012b) ‘Federal Court Takes Action,’ CHOICE website; Consumer Action Law Centre, Financial Counselling 
Australia and Victoria Legal Aid (2012) ‘Landmark Federal Court Decision a Ringing Endorsement of the Do Not Knock Sticker,’ 
Do Not Knock website. 
141 Essential Services Commission (2009) Guideline 19 – Energy Price and Product Disclosure, ESC: Melbourne. 
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 All applicable prices, charges, early termination fees, security deposits, service levels, 
concessions or rebates, billing and payments and how any of these matters may be 
changed 
 The start date and duration of the contract, availability of extensions, and termination of 
the contract if the customer moves during the term of the contract 
 If any requirement must or can be complied with by an electronic transaction—how the 
transaction is to operate and, as appropriate, an indication that the customer will be 
bound by the electronic transaction, or recognised as having received the information 
contained in it.  
The information must be provided either before the contract is formed (electronically, verbally or in 
writing) or as soon as practicable afterwards (in a single, written disclosure statement). The required 
information, when given in a written disclosure statement, must include or be accompanied by a 
copy of the market retail contract.  
ESC compliance and enforcement activity 
Despite evidence of breaches from retailer self-reporting, complaints data, and advice from 
community and consumer organisations, the ESC has been reluctant to enforce the regulatory 
requirements in the Energy Marketing Code, including those requirements relating to disclosure of 
agreement information. This is perhaps the most important area for ESC compliance and 
enforcement activity on door-to-door sales because it is the key domain in which Energy Marketing 
Code requirements go beyond the generic provisions of the ACL to cover energy-specific matters. 
While CAV and the ACCC might be more appropriate bodies for enforcement with regard to 
misleading and deceptive or unconscionable conduct and similar issues, the ESC is better-
positioned to ensure that the energy retailers comply with regulatory requirements aimed at 
minimising consumer detriment by supporting consumers to make informed decisions, even in the 
situational monopoly environment of door-to-door sales.   
ESC compliance reports, based on self-reporting by retailers, offer some insight into the extent to 
which Victorian retailers are complying with Energy Marketing Code requirements relating to the 
provision of information about an offer. Table 7, below, summarises data on Type 1 breaches of 
the Energy Marketing Code relating to agreement information.†   
Table 7: Type 1 breaches relating to marketing information, 2007–08  to 2010–11 
Year Systemic Isolated Total Customers affected* 
2010-11 7 6 13 >2,196 
2009-10 5 1 6 > 7,538  
2008-09 5 4 9 >13,074 
Source: Essential Services Commission (2010c) 2008-09 Compliance Report for Energy Retail Businesses, ESC: Melbourne; ESC 
(2011c) 2009-10 Compliance Report for Energy Retail Businesses, ESC: Melbourne; ESC (2012c) 2010-11 Compliance Report. 
                                                          
† Table 7 compiles information about breaches where required agreement information was not provided within specified 
timeframes or at all, or where incorrect information about the offer was supplied. It does not include breaches relating to 
misleading statements not explicitly relating to the actual agreement. Note that the table includes both door-to-door sales and 
telesales breaches as these are not always identified separately.  
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*Note: Some reported breaches – including some systemic breaches that continued for several months - do not include any 
indication of the number of customers affected. Hence, these figures will be substantially lower than the actual number of customers 
affected. 
While almost certainly an underestimate of the extent of breaches,† these figures do show that a 
substantial number of customers are not receiving the accurate information that retailers and their 
sales agents are required to provide, and that may be necessary if consumers are to make informed 
decisions in their interests. This potentially increases the likelihood that the door-to-door switching 
decisions made by affected customers will cause them financial detriment. However, satisfied with 
the actions taken by retailers to remedy these breaches, the ESC did not take further enforcement 
action on Energy Marketing Code breaches over the 2008-09 to 2010-11 period.  
In 2009-10, the ESC responded to concerns about non-compliance with Energy Marketing Code 
requirements with its Respecting Customers – Marketing Conduct Regulatory Program. The 
objectives of the program were: 
 To encourage and promote consumer confidence in the competitive retail market by 
ensuring customers are provided with truthful and accurate information in a way that allows 
them to make fully informed choices 
 To ensure that retailers comply with their obligations to new and existing customers, and 
are held accountable for their marketing conduct 
 To maintain the focus of senior management in the retail energy sector on reducing 
marketing conduct complaints 
 To mitigate language and comprehension difficulties experienced by Victorians of non-
English speaking background and other vulnerable communities.142 
In its first report on the Respecting Customers program, the ESC described the compliance and 
enforcement activities it had undertaken previously. They were:  
 investigating complaints and issues and ‘addressing’ them with the retailer 
 referring some ‘serious breaches’ of the Fair Trading Act to CAV‡ 
 publishing annual Compliance Reports 
 encouraging voluntary compliance 
 monitoring corrective actions by retailers 
 conducting a consumer information campaign and consumer website 
 consulting with newly arrived Australians 
 running a ‘Retail market conduct forum.’143 
The report also described a range of planned monitoring, consumer education, liaison and 
consultation activities to be undertaken as part of the program, and mentioned the possibility that 
‘appropriate enforcement activities’ might be taken in conjunction with CAV should there be retailers 
‘whose sales force demonstrates systemic or serious non-compliance with the marketing 
                                                          
† For a discussion of the reliability of self-reported regulatory compliance data, see: Parker, Christine and Vibeke Nielsen (2009) 
‘The Challenge of Empirical Research on Business Compliance in Regulatory Capitalism,’ Annual Review of Law and Social 
Science, 5:45-70. 
142 ESC (2009c) Respecting Customers – June 2009, p. 13. 
‡ On one occasion this lead to CAV securing an enforceable undertaking. 
143 ESC (2009c) Respecting Customers – June 2009, p. 8-12.  
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regulations.’144 It further noted that while the ESC ‘trusts these enforcement mechanisms will not be 
necessary’ it would ‘not hesitate to pursue enforcement action’ were customers to be systematically 
mistreated by retailers repeatedly breaching their regulatory obligations.145  
Research and consultation conducted during the course of the Respecting Customers program 
demonstrated that retailers were frequently failing to provide customers with offer and agreement 
information, in contravention of regulatory requirements. For example, a status report in December 
2009 noted that during consultations in Melbourne’s West, customers said that generally, sales 
agents ‘would not give customers any written material.’ Remarkably, the ESC’s commentary on this 
consultation indicates that the ESC did not consider this to be a ‘significant issue’ or a ‘serious 
breach.’146 Similarly, independent market research commissioned by the ESC in 2009 found that 
around 60 per cent of residential and small business customers were told they would receive a 
written Offer Summary, as requested in a telephone contact, but only half of the residential 
customers and a quarter of small business customers received them within the mandated ten 
business days. Three retailers provided written Offer Summaries to fewer than half of requesters,147 
suggesting systemic non-compliance. 
Prompted by these findings, the ESC requested information from retailers about how they provided 
offer information and the compliance systems they had in place. In response, some retailers said 
they did not provide offer information until after a customer enters into a contract, and less than half 
described an effective compliance monitoring process. Consequently, in July 2010, the ESC again 
wrote to retailers seeking ‘written assurance’ of compliance with regulatory requirements on Offer 
Summaries, and advising that upcoming audits would consider this issue.148   
A review of subsequent audits shows mixed results. Table 8 below collates retailers’ audit results 
concerning Guideline 19 and the information and consent requirements (Clause 3) in the Energy 
Marketing Code, for those audits published to date. 
                                                          
144 Ibid, p. 13-14. 
145 Ibid, p. 17. 
146 Essential Services Commission (2009d) Respecting Customers: Regulating Marketing Conduct – Energy Retail Businesses – 
Status Report – December 2009, ESC: Melbourne, p. 5.  
147 Ibid, p. 7-8. 
148 Essential Services Commission (2010a) Respecting Customers: Regulating Marketing Conduct – Energy Retail Businesses – 
2009-10 Final Report – December 2010, ESC: Melbourne, p. 18-19. 
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Table 8: Energy Marketing Code and Guideline 19 regulatory audit results, 2010–11  
Retailer EMC 
clause 3   
G’line 19  Commentary relating to agreement information 
Origin 
Energy 
C  C   Guideline 19 requirements were not clearly documented or understood 
 In-house marketing information did not meet Guideline 19 requirements 
 Sales agents were not trained, supervised or monitored on Guideline 19 
compliance 
TRUenergy A B  Generally compliant with EMC obligations to provide information 
 Sales agents supplied with & trained to provide Offer Summaries from 
April 2010 
 Offer Summary content met requirements 
Simply 
Energy 
A- A-  Adequate compliance with marketing obligations ‘overall’ 
 Offer Summaries met requirements & expressed with plain English 
 Door-to-door sales agent training included requirement to provide Offer 
Summaries, but no incentive or control in place 
 Price and Product Information Statements (PPISs) did not show all required 
detail 
 Documented procedures omitted some information-related code 
obligations 
AGL A+  A+ 
 
 No commentary as this 2010 re-audit followed a more comprehensive 
2009 audit showing significant non-compliance with 37 of 41 
performance indicators and 12 of 22 regulatory obligations. 
 2009 audit results for Energy Marketing Code Clause 3 and Guideline 
19 were C and D respectively 
Lumo 
Energy 
A+ A+   Sales agents trained to provide Offer Summary, but no incentive or 
controls to ensure these routinely given to customers when marketing 
Sources: Essential Services Commission (2011a) Summary Audit Report: Regulatory Audit of Origin Energy – September 2011, 
ESC: Melbourne, p. 15-16; ESC (2011b) Summary Audit Report: Regulatory Audit of TRUenergy – December 2011, ESC: 
Melbourne, p. 9-10; ESC (2012e) Summary Audit Report: Regulatory Audit of Simply Energy – January 2012, ESC: Melbourne; 
ESC (2010b) Summary Audit Report – Regulatory Audit of AGL Energy Limited – December 2010, ESC: Melbourne; ESC (2012d) 
Summary Audit Report – Regulatory Audit of Lumo Energy – May 2010, ESC: Melbourne. 
Table 8 shows that while most retailers were found to be complying with most marketing 
information obligations, there was frequently no control or incentive in place to ensure that sales 
agents provided written offer information as a matter of course. Origin Energy, one of Victoria’s 
largest retailers, and one engaged in extensive door-to-door sales activity, was not complying with 
either Energy Marketing Code or Guideline 19 requirements. In responding to the results of these 
regulatory audits, the ESC asked retailers to make administrative undertakings that they will remedy 
areas of non-compliance.   
In most cases, the deadline for these corrective actions and independent verification has now 
passed, but no further information has been made publicly available on the ESC website. For 
example, following its 2011 audit demonstrating major non-compliance with the Energy Marketing 
Code and Guideline 19, in January 2012 Origin Energy committed to a range of corrective 
actions and a further independent audit in July 2012.149 At the time of writing, the results of this 
audit were not yet available on the ESC website. Similarly, while initial regulatory audits of Red 
Energy, Neighbourhood Energy, Australian Power and Gas and Powerdirect were scheduled for 
                                                          
149 Origin Energy (2012) Letter to Mr David Heeps, CEO, Essential Services Commission, 4 January 2012, ESC website. 
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completion between April and June 2012, the results had not yet been published by the ESC as of 
December 2012.  
Ofgem compliance and enforcement activity (UK) 
The ESC’s failure to enforce regulatory requirements contrasts with a far more vigorous approach 
taken by the UK energy regulator, Ofgem, on regulation designed to ensure that consumers 
switching door-to-door have the information necessary for informed choice. Research and data on 
information required in door-to-door sales situations, and on the financial outcomes of door-to-door 
switching decisions, have also been used by Ofgem to inform regulatory changes.  
After its 2008 Energy Supply Probe finding that nearly half of those customers switching door-to-
door were made financially worse off, Ofgem introduced new requirements on retailers to provide, 
prior to sale: 
 A written (on paper or electronic display) estimate of annual costs under the tariff offered, 
based on that consumer’s consumption 
 For pre-payment meter customers† or where the sales agent has made a comparative 
claim, a comparison with the customer’s current deal.  
Additional requirements for point-of sale information were also introduced.150 
In 2012, an Ofgem investigation of EDF Energy found that it had breached aspects of these 
strengthened license conditions relating to information to be provided during door-to-door and 
telesales. Specifically, Ofgem found that EDF Energy had failed to:  
 Consistently provide complete and accurate information on aspects of sale, including 
Principle terms 
 Sufficiently ensure and control the provision of accurate estimates, comparisons and direct 
debit payments 
 Have regard to all relevant information when estimating prospective customers’ annual 
consumption. 
While controls were in place to address these issues, Ofgem found that they were insufficient.151 
Interestingly, Ofgem noted in its decision that while the breaches were less serious than others 
investigated in 2002 and 2008, the fact that Ofgem had been required to make repeated 
regulatory interventions regarding marketing over the decade meant that a large penalty was then 
appropriate.152 EDF Energy agreed to a package of payments totalling £4.5 million – the largest 
payment of its kind. Most of this amount was delivered to vulnerable consumers in the form of 
compensation payments, with the remainder contributed to the Citizens Advice Bureau’s Energy 
Best Deal campaign. At the time of writing, four of the remaining ‘Big Six’ energy retailers were 
also under investigation by Ofgem for misselling.  
                                                          
† This appears to be used as a proxy for consumer vulnerability. 
150 Ofgem (2009) Energy Supply Probe – Proposed Retail Market Remedies. 
151 Ofgem (2012a) Decision of the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority to impose a financial penalty following an investigation 
into compliance by EDF Energy Customers plc (“EDF Energy”) with the obligations under conditions 23 (“SLC 23”), 25 (“SLC 25”) 
and 27 (“SLC 27”) of the Standard Conditions of the Electricity and Gas Supply Licences, Ofgem, London, p. 2. 
152 Ibid, p. 2. 
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Prohibition 
The strongest policy instrument that government may employ with regard to door-to-door selling is 
prohibition. Prohibiting a product or practice restricts trade and hence, banning is a measure that is 
the ‘last resort of the consumer regulator.’153 Because prohibition has strong effects, careful 
evaluation of benefits and costs, including any impacts on efficiency and consumer choice, is 
critical.154 
Arguing that there will ‘always be a role’ for bans, UK academic Howells describes the rationale 
underpinning prohibition of certain products and practices: 
The justifications for such interventions derive both from the desire to protect the consumer and 
to prevent society from suffering the external costs that arise when consumers suffer harm. 
Moreover, poor quality goods, unbalanced contract terms, and bad marketing practices may 
undermine confidence in the market. 155 
Hence, although severe, prohibition is sometimes necessary, and in many countries, unsafe and 
potentially harmful products as well as practices such as lying and harassment are subject to 
bans.156 
In its Consumer Policy Toolkit, the OECD sets out some criteria for effective prohibition. Among 
these is a requirement that an appropriate enforcement and monitoring regime is in place to 
discourage the formation of illicit markets.157 This requirement, however, would presumably be less 
important were energy door-to-door sales to be banned, given energy retail’s high barriers to entry 
and extensive regulatory requirements. More relevant is the need for community support for any 
ban, with consumers and firms made aware of the prohibition and its justification.158 
As detailed above, specific types of business conduct (within the context of door-to-door sales or 
elsewhere) are prohibited under the ACL. This section, in contrast, discusses the wholesale 
prohibition of door-to-door sales, either economy-wide or in a specific sector. It covers both 
prohibitions that are in place and unsuccessful attempts at banning door-to-door sales. 
Complete prohibition 
In some jurisdictions, unsolicited door-to-door selling has been completely prohibited, or attempts 
have been made to prohibit it. 
Act on Certain Consumer Contracts 2004 (Denmark) 
Denmark has prohibited unsolicited door-to-door selling and similar sales methods, including 
unsolicited telesales, under Chapter 2 of its Act on Certain Consumer Contracts (2004).159 Chapter 
6 of the law includes provisions for penalties of a fine for violations of this ban. CUAC’s review did 
                                                          
153 OECD (2010) Consumer Policy Toolkit, p. 97; Howells (2005) ‘The Potential and Limits of Consumer Empowerment,’ p. 366. 
154 OECD (2010) Consumer Policy Toolkit, p. 99. 
155 Howells (2005) ‘The Potential and Limits of Consumer Empowerment,’ p. 366. 
156 OECD (2010) Consumer Policy Toolkit, p. 97-98. 
157 Ibid, p. 99. 
158 Ibid, p. 99. 
159 Nielsen, Ruth (2011) Contract Law in Denmark, Kluwer Law International: Alphen aan den Rijn, p. 99. 
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not uncover any other countries in which unsolicited door-to-door selling is subject to a general 
ban.† 
‘Green River’ ordinances (USA) 
In 1931 the town of Green River, Wyoming passed and approved a municipal ordinance 
(Ordinance No. 75) declaring door-to-door solicitation ‘a nuisance.’ The ordinance prohibited 
door-to-door solicitation unless the sales agent was ‘requested or invited’ by a resident, making it 
subject to criminal penalties. Subsequently, hundreds of other towns and cities throughout the USA 
adopted similar ordinances, many of which remain in place. 
Soon after its introduction, Green River’s ordinance was challenged in court by the Fuller Brush 
Company,160 which claimed that the ordinance violated the First Amendment right to free speech. 
Although the court upheld the Green River ordinance,161 subsequent cases have ‘whittled away at 
local governments’ power’ to protect residents from door-to-door solicitation and ‘revitalized and 
expanded constitutional protections for doorstep speech,’ including commercial speech.162 Hence, 
although a number of Green River ordinances remain in place, these are no longer likely to 
withstand challenge unless they apply only to consumers who explicitly advise (such as via a No 
Canvassing sign) that they do not wish to receive door-to-door sales calls.163 In April 2012, for 
example, the town of Collierville was reportedly forced to lift its ban on door-to-door sales after 
sellers challenged its 1996 ordinance. The town planned to respond by encouraging residents to 
use No Canvassing signs and sign onto a local Do Not Solicit Register.164   
Sector-specific bans 
In a number of countries, governments have prohibited (or considered prohibiting) unsolicited door-
to-door sales of particular products and services. Such prohibitions typically deal with products and 
services that carry a heightened risk of substantial financial detriment. 
Financial products and consumer credit (Australia) 
Australia has prohibited the door-to-door sales of financial products and consumer credit. The 
National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) bans the unsolicited door-to-door sale of 
credit, although it does allow for in-homes sales with a prior appointment.165 Similarly, under the 
Corporations Act 2001 unsolicited face-to-face and telephone sales of interests in managed 
investment schemes, securities or other financial products are prohibited.166 
In their 2007 report Coercion and Harassment at the Door, Consumer Action and the FCRC 
argued that these bans ‘[recognise] the immense detriment that can ensue where consumers face 
                                                          
† Although door-to-door sales were apparently prohibited in China between 1998 and 2006. See: Lee, Don (2006) ‘Avon calling 
again, as China lifts sales ban’ The Sydney Morning Herald, December 16, 2006. 
160 Town of Green River, Wyoming v. Fuller Brush Co., 65 F.2d 112 (10th Cir. 1933) 
161 Grubb, Marna (n.d.) ‘1931 Green River Ordinance,’ City of Green River website.  
162 Lukasic, Lisa (1997) ‘Are “Green River” Ordinances Constitutional Under the First Amendment?’ in Local Government Law 
Bulletin, Institute of Government, University of North Carolina: Chapel Hill, p 6. 
163 Ibid, p. 10. 
164 Anthony, Kontji (2012) ‘Collierville to lift ban on door-to-door salesmen’, WMCTV news, 12 April 2012. 
165 National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009, Schedule 1 - National Credit Code, Part 9, s 156. 
166 Corporations Act 2001, Part 6D, Division 1, s. 736, and Part 7.8 Division 8, s. 992A and 992AA. 
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pressure to purchase financial products and services where the transaction has been unsolicited.’167 
The report went on to note that energy contracts share important features in common with financial 
contracts, ‘namely that they both involve a deferred debt to be repaid, and if not repaid, can mean 
a default is listed on the consumer’s credit information file.’168  
Bans on unsolicited door-to-door and telephone sales of financial products and consumer credit are 
also likely to reflect acknowledgement of the complexity of these products and, consequently, the 
difficulty – if not impossibility – of making an informed and considered decision about such 
products in the unsolicited sales context. Discussing the inadequacy of a 30-day cooling-off period 
on insurance policy purchases, Rekaiti and Van den Bergh note that: 
Insurance policies contain complex provisions. Only specialised lawyers can explain the 
precise meaning of clauses affecting the value of the policy. Even if the consumer is able to get 
this specialised information within a month, he must still process it and apply it to his particular 
situation.169  
Although energy agreements are certainly less complex than insurance policies, their terms and 
conditions are nonetheless detailed and often difficult to compare. This complexity is likely to grow 
with the introduction of flexible pricing in 2013.  
Property Services (UK) 
In response to a super-complaint by Citizens Advice, in 2004 the UK OFT published a major report 
on door-to-door selling. Based on OFT’s investigations into the detriment associated with different 
types of door-to-door selling, this report included a recommendation that the Department of Trade 
and Industry (DTI) consult on a potential prohibition on the unsolicited door-to-door sale of property 
maintenance and repairs.170 Following consultation, however, this recommendation was not 
implemented.   
Discussion and recommendations 
Door-to-door sales of energy in Victoria are subject to a range of obligations under ACL and 
Victorian energy regulations. However, the legal and regulatory requirements can only minimise 
consumer detriment from door-to-door selling to the extent that they are complied with. Evidence 
from consumer complaints, compliance and audit reports, consumer research and other sources 
suggests, however, that compliance is currently patchy.     
Enforcement 
CUAC therefore strongly supports the ACCC’s recent focus on enforcing the ACL in relation to 
energy door-to-door sales. The ACCC has acknowledged that the ACL can only be effective if it is 
‘enforced and seen to be enforced.’171 It has welcomed strong Federal Court penalties for breaches 
of the ACL, suggesting that such penalties are necessary to deter poor conduct and make a ‘clear, 
profound and lasting impact’ on business behaviour, as well as to demonstrate to consumers that 
                                                          
167 CALC & FCRC (2007) Coercion and harassment at the door, p. 8. 
168 Ibid, p. 8. 
169 Rekaiti & Van den Bergh (2000) ‘Cooling-off Periods in EC Member States,’ p. 388. 
170 OFT (UK) (2004) Doorstep Selling, p. 112. 
171 Sims (2012b) Enduring perspectives, p. 3. 
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their rights are being protected.172 The ACCC’s enforcement activity also reflects its 
acknowledgement that accounts of poor door-to-door selling behaviour are numerous enough to 
indicate real substance behind many complaints, as well as its recognition of the added 
significance of energy door-to-door misselling specifically, given energy’s status as an essential 
service.173 
Although it is too early to assess the impact of enforcement action on energy retailers’ overall 
compliance, this enforcement activity has led to a substantial penalty, helped to clarify the law, and 
garnered significant public attention. Ongoing enforcement action should solidify these gains. The 
ACCC has recently indicated that use of its ACL enforcement powers remains a priority.174 Within 
this, while complaints of energy door-to-door misselling continue, CUAC believes that, with the 
support and collaboration of CAV, the ACCC should continue to include enforcement action on 
energy door-to-door sales. 
Recommendation 3 
That the ACCC maintain its focus on enforcement and testing of the ACL unsolicited consumer 
agreement provisions, including in the energy sector.  
In contrast to the ACCC’s approach to enforcing compliance with the ACL unsolicited consumer 
agreement provisions, over a number of years, the ESC has consistently argued that a ‘light-touch’ 
approach to ‘voluntary compliance’ generates better consumer outcomes and ‘perceptions of the 
competitive retail market.’175 During this period, however, EWOV complaints about energy 
retailers, including marketing and transfer complaints, have continued to escalate year on year. At 
the same time, commissioned research, consumer reports, independent audits and retailers’ self-
reported compliance all show that in many instances, retailers are not complying with marketing 
information requirements in the Energy Marketing Code and Guideline 19. 
While emphasising its preference for voluntary compliance, the ESC has acknowledged that a 
credible threat of sanctions is a necessary element of a regulator’s compliance and enforcement 
approach.176 However, in reviewing compliance, audit and performance reports and other 
documents, CUAC found no examples of occasions on which the ESC had used any of its statutory 
enforcement powers in relation to door-to-door selling or other marketing activities.† Energy retailers 
have now had several years to familiarise themselves with these regulatory requirements. They have 
also been reminded of these obligations and asked to comply voluntarily on a number of 
occasions.  
While the ACL unsolicited consumer agreement provisions do include some requirements to provide 
information about the agreement being entered into, these are not detailed or specific enough to 
ensure that Victorian energy consumers have access to the information enabling them to make 
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appropriate switching decisions at the door. Hence, the marketing information requirements 
contained in the Energy Marketing Code and Guideline 19 are critical, as is the ESC’s role in 
ensuring compliance with them. With the impending introduction of flexible pricing making clear 
and comprehensive information more important than ever, CUAC believes that now is time for the 
ESC to take stronger enforcement action should non-compliance with these obligations continue. 
Following the most recent round of regulatory audits, retailers provided assurances to the ESC that 
corrective actions would be undertaken to rectify areas of non-compliance, and independent 
verification provided to the Commission. Although these actions should now have been completed, 
no further information has been published on the ESC website. Similarly, initial results from four 
further regulatory audits which were scheduled for completion some months ago have not yet been 
made available. The results of all completed regulatory audits, and, where applicable, evidence of 
subsequent corrective action should be made publicly available in a timely fashion.  
Recommendation 4 
That the Essential Services Commission ensure that results from regulatory audits and evidence of 
subsequent corrective action be made publicly available on the ESC website within three months of 
their completion. 
Should any retailers have failed to fulfil undertakings made following their most recent regulatory 
audits by the specified deadlines, stronger enforcement action should now be taken. 
Recommendation 5 
That, should retailers have failed to comply with administrative undertakings arising from 2010-11 
regulatory audits within the specified timelines, the Essential Services Commission use its statutory 
powers to enforce compliance with Energy Marketing Code and Guideline 19 requirements. 
Monitoring and prohibition 
CUAC is not, at this stage, advocating for the prohibition of energy door-to-door sales. 
Nonetheless, we believe this option must be kept ‘on the table’ should less prescriptive approaches 
to minimising detriment fail. At the same time, as the energy retail market changes, the suitability of 
door-to-door sales in the sector must be re-assessed in light of new conditions. The widespread 
introduction of flexible pricing, for example, will be a profound change, and one that increases 
both the complexity of energy agreements and, potentially, the financial detriment that may result 
from unsuitable choices. 
Recommendation 6 
That the Victorian Government and the Essential Services Commission closely monitor consumer 
impacts during the widespread introduction of flexible pricing in 2013. Should this monitoring 
show that consumers are experiencing increased detriment from the door-to-door sale of flexible 
pricing offers, the Energy Marketing Code should be reviewed and protections enhanced.    
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4. CONSUMER-CENTRED 
APPROACHES 
A number of policy approaches to door-to-door selling can be categorised as consumer-centred: 
that is, they place the onus on consumers to, through their choices and actions, protect themselves 
from potential door-to-door selling misconduct and/or detriment, or to opt out of any participation in 
this sales channel. Consumer-centred approaches include consumer education and information 
initiatives, No Canvassing signs and stickers, No Contact lists and registers, excluded zones, and 
combinations of these approaches. There is also substantial overlap among each of these, and 
most approaches include a consumer education component.   
Consumer education and information 
Consumer education and information initiatives aim to equip consumers with the knowledge, skills 
and confidence they need to participate effectively in increasingly complex and information-
intensive markets.177 Consumer education can be formal, including training, advice and instruction 
provided in settings such as schools, or can occur informally, gained via everyday experience and 
individual research.178 It is carried out by governments, but also by civil society, consumer 
organisations, business, educational institutions, and through the media.179  
Consumer education programmes and initiatives frequently target specific vulnerable consumer 
groups and/or specific consumer issues. For example, a targeted education program might focus 
on migrants, recognising that they may have difficulty interacting in the marketplace due to 
unfamiliarity, language barriers and a lack of access to mainstream information resources,180 so a 
targeted education might focus specifically on educating these consumers. Specific issues that are 
frequently the subject of targeted education programmes include financial literacy, fraud and 
scams, and other deceptive practices.181  
Consumer education and awareness initiatives are a mainstay of door-to-door selling policy in a 
range of sectors and jurisdictions, reflecting a more general emphasis on consumer information and 
education in developed economies. In its Promoting Consumer Education: Trends, Policies and 
Good Practices report, the OECD suggests that most countries see consumer education as playing 
a role in: 
(a) consumer protection: increasing consumers’ awareness of their rights and responsibilities 
helps them to protect their own welfare 
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(b) consumer empowerment: knowledge enables consumers to participate proactively, 
avoid falling prey to fraudulent and deceptive practices, and make informed decisions in 
the marketplace, in turn boosting consumer confidence  
c) promoting the public interest: educated consumers can contribute to environmental and 
social objectives.182  
To achieve these goals, consumer education may be used in concert with other tools as a 
‘foundation.’183 
Consumer education and information in Victoria 
Several government departments, regulatory agencies and consumer and community organisations 
produce consumer information materials on door-to-door sales, and/or conduct consumer education 
activities in this area. Some of these are described below. 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
The ACCC has a statutory role in informing consumers about their rights and responsibilities under 
the ACL. The ACCC has produced a series of ACL factsheets including one on door-to-door sales, 
available in English and 20 community languages.184 
In addition, in August 2012, the ACCC responded to community concerns with the launch of a 
consumer awareness campaign on door-to-door selling. The campaign information materials 
themed Knock! Knock! Who’s there? include a detailed consumer guide to door-to-door sales. The 
guide both describes consumers’ rights under the ACL and other applicable industry laws and sets 
out practical tips on, for example, using Do Not Knock stickers, reading agreements before signing 
them, exercising ‘cooling off’ rights, and so on. The guide also includes information and advice 
specific to energy sales, including a suggestion that consumers contact their existing energy 
provider to check whether cancelling their existing contract will attract exit fees.185 In addition to the 
guide, the ACCC produced a more condensed brochure, a postcard, a fridge magnet and its own 
Do Not Knock sticker. The ACCC received around 7,000 requests for Do Not Knock stickers and 
consumer guides following the launch of the campaign.186 
Consumer Affairs Victoria 
CAV has a number of ongoing community education activities relating to door-to-door selling. CAV 
has officers who are available to give community presentations on door-to-door issues, including 
energy-specific content, and has also developed a presentation that can be delivered by 
communities themselves. CAV enquiry and complaints staff all are trained in unsolicited consumer 
agreement requirements, and information on door-to-door selling is available through its 
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metropolitan and regional offices. The CAV website also hosts consumer information on door-to-
door sales in a number of languages and in Easy English.187 
In addition to these ongoing activities, in February 2012 CAV launched an Energy Marketing 
Campaign aimed at empowering consumers to shop around for the best energy deal, without 
feeling pressured to accept an offer on the spot. The campaign also promoted the use of Do Not 
Knock stickers to vulnerable consumers who are not confident in dealing with sales agents. The 
campaign disseminated its messages via metropolitan and regional media, ethnic community 
media, targeted presentations to vulnerable consumer groups and social media (Twitter and 
Facebook). The campaign achieved 56 mentions in ethnic community publications and 13 print 
and radio stories.188 Members of CAV’s Energy Marketing Working Group, which included 
CUAC, supported the campaign via traditional and social media. 
Energy and Water Ombudsman (Victoria) 
EWOV has produced a five minute Energy Marketing and Transfers consumer video, available on 
the EWOV website. In the video, an EWOV conciliator outlines key consumer rights and retailer 
obligations in relation to door-to-door selling and telesales.189 An EWOV Energy Marketing 
factsheet sets out more detailed information about obligations under the Energy Marketing Code 
and ACL, as well as examples of the kinds of door-to-door sales problems that can occur.190 In 
addition to its text-based and audio visual resources on a range of energy and water topics, 
EWOV conducts community education visits, including activities targeting specific vulnerable 
consumer groups.191  
Other government and regulatory information materials 
Victoria’s ESC, which currently regulates retail energy in Victoria, offers consumer advice on 
‘Dealing with Salespeople’ on its website. The ESC describes requirements in the Energy Marketing 
Code and the ACL regarding permitted hours of contact, disclosure of prices and charges and 
other contract terms and conditions and cooling-off periods. It also advises consumers of their right 
to take time to consider their decision, and to ask sales agents to leave. The ESC’s 2009-10 
Respecting Customers programme, discussed in Chapter 3, also included a substantial consumer 
education and information component.  
More broadly, the Your Choice website maintained by the ESC supports consumers to compare 
energy retail market offers, thereby providing an alternative avenue for participation. Similarly, the 
Victorian Government’s Switch On website and campaign, while not addressing door-to-door sales 
directly, offers information and advice to support energy market participation.  
ASIC’s MoneySmart website includes information about ‘Avoiding sales pressure’. While not 
specific to door-to-door sales, this page describes a range of persuasion tactics commonly 
employed in door-to-door selling. It suggests that ‘the outcome is rarely good’ when a decision is 
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made under pressure, and advises consumers to ask for time to think, to consider their cooling-off 
rights, to shop around, and to make use of Do Not Knock stickers. The site also links to more 
detailed information about consumers’ legal rights.192 
Consumer and community organisations 
Consumer Action, together with Financial Counselling Australia and Victoria Legal Aid, maintains a 
Do Not Knock website, which offers consumers access to Do Not Knock stickers as well as 
information and advice on consumer rights, dealing with sales agents and making complaints.  
In a relatively rare example of a non-text resource, Victoria Legal Aid has produced two short 
videos on ‘Dealing with door-to-door sales,’ available on the Do Not Knock website. The first of the 
videos shows an older Italian-Australian man, Marcello, interacting with a door-to-door sales 
person, eventually signing a contract despite his initial reluctance. The second video features a 
lawyer describing Marcello’s cooling off rights and explaining other consumer protections related to 
door-to-door sales.193 
Victoria Legal Aid has also published a ‘how to’ guide which explains how to run a community 
legal education session on door-to-door sales. The guide sets out basic steps for delivering an 
effective and engaging session that can be tailored to different target groups including older 
people, people with a disability, culturally diverse and newly arrived communities, and community 
sector workers. The guide includes resources and speakers' notes.194  
The role, effectiveness and limitations of consumer education 
Consumer education is a key plank of government and civil society responses to door-to-door 
selling, and hence, an examination of the role, effectiveness and any limitations of these 
approaches in important. Consumer awareness and education campaigns can be powerful policy 
tools, and providing consumers with information about their rights is undoubtedly beneficial. UK 
academic Geraint Howells argues that informational approaches are increasingly dominant in 
consumer policy because they appear to present a ‘win-win’ solution for governments concerned 
both with consumer protection and maintaining competitive, efficient markets: 
Consumers are given the means to protect themselves and drive up standards, whilst business 
is allowed flexibility to provide the goods and services the market demands without restrictive 
and potentially anti-competitive substantive regulatory controls.195  
This dynamic is certainly apparent in relation to door-to-door sales of energy. In this policy area, 
educating consumers about their rights seems to strike a balance between protecting consumers and 
allowing the continuation of a practice which drives customer switching and is therefore widely 
seen as crucial to energy market competition. Howells argues, however, that the success of any 
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particular informational strategy should not be assumed without a ‘thorough examination of whether 
[it is] likely to truly deliver the desired outcomes.’ 196 
Evaluation strategies 
Perhaps surprisingly given the prevalence of education and information approaches, however, there 
is little publicly available research evidence about their effectiveness. As the OECD notes, 
evaluating consumer education is difficult because results may take some time to materialise and are 
rarely visible or quantifiable.197 For programmes with clearly identified aims and content, evaluation 
can rely on the subjective reporting of participants about, for example, the value of the information 
provided or the ways in which behaviours have been changed. In many cases, however, while 
assessing whether consumers have received advice may be fairly simple, determining ‘whether the 
information was effective in improving consumers’ decisions’ is difficult or impossible.198 
Alternatively, evaluation can look at or other measurable indications of change (such as shifting 
consumer complaint levels).199 As discussed elsewhere in this report, however, clearly linking 
particular campaigns and approaches to changes on these broader indicators is difficult.  
Limitations 
While making information available to consumers has obvious benefits, it is also important that the 
limitations of information and education as a consumer protection tool are recognised.200 Some of 
these limitations are clear from an analysis of the consumer education materials and activities on 
door-to-door sales described above.  
Firstly, it is important to note that simply providing or distributing information to consumers does not 
mean that that information will be taken account of and absorbed. Information provided may be 
ignored by consumers because they have other things going on in their lives and limited time or 
inclination to increase their knowledge of consumer issues.201 For those who do devote attention to 
informational resources, even apparently simple and clear information can be difficult for many 
consumers to understand.202 The OECD’s Consumer Policy Toolkit emphasises this point in its 
discussion of changes to consumer markets: 
... one would expect consumers to be well-equipped to deal with today’s more challenging, 
information-driven economy. Unfortunately, literacy levels are relatively low. Surveys carried out 
during the 1990s in many countries revealed that only a small proportion of respondents had 
skills needed to deal with many standard consumer contracts.... A larger number were judged 
as having skills suitable for coping with the demands of ordinary life and work. But in all 
countries, there was a sizeable population of persons who were ill-equipped to cope with 
modern-day challenges.203 
Information and education for consumers with poor literacy skills cannot take the form of dense, text-
heavy documents, and information will instead need to be presented using very simple text and 
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pictures, via audio-visual means, or in resource-intensive face-to-face contexts. While there are some 
consumer education activities and resources on door-to-door selling that meet these requirements, 
such as Victoria Legal Aid’s video, their coverage appears to be fairly limited.  
All consumers, moreover, have limits on the amount of information they can absorb and process at 
any one time. Hence it is important that information be provided in a manner that does not simply 
‘[wash] over the heads of consumers.’204 It is unlikely, for example, that even well-educated and 
affluent consumers will retain information about the detail of door-to-door selling provisions such as 
permitted calling hours.  
Even where information is absorbed and retained, it will not necessarily translate into changed 
behaviour. Information can be transmitted effectively, but consumers’ behaviour may continue to be 
driven by other emotional and personal factors as well as ‘behavioural biases that are difficult to 
overcome.’205 This means that simply informing consumers of a risk may not be sufficient to mitigate 
that risk.206  For example, almost all of the consumer information materials dealing with door-to-door 
selling explicitly tell consumers that they should not feel pressured to accept a door-to-door sales 
offer. It is by no means clear, however, that this instruction actually equips consumers to feel 
confident and assertive when faced with a practiced sales-agent employing sophisticated 
psychological persuasion tactics inside the consumer’s home.  
CUAC’s 2011 research into the experiences and needs of Victorian Aboriginal consumers of 
energy and water provides an illustration of this point. Discussions with Aboriginal consumers as 
well as service providers and advocates illuminated some of the complex cultural and behavioural 
factors that influence interactions with door-to-door sales agents. CUAC heard that many Aboriginal 
people, for historical and cultural reasons, tend to be unassertive, and to find interactions with sales 
agents intimidating.207 While efforts should certainly be made to ensure that these consumers are 
informed about their rights in door-to-door selling situations, it seems unrealistic to expect that 
knowledge of these rights will necessarily translate into change to deeply rooted emotions, 
perceptions and behaviours. This in turns raises an ethical question about the extent to which it is 
fair and appropriate to place the onus to minimise detriment on vulnerable and disadvantaged 
consumers themselves, rather than on the businesses that use this sales channel. 
As was noted during initial development of Australia’s Do Not Call Register (discussed in detail later 
in this chapter), an important limitation of consumer education and awareness approaches with 
regard to intrusive marketing practices is that they involve consumers taking action after a marketing 
approach has been made.208 Other mechanisms that allow consumers to opt out of participation 
altogether place less demand on individuals to absorb detailed information about their rights and to 
translate this knowledge into particular behaviours. 
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No Canvassing stickers and signs 
One way in which consumer organisations, governments and other bodies have facilitated 
individual consumers’ decisions to opt out of door-to-door sales is through the production and 
distribution of signs or stickers advising sales agents that unsolicited door-to-door sales are 
unwelcome and/or unlawful. If respected by sellers, these stickers enable consumers to avoid the 
potential financial and non-financial detriment that can arise from misselling or poor decision-
making, as well as the time and annoyance costs of interacting with sales agents at all. If ignored 
or unnoticed by sales agents, the stickers may nonetheless boost consumers’ willingness and 
confidence in asking sales agents to leave. 
Do Not Knock stickers (Australia) 
In response to client reports of door-to-door sales misconduct, in 2007 Consumer Action and 
Financial Counselling Australia (FCA) jointly launched a Do Not Knock sticker. The sticker, which 
advises sales agents that unsolicited doorknocking is ‘unlawful’ at a particular address, was 
distributed to consumers for them to affix to their doors. The stickers were re-launched in August 
2011, available to consumers via free download or from a network of community agencies across 
Australia. According to Consumer Action, more than 200,000 stickers were distributed in the year 
following the re-launch.209 Since Consumer Action and FCA launched the Do Not Knock sticker, 
other community organisations, companies and government agencies (including the ACCC) have 
produced and distributed this and other versions of the stickers. The sticker is also available for free 
download via the Do Not Knock website at www.donotknock.org.au. 
Applicable law and regulation 
Both Victoria’s Energy Retail Marketing Code and the NECF include provisions requiring that 
energy retailers and door-to-door sellers acting on their behalf comply with signs on a person’s 
premises indicating that canvassing is not allowed.  
At the same time, although the ACL does not make specific reference to such signs or stickers, the 
September 2012 Federal Court ruling on ACCC v Neighbourhood Energy, discussed in the 
previous chapter, means that such signs are considered a request to leave under the ACL. Hence, 
retailers are liable to a penalty of up to $50,000 each time a representative sales agent ignores 
the stickers.210  
Effectiveness 
The effectiveness of Do Not Knock stickers was addressed in submissions to the House of 
Representatives Social Policy and Legal Affairs Committee during its inquiry into the Do Not Knock 
Register Bill 2012.211 Industry and door-to-door selling companies argued that the stickers were an 
effective, low-cost approach to opting out, and one that they favoured over more stringent 
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approaches including the use of a register.212 Alinta Energy argued further that a register should not 
be put in place unless the Do Not Knock stickers could be shown to have failed.213  
Consumer Action, however, argued that a Do Not Knock Register would be preferable and 
complementary because some sales agents ignored the stickers, while a register would carry 
substantial penalties for non-compliance.214 Consumer Action noted that reports from consumers 
suggest an ‘increasing tendency’ for some sales agents to ignore the stickers, despite their being 
required to respect them. EWOV data for the April to June 2012 quarter includes complaints from 
consumers alleging that sales agents ignored Do Not Knock or No Canvassing stickers.215 At the 
time of writing it remains to be seen whether the recent Federal Court decision results in greater 
compliance with these requirements.  
Although Do Not Knock stickers have been popular with consumers, achieving a comprehensive 
coverage of those households that wish to opt out would appear much less likely through the use of 
stickers than via a register. While distribution of stickers via a collection of consumer and community 
organisations and government departments is a fairly complex and somewhat haphazard exercise, 
registering one’s address on a centralised, government-run register can be made simple and fast for 
consumers. In a survey of Do Not Call Register users conducted by Newspoll, 95 per cent said that 
registering was very easy (71%) or easy (24%).216 
Excluded zones 
As a collective response to unwanted door-to-door selling, some jurisdictions have seen the 
establishment of particular geographical areas in which the practice is discouraged or banned.   
No Cold Calling Zones (UK) 
In the UK, many communities have established No Cold Calling Zones (NCCZs): small residential 
areas, often only one street or a small cluster of houses, in which unsolicited door-to-door selling has 
been collectively declared unwelcome. Signs placed at the boundaries of an NCCZ advise sales 
agents and others that the area is designated as ‘no cold calling.’  
The NCCZs initiative was launched in 2005 by the UK Trading Standards Institute, an association 
of consumer affairs professionals, with the aim of protecting vulnerable consumers in particular. The 
initiative followed a number of years of unsuccessful campaigning for greater legislative protection 
from unsolicited door-to-door sales and a large consumer survey which found that 96 per cent of 
respondents did not wish to buy in the home. By 2008 there were more than 500 NCCZs across 
England.217 
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Operation of NCCZs 
NCCZs are set up by local communities at their initiative, typically with the assistance of local 
government Trading Standards departments which provide guidance and materials and maintain 
records of designated NCCZs. The Trading Standards Institute has also produced a guide for local 
communities which explains how they can set up an NCCZ, including advice on selecting an area, 
consulting and establishing community support, enlisting partners, attracting funding, running the 
scheme and measuring its effectiveness. The guide recommends that a ‘local champion’ takes 
responsibility for managing the initiative and notes that success is more likely when partners such as 
local government, police and neighbourhood watch groups are involved.218 
The establishment of an NCCZ typically involves a substantial consumer awareness and education 
component. Initially, residents are consulted to ensure that there is strong community support for 
creation of an NCCZ. Residents are then engaged and given information about how they can deal 
with unwanted cold-callers through simple, brief information packs, personal visits and community 
meetings. Individual residents are encouraged to affix door stickers which advise cold callers that 
they are not welcome, and they may also be given ‘no cold calling’ cards that can be handed to 
unwanted callers. As well as discouraging the practice of unsolicited door-to-door sales, then, 
NCCZs can also give consumers – particularly vulnerable consumers – greater confidence in 
dealing with any unwanted sales approaches that are made.219 
NCCZs and energy door-to-door selling 
The NCCZ initiative was initially established with the primary aim of combating doorstep crime 
including rogue trading and distraction burglary. Although NCCZs were also intended to 
discourage legal but unwanted unsolicited door-to-door selling, energy sales agents were routinely 
ignoring the zones, which have no special legal status. Following campaigning from Consumer 
Focus and the Trading Standards Institute, in May 2010 the ‘big six’ retailers agreed to respect 
both NCCZs and no canvassing stickers.220 The self-regulatory Energy Sure Code of Practice, 
discussed in the following chapter, was amended to reflect this: 
(a) not call on premises in recognised* no cold calling zones where there is a message 
prominently displayed from the consumer in the form of a written note or sticker indicating 
support by police. 
(b) not call on any premises where there is a message prominently displayed in the form of a 
visible, clearly worded and unambiguous notice indicating that a consumer does not wish to 
receive uninvited doorstep sales callers. 
*Members will recognise Local Authority no cold calling zones as lawful where they meet the 
requirements of proportionality as set out by the Office of Fair Trading in their letter to the 
Association and Local Authorities dated February 2008.221 
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Effectiveness 
Small-scale local evaluations tend to show that NCCZs are effective at reducing the incidence of 
unsolicited doorknocking and boosting residents’ awareness and confidence in door-to-door 
situations. For example, after a six month Welsh pilot project covering two areas of approximately 
200 houses, a resident survey found that 92 per cent considered the pilot a success and supported 
continuation. Large majorities felt that the number of cold callers had decreased, reported feeling 
safer in the area and said that when cold callers did come they felt more comfortable sending them 
away.222 
While NCCZs appear to be fairly effective at both reducing unsolicited door-to-door selling and 
providing consumer education, by their nature their scope is limited. The establishment of an NCCZ 
requires consultation with and support from a substantial majority of included households. While this 
process of engagement is central to NCCZ effectiveness, this requirement naturally limits a zone’s 
size. NCCZs are probably of most use as mechanisms to protect vulnerable consumers in 
particular, which is indeed how they have been used in the UK. Even so, NCCZs require some 
initiative from each local community, they are unlikely to achieve full coverage of disadvantaged 
areas. In Australian jurisdictions, where Do Not Knock stickers are considered a request to leave 
under the ACL, excluding entire areas would seem to offer little or no benefit over and above the 
distribution of stickers with accompanying consumer education messages. 
The use of NCCZs as a community-level response particularly targeted at potentially vulnerable 
consumers also raises issues about the avenues open for these consumers to participate in 
competitive retail energy markets. Retailers in the UK have argued that door-to-door selling is an 
effective way of informing disadvantaged consumers who often lack internet access and the 
information that facilitates switching.223 As discussed above, however, 2008 Ofgem research 
found that almost half of those switching door-to-door ended up on a more expensive offer, raising 
questions about the extent to which door-to-door selling in that market enables vulnerable consumers 
to both ‘participate’ in the market and make good switching decisions. While face-to-face advice is 
indeed necessary or preferable for many vulnerable consumers, the benefits of this may be 
outweighed by the situational monopoly characteristics of the door-to-door setting.  
No Contact lists and registers  
Another approach to allowing individuals to exclude themselves from door-to-door selling is the use 
of No Contact lists and registers. Consumers register or sign up to such lists, indicating that they do 
not wish to be contacted by door-to-door sales agents. A private members bill for the creation of a 
legislated Do Not Knock register, modelled on Australia’s existing telesales Do Not Call Register, 
was recently introduced, but, at the time of writing, seemed unlikely to progress. Under the NECF 
and Victoria’s existing Energy Marketing Code, nevertheless, energy retailers are already required 
to maintain individual No Contact lists. 
                                                          
222 Cardiff Council (2011) Stopping the Door-Stepper. 
223 House of Commons Energy and Climate Change Committee (2011) Ofgem’s Retail Market Review – Sixth Report of Session 
2010-12, House of Commons: London, p. 53. 
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Do Not Call Registers 
A recent proposal for creation of an Australian Do Not Knock Register (discussed below) referred to 
the success of the Do Not Call Register already in place.224 The Do Not Call Register, which 
allows consumers to opt out of receiving telesales calls, is one of a number of such registers around 
the world. While there are differences between telesales and door-to-door selling, experience with 
the adoption of Do Not Call Registers has lessons of relevance to any potential Do Not Knock 
Register. 
Australia’s Do Not Call Register  
Maintained by the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA), the Do Not Call 
Register is a secure database on which consumers can have their telephone and fax numbers 
registered at no charge. Under the Do Not Call Register Act 2006, businesses both in Australia 
and overseas are required by law to avoid contacting consumers via registered telephone and fax 
numbers, and may face penalties if they do so. Some public interest organisation are exempt and 
may continue to contact registered numbers, as can companies that have an existing business 
relationship with a particular consumer. 
The Do Not Call Register was developed in response to increasing community concern about 
growth in telesales calls, which were widely perceived as inconvenient and intrusive.225 After a 
public consultation on potential models in 2005, the Act was passed in 2006, with the register 
coming into operation in May 2007. The introduction of the register was accompanied by a 
comprehensive consumer and industry education program.226 Reflecting this, more than 1.3 million 
numbers were registered during the first month of operation, while more than 1,000 firms had 
signed up to check their calling lists against the register.227 The number of listed numbers has grown 
by more than one million each year,228 and a representative survey conducted by Newspoll in 
2009 found high awareness of the register: three quarters of Australian adults had heard of it.229 
Among those not yet registered, interest in registering was high. By October 2012 the Do Not Call 
Register had reached eight million registrations, representing nearly two thirds of Australian 
households.230 It should be noted that this indicates an extremely high level of public support for the 
government’s decision to establish the register.  
The Do Not Call Register operates on a full direct costs recovery basis, with telesales companies 
charged subscription fees to ‘wash’ call lists against the register. This cost recovery does not include 
the estimated $33.1 million cost of establishing the register,231 nor the regulatory costs associated 
with monitoring and enforcing compliance. 
                                                          
224 Pyburne, Paula (2012) ‘Do Not Knock Register Bill 2012,’ Bills Digest No. 17, 2012-13, Canberra: Parliament of Australia 
Department of Parliamentary Services, p.4.  
225 Australian Communications and Media Authority (2006) ACMA Annual Report 2005-06, ACMA: Melbourne, p. 47. 
226 Australian Communications and Media Authority (2007) ACMA Annual Report 2006-07, ACMA: Melbourne, p 56. 
227 Ibid, p. 56. 
228 Pyburne (2012) ‘Do Not Knock Register Bill 2012,’ p.14-15. 
229 Newspoll (2009) Community Attitudes to Unsolicited Communications, p. 3. 
230 Australian Communications and Media Authority (2012b) ‘Do Not Call Register tops eight million numbers!,’ Media Release, 
16 October 2012. 
231 Australian Government Treasury (2012) Submission to the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Social Policy and 
Legal Affairs Do Not Knock Register Bill 2012 inquiry, Parliament of Australia: Canberra, p. 6. 
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Compliance with the Do Not Call Register Act 2006 has not been total. Consumer complaints 
which raise potential contraventions have tended to grow substantially year upon year, despite a 
drop in 2008-09 attributed to a ‘significant improvement’ in industry compliance.232 Most recently, 
in 2011-12 consumers lodged 21,969 telesales and fax marketing complaints, of which 19,000 
involved potential breaches of the Act.233 In response to complaints, ACMA sends advisory and 
warning letters before launching formal investigations, which may result in infringement notices, 
enforceable undertakings and formal warnings. In the 2009-10 financial year ACMA also 
commenced Federal Court proceedings against one company, resulting in a $120,000 penalty.234  
Despite somewhat patchy compliance, for registered consumers, the Do Not Call Register appears 
to be mostly effective. In the 2009 Newspoll survey, 79 per cent of those with a registered home 
phone number reported receiving fewer telesales calls after registration, while 16 per cent reported 
no change and three per cent an increase. For mobile phone users the results were slightly poorer: 
65 per cent of those with a registered mobile phone said telesales calls had decreased, while 30 
per cent reported no change.235 An internal ACMA survey of recent registrants in January 2010 
found that 90 per cent of home and 76 per cent of mobile numbers reported a decrease in 
telesales calls. 
Overseas Do Not Call Registers 
A number of other countries have established Do Not Call Registers, and ACMA is part of an 
international regulatory forum on such registers.236 Some overseas examples are summarised in 
Table 9, below. 
                                                          
232 Australian Communications and Media Authority (2009) ACMA Annual Report 2008-09, ACMA: Melbourne, p. 66. 
233 Australian Communications and Media Authority (2012a) ACMA Annual Report 2011-12, ACMA: Melbourne, p. 24. 
234 Australian Communications and Media Authority (2011) ACMA Annual Report 2010-11, ACMA: Melbourne, p. 13. 
235 Newspoll (2009) Community Attitudes to Unsolicited Communications, p. 4. 
236 ACMA (2012) ACMA Annual Report 2011-12, p. 94. 
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Table 9: Overseas examples of Do Not Call Registers 
Scheme Began  Description 
UK - Telephone 
Preference Service 
1999 Registration is free for consumers and registry costs are paid by the direct marketing 
industry. The Direct Marketing Association runs the register but enforcement is the 
responsibility of the Information Commissioner. Although compliance is a legal 
requirement, and despite high complaint numbers, actual enforcement activity has been 
limited.  
United States of 
America (USA) - Do 
Not Call List 
2003 Created by the US FTC. Telesales firms are required to buy the list, which funds its 
operation. As of January 2010, more than191million phone numbers had been placed 
on the register. The FTC has taken enforcement action against more than 30 firms, 
alleging violations of the regulations. 
Canada - National Do 
Not Call List  
2006 Certain public interest callers and existing business relationship calls are exempt. 
Consumers may register for free, with registration lasting for five years. Canadian 
Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission may impose fines of $15,000 
per violation for corporations. Early criticism of ineffectiveness led to changes. 
India - National 
Customer Preference 
Register  
2007 A National Do Not Call register had limited effectiveness and was replaced by the 
National Customer Preference Register in 2010. Consumers may register to block all 
commercial communication from seven industry categories. Telemarketers must register 
with the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) and pay a security deposit. The 
TRAI can impose fines or disconnect and blacklist telemarketers for repeated violations. 
Netherlands - Do Not 
Call Register 
2009 Legally binding. Consumers can place their number on the registry by phone, email or 
mail, and can choose to block all calls or commercial calls only. Fines of up to 
€450,000 can be imposed for businesses which contact registered numbers. 
Telemarketers are made to inform consumers that they can be added to the register ‘at 
the outset of every call,’ and must process that registration if desired. Unless otherwise 
requested, registration is free and permanent . 
Sources: Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (2012) Consumers Handbook on Telecommunications, TRAI: New Delhi, p. 17; 
OECD (2010) Consumer Policy Toolkit, p. 40; Department of Communication, Information Technology and the Arts (2005) 
Introduction of a Do Not Call Register, p. 6; Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (2012) National Do 
Not Call List website; Redmond (2005) ‘Intrusive Promotion as Market Failure.’ 
Effectiveness of Do Not Call Registers 
Internationally, Do Not Call Registers have had mixed results. One unintended consequence of the 
creation of the registers in some jurisdictions is that companies have simply shifted from telesales to 
other intrusive marketing methods. For example, although the USA Do Not Call List led into a ‘new, 
more restrained phase’ of telesales activity:  
... individual telemarketers have reportedly moved call centres off shore or shifted their intrusion 
to e-mail spam and direct-mail campaigns. In the months preceding the initial activation of the 
register, telemarketers increased calls significantly in an attempt to establish ‘business 
relationships’ with consumers to be able to legally call them in the future.237 
There is also some indication that the decrease in telesales calls in India was accompanied by a 
dramatic increase in SMS marketing.238 Similarly, Frost & Sullivan in their study of the Australian 
door-to-door selling industry recognise this interrelationship between telesales and door-to-door 
selling, identifying the restriction of telesales via the Do Not Call Register as a driver likely to 
                                                          
237 Redmond (2005) ‘Intrusive Promotion as Market Failure,’ p. 13. 
238 The Economic Times (2011) ‘Telemarketing Calls: What killed the ‘Do Not Call’ registry?’ 24 April 2011. 
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encourage continued growth in door-to-door sales.239 These examples suggest that governments 
considering placing restrictions on one form of intrusive marketing activity should consider other 
similar channels in tandem. 
Inadequate enforcement has also hampered the effectiveness of Do Not Call Registers in some 
countries. In its initial years of operation, Canada’s National Do Not Call List was heavily criticised 
as ineffective, with some consumers reporting increased calls following registration.240 Although 11 
fines totalling around CA$73,000 were imposed between September 2008 and July 2010, only 
$250 was actually collected.241 However, a later survey reported in 2011, after increased 
enforcement activity, found that eight in ten registrants were reporting reduced telesales calls.242 
Similarly, inadequate enforcement powers in the UK prior to 2012 have reportedly limited the 
effectiveness of the Telephone Preference Service.243  
Do Not Knock Register Bill 2012 
In May 2012 a private member’s bill for the creation of a Do Not Knock Register, modelled on the 
Do Not Call Register, was put forward in the Australian parliament. The Do Not Knock Register Bill 
2012 was to establish a scheme allowing individual consumers to opt-out of unsolicited door-to-
door sales calls by requesting their address be added to a Do Not Knock Register. The overarching 
objectives of the Bill were to protect vulnerable consumers who could be taken advantage of by 
unscrupulous sales agents, and to give consumers choice about whether sales agents could knock 
on their doors. The scheme would include a complaints mechanism and provide for penalties to be 
applied in cases of non-compliance. The Do Not Knock Register Bill 2012 was then referred to the 
House of Representatives Social Policy and Legal Affairs Committee for an inquiry.  
Broadly, consumer groups, including CUAC,† supported the Do Not Knock Register Bill 2012, 
viewing a register as a simple, effective way for consumers to exercise their right to opt-out of door-
to-door sales activity. Consumer group submissions drew attention to continued reports of misselling 
activity despite existing protections. Some improvements to the design of the register were also 
proposed. Consumer Action, for example, argued that online registration should be supplemented 
by other means of registration, including via outreach, if the register was to reach the most 
vulnerable.244  
Retailers and door-to-door selling companies, in contrast, argued the Bill was unnecessary and 
premature given the existence of unsolicited consumer agreement provisions in the ACL and the use 
of Do Not Knock stickers.245 As an alternative to a Do Not Knock register, industry proposed further 
consumer education about ACL provisions.246 Similarly, the Australian Treasury noted that the ACL 
was due for review in 2015, and argued for any policy gaps on door-to-door selling to instead be 
                                                          
239 Frost and Sullivan (2012) Research into the door-to-door sales industry, p. 45. 
240 CBC news (2009) ‘Registered with the do-not-call list? Expect more calls, says consumer watchdog,’ 23 January 2009. 
241 CBC news (2010) ‘Do Not Call List ‘useless’, critics say,’ 7 July 2010. 
242 Marketing Research and Intelligence Association (Canada) (2011) Do Not Call List shows blocking power: VoxPop Survey, 
MRIA: Mississagua. 
243 BBC News (2012) ‘Cold-call firms flout rules that block telemarketers’,1  July 2012. 
† In addition to the Consumer Action, FCA, National Seniors Australia, the Queensland Consumers’ Association and CHOICE. 
244 Consumer Action Law Centre (2012c) Submission to the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Social Policy and 
Legal Affairs Do Not Knock Register Bill 2012 inquiry, Parliament of Australia: Canberra, p. 8. 
245 Standing Committee on Social Policy and Legal Affairs (2012) Advisory Report: Do Not Knock Register Bill 2012, p. 15. 
246 Ibid, p. 15. 
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addressed at that time.247 The Standing Committee in its Advisory Report agreed with this 
assessment, arguing that further regulation would only be merited should consumer education efforts 
‘prove ineffective, and if courts decide that the Do Not Knock sticker does not amount to a request 
to leave.’248 
Cost effectiveness 
Opponents of the Do Not Knock Register also drew attention to its implementation costs. Energy 
Assured Limited argued that the Register would be accompanied by monitoring and training costs, 
as well as the cost to retailers of ‘wash[ing] several million households against the register each 
month.’ Similarly, door-to-door selling provider Salmat alleged that Do Not Knock stickers were 
effective, whereas compliance with a Register would be ‘unrealistic and unworkable’ as businesses 
would not necessarily have the resources to comply.249  
While checking registered addresses against doorknocking lists would undoubtedly involve 
administrative costs, there are arguably administrative and efficiency benefits for door-to-door sellers 
in the use of a Do Not Knock Register as compared to Do Not Knock stickers. For example, in 
selecting geographical areas to visit, energy retailers and door-to-door sellers could exclude areas 
in which a high proportion of households were registered, focusing instead on areas where 
customers were more pre-disposed to purchase. In this regard, it is worth noting that door-to-door 
sellers and industry frequently claim they do not wish to sell to consumers who do not want to be 
sold to.250 Sales agents themselves could efficiently skip houses listed in the register by reviewing a 
list, without having to spend time entering the property and sighting a Do No Knock sticker. A 
register would also reduce the risk to sales agents of face-to-face conflict with consumers. 
While the Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill suggested that the Register would have no 
budgetary impact, the Australian Treasury suggested that its establishment costs were likely to be 
similar to those of the Do Not Call Register, which was funded by the Federal Government at a 
costs of $33.1 million over four years.251 Treasury’s submission to the inquiry painted a positive 
picture of the door-to-door sales industry and argued that community concern about door-to-door 
selling was ‘not proportionate’ to the size of the problem given low complaint numbers and ‘only a 
relatively low, anecdotal level of evidence...[of] consumer detriment.’252 Similarly, an explanatory 
digest on the Bill prepared for Parliamentarians suggested that ‘without further quantitative data’ 
about how many community members require additional protection, there was insufficient policy 
rationale for a register.253 In September 2012 the Committee released its Advisory Report on the 
Do Not Knock Register Bill 2012, recommending that the Bill not be passed.254  
                                                          
247 Ibid, p. 15. 
248 Ibid, p. 22. 
249 Ibid, p. 19. 
250 See, for example: Salmat (2012), Submission to the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Social Policy and Legal 
Affairs Do Not Knock Register Bill 2012 inquiry, Parliament of Australia: Canberra, p. 5. 
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Legal Affairs Do Not Knock Register Bill 2012 inquiry, Parliament of Australia: Canberra, p. 6. 
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No Contact lists 
While there is at present no overarching register that allows customers to opt-out of energy door-to-
door selling, both Victoria’s currently applicable Energy Marketing Code and the NECF require 
energy retailers to maintain individual No Contact lists.  
Energy Marketing Code and NECF provisions 
Clause 2.3 of the Energy Marketing Code states that retailers must keep a record of consumers 
who have requested that they not be contacted ‘at all or in a specified medium’ including in 
person. If requested, the retailer must provide written confirmation that the consumer has been 
placed on the list. The Code does not set any duration for the consumers’ inclusion on the list, but 
should the consumer change address, their details may be removed. 
Similarly, No Contact lists provisions are included in Part 2 Division 10 of the National Energy 
Retail Rules (NERR). Under the Rules, retailers must ensure that a No Contact list is created and 
maintained for its marketers, whether by the retailer itself or on its behalf. A residential consumer 
can indicate they wish to be placed on the list by applying in person, electronically, by telephone 
or in writing, and once listed, the retailer must not make contact with the customer. The entry 
remains on the list for a period of two years, but may be refreshed. In contrast to the Energy 
Marketing Code, the list applies to door-to-door selling and direct mail but not to e-marketing or 
telesales calls, presumably due to the existence of the Do Not Call Register. The NERR also states 
that the retailer must publish a statement on its website advising of the existence of the list. At the 
time of writing the NECF provisions applied only to consumers in Tasmania and the ACT. 
Effectiveness 
CUAC reviewed the websites of all retailers that sell door-to-door in Victoria to determine whether 
consumers could easily access information about retailers’ No Contact lists. On each website, 
CUAC inspected the homepage, ‘Contact us’ page and site map and used the sites’ search 
functions to search for the terms ‘no contact,’ ‘list’ and ‘door-to-door.’ Any other pages that might 
potentially make reference to the list were also inspected. Following these procedures, CUAC found 
consumer information about the No Contact list present on only one retailer website.† This 
information was clear and comprehensive, but even so, it was not mentioned on the homepage 
and might easily be missed by an interested consumer.  
While both the Energy Marketing Code and the NECF require the maintenance of no contact lists, 
their ultimate purpose is unclear and their effectiveness unlikely. Retailers do not promote or 
advertise the existence of their No Contact lists or even, it would appear, make reference to them 
at all. Hence, it is probable that the vast majority of consumers are unaware of this requirement on 
retailers. Furthermore, given that almost all energy retailers sell door-to-door, even an aware 
consumer  who wished to opt out would need to contact and register with each retailer: a time-
consuming and potentially confusing exercise.  
                                                          
† Additional retailers had links on their website to Victoria’s Energy Marketing Code of Conduct, which makes reference to the No 
Contact list.  
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If the intention behind No Contact list provisions is to enable consumers to opt-out of door-to-door 
selling (among other forms of direct marketing), it seems clear that a centralised register like the 
proposed Do Not Knock Register, would be a far more effective and efficient mechanism. The No 
Contact list requirements would also seem to suggest that ‘washing’ door-to-door selling lists against 
a list of excluded addresses is feasible and indeed, already occurring, albeit it on a presumably 
very limited scale.  
Discussion and recommendations 
Consumer-centred mechanisms for minimising detriment have been a central component of policy 
approaches to door-to-door selling, both in Victoria and in other jurisdictions. Importantly, they have 
the potential to achieve consumer protection goals without excessively limiting sellers’ activities. 
However, these approaches also have limitations: it can be difficult to achieve wide coverage of 
affected consumers, and sellers’ behaviour is not directly addressed.  
Consumer education and information 
Consumer information and education is undoubtedly important – consumers need to be aware of 
their rights. Informed and empowered consumers are less likely to incur substantial detriment from a 
door-to-door sales interaction and, should they have a negative experience, are more likely to 
access avenues for redress. Nevertheless, governments and regulators need to be aware of the 
limits to consumer education. Its primary limitation is that it does not tackle misselling at its source, 
but instead places the responsibility on consumers to identify and defend themselves against poor 
behaviour. In doing so it may place unrealistic expectations on very vulnerable consumers to 
absorb, understand and, crucially, act on information about their rights.  
Nevertheless, CUAC believes that vulnerable consumers should be a primary focus of education 
and information initiatives relating to door-to-door sales, since they are most at risk of detriment. Our 
review of currently available consumer information materials suggests mixed success on this point. 
There is information available in a number of community languages and in Easy English, but 
resources tend to be text-heavy and primarily available online, potentially limiting access for 
consumers without the internet at home. Often, these resources describe consumer rights but offer 
less guidance about how this information might be translated into action. Finally, CUAC’s earlier 
research has found that consumer information and education for vulnerable consumer groups is 
often most effective when delivered in face-to-face contexts. Hence we see a need for ongoing 
government support for consumer and community groups to deliver this education.       
The task of protecting consumers from unwanted door-to-door selling and the detriment potentially 
associated with it should never be left to individual consumers alone – CUAC believes that policy 
approaches to door-to-door selling must also focus heavily on ensuring that sellers comply with their 
responsibilities. 
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Recommendation 7 
That Consumer Affairs Victoria and the Essential Services Commission support community and 
consumer organisations to provide targeted, face-to-face education and information on door-to-door 
sales to vulnerable consumers. 
Opt-out mechanisms 
Many of the consumer-centred approaches reviewed in this chapter focus on providing consumers 
with a mechanism to opt-out of any participation in door-to-door sales. The most important benefit of 
these opt-out mechanisms is that, provided they are respected by sellers, they allow consumers to 
avoid all of the potential detriment associated with door-to-door selling, including the relatively 
minor yet pervasive time and emotional costs of sending unwelcome sales agents away. At the 
same time, opt-out mechanisms do not prevent sellers from undertaking door-to-door sales and 
should not be seen, therefore, as unnecessarily restrictive.  
Although opt-out mechanisms have important benefits, not all are effective. For instance, it would 
appear that current requirements on retailers to maintain No Contact lists are of limited use. 
Retailers are not publicising the existence of these lists, meaning that consumers are unlikely to be 
aware of or using them. CUAC’s review of retailer websites indicated that retailers may not be 
compliant with NECF requirements that mention be made of the lists on retailers’ websites. 
However, even if there were strong consumer awareness of No Contact lists, they would still be an 
overly complex and inefficient opt-out mechanism, since they require consumers to register with 
each retailer individually.† 
Although the recent Do Not Knock Register Bill 2012 failed to gain support, CUAC’s review of the 
evidence suggests that a register would likely be the most effective and efficient approach to opting-
out. The extraordinary popularity of Australia’s Do Not Call Register Bill shows that the community 
strongly supports mechanisms which allow consumers to avoid intrusive selling practices. This high 
level of uptake and support might also be taken as an indication that consumers will have some 
degree of ‘willingness to pay’ for such registers.  
Regulators and policy makers have been reluctant to view the demonstrated near-universal consumer 
dislike of door-to-door sales as an indication of any significant detriment. However, while the time 
loss and annoyance costs of many individual door-to-door sales encounters may be fairly small, the 
extent of door-to-door sales activity means that, cumulatively, the detriment is substantial: this is what 
accounts, in large part, for negative community perceptions of door-to-door selling. While a Do Not 
Knock Register would have associated costs that may eventually be borne by consumers, it is by no 
means clear that consumers would be unwilling to bear those passed-through costs in order to avoid 
door-to-door selling. 
Although industry has argued that Do Not Knock stickers are effective and low-cost, it seems unlikely 
that achieving equivalent coverage of interested households through the distribution of stickers 
would be more cost-effective than the same level of coverage achieved via a centralised register. 
                                                          
† Moreover, unlike other opt-out mechanisms they do not insulate consumers from unwanted door-to-door sales from other sectors 
such as telecommunications. 
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Moreover, while the costs of producing, publicising and distributing Do Not Knock stickers have 
often been borne by government agencies and resource-constrained consumer groups, a register 
could be largely funded via industry subscription fees. This would be appropriate and efficient 
given that the annoyance and time loss costs to consumers are an externality arising from sellers’ 
decisions to use the door-to-door sales channel. 
In sum, CUAC believes that the idea of a Do Not Knock Register has been ruled out too quickly 
and on the basis of ill-considered arguments and insufficient evidence. We will continue to support 
a more careful consideration of the design, implementation, costs and willingness to pay for such a 
register.  
In the absence of a Do Not Knock Register, however, CUAC sees an important opportunity for the 
ESC to improve the practical effectiveness of No Contact list provisions already contained in its 
Energy Marketing Code by developing an online tool which allows consumers to request their 
addition to retailers’ lists. Using this tool, consumers would be able to fill in their contact details and 
select, using check boxes, the retailers to whose No Contact lists they wished to be added. Using 
an automated process, the ESC could then forward these details to the consumer’s chosen retailers. 
Hence, rather than having to identify every retailer that might market to them door-to-door, finding 
contact details and sending individual requests to each, this tool would give consumers a quick and 
simple way of opting-out of door-to-door sales. This tool should be fairly simple to develop and 
could be hosted on the ESC’s existing Your Choice website. In jurisdictions where the NECF has 
come into effect, the AER might also consider developing a similar tool.   
Recommendation 8 
That the Essential Services Commission improves the effectiveness of No Contact list requirements in 
the Energy Marketing Code by developing of an online tool through which consumers can request 
to be added to retailers’ No Contact lists. This facility should be hosted on the ESC’s Your Choice 
website.   
Finally, the debate about the costs of a Do Not Knock Register in relation to the level of consumer 
detriment provides further demonstration of the difficulties discussed in Chapter 2 of this report, 
highlighting the dearth of reliable data about overall levels of door-to-door selling misconduct and 
the financial consequences of energy door-to-door switching decisions. Opponents of the Bill 
argued that existing measures were effective and that there was insufficient evidence of the need for 
additional protections – ignoring the fact that this results from an overall lack of reliable data, rather 
than positive evidence of low levels of consumer detriment. The lack of any representative picture of 
the average door-to-door selling interaction leaves decision-makers reliant on inadequate complaints 
data. This both limits the ability to evaluate the effectiveness of existing policies and undercuts efforts 
to improve consumer protections. CUAC will be advocating vigorously for implementation of 
Recommendations 1 and 2 on research and data.    
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5. SELF-REGULATORY AND 
VOLUNTARIST APPROACHES 
In part of the same transformational process that saw the introduction of competition into essential 
service provision, the past two decades have seen a shift in emphasis away from state intervention 
in markets and towards self-regulation.255 Self-regulation refers to a situation in which ‘the rules 
which govern behaviour in the market are developed, administered and enforced by [those] whose 
behaviour is to be governed’.256 In most instances, this self-regulation takes the form of an industry-
level organisation setting rules and standards for businesses within that industry,257 although it can 
also occur at the level of the individual business. In this report, industry-level efforts are referred to as 
‘self-regulatory schemes’ while ‘voluntarism’ refers to a situation in which an individual business 
undertakes, unilaterally, to ‘do the right thing’.258  
Self-regulatory and voluntarist approaches often sit side-by-side with legislative and regulatory 
approaches, and there may be interaction between the two. For example, Australia’s self-regulatory 
Energy Assured scheme, discussed in detail below, coexists with the ACL and state-based energy 
marketing regulations. The scheme also required ACCC authorisation due to potential competition 
implications, and hence sits within a wider framework of government intervention. Individual 
businesses’ voluntary agreements to undertake (or not undertake) particular actions are also 
frequently facilitated or coordinated by governments.259 Similarly, while self-regulatory and 
voluntarist approaches are most often voluntary, at least in name, there may be considerable 
external pressure to self-regulate,260 with self-regulation often prompted by the threat of government 
intervention.261 
Voluntary industry codes of conduct 
A form of self-regulation that began proliferating in the 1990s,262 codes of conduct are sets of 
principles and rules setting out the way in which a body should behave towards stakeholders.263 
Codes of conduct vary widely in terms of applicability, authoritativeness and specificity. They may 
be developed by and applied to individual businesses, industries, professions or public sector 
                                                          
255 Jenkins, Rhys (2001) Corporate Codes of Conduct: Self-Regulation in a Global Economy – Technology, Business and Society 
Programme Paper Number 2, United National Research Institute for Social Development: Geneva, p. 1. 
256 National Consumer Council (2000) Models of self-regulation: An overview of models in business and the professions, NCC: 
London, p. 4. 
257 Gunningham, Neil and Darren Sinclair (1999) Regulatory Pluralism: Designing Policy Mixes for Environmental Protection, Law 
and Policy 21(1), p. 54. 
258 Ibid, p. 54. 
259 Ibid, p. 54 
260 NCC (2000) Models of self-regulation, p. 4. 
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organisations.264 They may be voluntary or mandatory, either legally or as a condition of 
membership,265 with voluntary codes falling under the category of self-regulation. While some are 
general statements of ethical intent, others are more substantive and prescribe specific processes 
and procedures, such as how a dispute resolution mechanism will work.266 Depending on the 
Code’s intended purpose, development, administration and enforcement can be undertaken by 
code signatories, government, or a combination of the two.267 Where they are in place, codes of 
conduct are only one of several mechanisms prescribing and determining conduct; applicable laws 
and regulations as well as ‘informal norms’ also help set the framework for business conduct.268 
In a best case scenario, voluntary industry codes of conduct may increase industry transparency 
and stakeholder confidence; minimise breaches of consumer law; and offer a competitive marketing 
advantage to signatories.269 At the same time, voluntary codes may have advantages over 
government interventions, including increased flexibility in adapting to changing industry needs. A 
greater ‘sense of ownership’ of the code may mean greater commitment from industry participants. 
Voluntary industry codes can also be less intrusive that government interventions, quicker and less 
costly to put in place, and place lower demands on government resources and reducing 
businesses’ compliance costs.270  
Voluntary industry codes of conduct in well-functioning markets can be effective. However, they are 
not necessarily so, and moreover, ineffective voluntary codes can actually be damaging. As the 
OECD cautions, ineffective codes of conduct have the potential to undermine consumer confidence 
if they are used where other tools, such as regulation, might have been more appropriate.271 At the 
same time, the existence of a voluntary industry code may act as a barrier to adequate 
legislation.272 Hence, they should be put in place only where the circumstances are appropriate 
and they are carefully designed. 
Appropriate circumstances for a voluntary industry code 
As with any policy tool, the OECD recommends that governments make an ‘evidence-based 
assessment’ of the likely efficacy of a voluntary code of conduct in addressing specific identified 
issues.273 Among the range of factors that should be considered in this assessment are: 
 the nature of the industry, including its history in relation to the code’s objective; 
 the current degree of community and consumer trust and confidence in the industry; and 
 the industry’s ‘commitment’ to self-regulation and the willingness of the code administrator to 
enforce compliance.274 
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Where an analysis of these factors suggests that a voluntary industry code is likely to be effective it 
may be an appropriate instrument for addressing a given consumer issue. 
Features of an effective voluntary industry code 
Even in situations where a voluntary industry code may be appropriate, poor design or 
implementation may compromise its effectiveness. Researchers and policy and regulatory bodies 
have identified a range of features that characterise the design and development of effective 
voluntary industry codes of conduct. 
Consumer involvement  
A consultative process for code development is generally considered to be an important feature of 
a voluntary industry code. The ACCC suggests that involvement of consumer representatives in code 
development will increase stakeholder acceptance and help to ensure that the code offers more 
robust consumer protection, while consumer involvement in code administration improves 
transparency.275 Similarly, the ASIC checklist for code approval in the financial services sector 
requires a consultative process for code development which includes consumer groups and, related 
to this, code content which addresses stakeholder issues.276 ASIC notes that where these 
procedures are not followed, a code may be less effective and fail to win stakeholder 
confidence.277 A code that has been developed with the involvement of government and consumer 
stakeholders is sometimes referred to as a ‘negotiated code.’278 
Industry coverage and awareness 
Voluntary industry codes are more likely to be successful in circumstances where industry support is 
widespread.279 A code with only partial coverage may exclude those firms which were and 
continue to be the source of most consumer problems, rendering the code largely ineffective.280 
Industry awareness is also crucial – a code with full industry coverage may be ineffective if 
employees are unaware of, and fail to follow, the code’s provisions.281  
Exceeds legislated requirements 
One of the potential strengths of self-regulatory approaches in comparison to legislation (which is 
usually written in negative terms) is that they can benchmark and encourage best practice.282 
However, voluntary industry codes will only be complementary in this way if they go beyond 
mandatory minimum standards, while codes which target the same level of performance as is 
already mandated may be considered ‘redundant’.283 Arguably, however, a self-regulatory scheme 
that targets minimum standards but whose processes boost compliance with those standards might 
still be considered effective to some degree. In its regulatory guide on codes of conduct in the 
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financial services sector, ASIC notes that a code must do more than ‘restate the law’ and sets out its 
expectation that an effective code will fulfil at least one of the following criteria: 
a) address specific industry issues and consumer problems not covered by legislation; 
b) elaborate upon legislation to deliver additional benefits to consumers; and/or 
c) clarify what needs to be done from the perspective of a particular industry or practice or 
product to comply with the legislation.284 
Complaints handling and redress 
Research suggests that an effective system of complaints handling contributes to the overall 
effectiveness of voluntary industry codes.285 The ACCC in its guidelines for effective industry codes 
suggests that complaints procedures should see complaints first considered by code signatories, 
and then, if resolution is not achieved, lodged with the administration committee or an independent 
decision-maker. Complaints handling should meet relevant standards and there should be a 
mechanism for independent review of complaints handling decisions,286 and complaints procedures 
should be clear, accessible and well-publicised to consumers.287 Adequate provisions for consumer 
redress are also widely considered to be an important component of an effective code.288 ASIC 
suggests that, at a minimum, provisions for redress include compensation for any direct financial 
loss or damage as well as binding non-monetary orders obliging a signatory to take (or not take) a 
particular course of action to resolve the breach.289 
Meaningful monitoring and enforcement 
Compliance is also critical to code effectiveness – a code can only succeed to the extent that 
businesses comply with its requirements. To this end, industry codes should include provisions for 
effective monitoring and for ‘identifying and disciplining’ businesses that do not comply.290 The 
ACCC guideline also emphasises the role of ‘commercially significant sanctions’ in encouraging 
compliance and creating credibility with participants and stakeholders.291 In their comprehensive 
review of the academic literature on the use of codes of conduct in the private sector, Carson, 
Baetz and McGill cite a number of studies which have highlighted the importance of performance 
measurement, monitoring and enforceability.292 Contrastingly, where rules are not ‘taken seriously’ 
by industry or enforced, voluntary codes of conduct may be seen by consumers and the community 
as little more than ‘public relations gimmicks’293 – and justifiably so.  
A voluntary industry code of conduct implemented in appropriate circumstances and incorporating 
these features is most likely to be effective and of benefit to consumers. 
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Energy Assured (Australia) 
Beginning operation in January 2012, Energy Assured is a self-regulatory industry scheme on door-
to-door sales of energy in Australia. The stated intention of the scheme is to enhance compliance 
with the existing regulatory framework on energy door-to-door selling. In so doing, it aims to 
improve selling standards and the consumer experience, boost consumer confidence and reduce 
complaints, and to discipline or remove so-called ‘rogue’ agents.294 Energy Assured is administered 
by the independent company Energy Assured Limited, and has as its members both energy retailers 
and door-to-door selling companies that they contract.  
Development of the scheme 
With community dissatisfaction with energy door-to-door selling practices growing, in 2010 the 
Office of the Victorian Minister for Energy requested that the Energy Retailers’ Association of 
Australia develop a voluntary code of conduct dealing specifically with the practice. Responding to 
community concern and government pressure, in October 2010 the industry put forward its 
proposal for the Energy Assured scheme. An application for authorisation of the scheme was 
lodged with the ACCC, which has responsibility for granting authorisation for potentially anti-
competitive conduct on public benefit grounds.†295  
Participating in the ACCC’s public consultation on the application, CUAC (along with other 
consumer organisations) expressed concerns about the design of the proposed scheme and argued 
for its rejection and re-design. We noted that Energy Assured had failed to involve consumer 
representatives in the design and development of the scheme which, as noted above, has been 
widely recognised as important – including by the ACCC in its own guidelines. We were also 
concerned that the EAL Code of Practice, as initially formulated, had potential to be used to 
discourage consumers from seeking redress via the relevant Ombudsman.296 
In its April 2011 Draft Determination, the ACCC suggested that Energy Assured was unlikely to 
deliver on its objectives and produce material benefit for consumers due to deficiencies in the code. 
These deficiencies included consumer information requirements that fell short of legislated 
obligations, inadequate public accountability on non-compliance reporting and an insufficiently 
rigorous sanctions process.297 These were seen as reflecting an underlying lack of accountability on 
energy retailers for the behaviour of sales agents acting on their behalf and for their benefit.298 
Following the draft determination the EAL revised the code, and in June 2011 the scheme was 
granted authorisation.  
The Energy Assured scheme’s key document is its detailed Code of Practice. The Code contains 
Standards with which member retailers and door-to-door sales companies as well as individual 
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agents must comply. These standards reflect requirements in the ACL and NECF. It sets out the roles 
and responsibilities of member retailers and door-to-door selling companies and details sales agent 
registration, recruitment and training processes and requirements. There are procedures for 
complaints handling and for monitoring and disciplining sales agents, as well as provisions dealing 
with member reporting, audit, warning notices and sanctions. Finally, the Code sets out an appeals 
process for sales agents and members who have been subject to disciplinary action.   
Effectiveness of the Energy Assured scheme design 
Assessed against the criteria for effective voluntary industry codes described above, the design of 
the Energy Assured scheme has both strengths and weaknesses. Among the scheme’s weaknesses 
is that consumer representatives were not meaningfully included in the process of its development, 
potentially resulting in less robust consumer outcomes. Most effective self-regulatory schemes set 
standards or offer protections beyond the legislated minimum, but the standards contained in 
Energy Assured’s Code of Practice do not exceed existing requirements under the ACL or Victoria’s 
Energy Marketing Code. Nonetheless, the Code of Practice does set out fairly detailed operational 
requirements, such as those surrounding sales agents’ training and competency testing, which 
would appear to have the potential to increase compliance with existing standards.  
Importantly, the Energy Assured scheme effectively has full industry coverage, with all energy 
retailers who sell door-to-door in Victoria being members of the scheme. Because member retailers 
are prohibited from contracting door-to-door selling services from companies which are not also 
members, all door-to-door energy sales in Victoria are covered by Energy Assured.‡ CEO of Energy 
Assured, Anne Whitehouse, told CUAC that both retailers and door-to-door selling companies are 
committed to the scheme.  
Energy Assured does not itself handle complaints, but requires that retailers have an internal Sales 
Complaint Handling Process that complies with the applicable Australian Standard on Complaints 
Handling. Any complaints made to Energy Assured itself are in the first instance referred to the 
relevant retailer, and to EWOV† should the customer be dissatisfied with a retailer’s response. 
While consumers are able to have complaints about door-to-door selling dealt with, the Energy 
Assured scheme lacks any provision for consumer compensation, limiting consumer redress and, 
CUAC has argued, reducing incentives to comply with the code – although EWOV may in some 
cases negotiate redress for consumers in resolving complaints.299  
The Energy Assured scheme also includes provisions for monitoring and disciplining individual sales 
agents, and also sets out monthly reporting and annual independent compliance audit requirements 
on energy retailers. The Code Manager is required to investigate all potential code breaches that 
are raised in monthly reports, compliance audits or in a complaint from an ombudsman, other 
scheme member, government or regulatory body or consumer advocacy group. Where a 
compliance issue is identified, the code manager must issue a warning notice describing (among 
other things) the breach, the remedial action to be taken, and the sanctions that will apply if action 
is not taken. If warning notices are not complied with, sanctions must be applied.  
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While the Energy Assured scheme does provide for sanctions, it is not clear that these are 
‘commercially significant.’ Sanctions range from written undertakings for a Minor Operational 
Breach (level 1) through to membership cancellation and public censure for repeated serious, 
material and/or systemic breaches and failure to comply (level 6).  
Table 10: Energy Assured sanctions 
Level Description 
1  Member to provide undertaking not to repeat breach 
 EAL Board notified of breach (member not named) 
2  Formal letter of admonishment issued  
 Member details to code manager strategy to rectify issue & implements action plan to prevent re-
occurrence 
 EAL Board notified of breach (member named) 
3  Formal letter of admonishment issued  
 Member details to code manager strategy to rectify issue & implements action plan to prevent re-
occurrence 
 EAL Board, energy regulator & ombudsman notified of breach (member named) 
4  Member-appointed independent auditor audits areas of activity where breach occurred  
 Member details to code manager its strategy to rectify issue & implements action plan to prevent re-
occurrence 
 EAL Board, energy regulator & ombudsman notified of breach (member named) 
5  Formal letter of admonishment issued  
 Member details to code manager strategy to rectify issue & implements action plan to prevent re-
occurrence 
 EAL Board, energy regulator & ombudsman notified of breach (member named) 
 Other stakeholders and public notified of breach 
6  Member de-registered (permanently or temporarily) and membership cancelled 
 Public statement identifies member, code section breached and period of de-registration 
Source: Energy Assured Code of Practice 
Sanctions are largely focussed on requiring the member to review its operations and take steps to 
rectify problems and prevent their re-occurrence. No financial penalties are applied at any stage, 
although members must bear the cost of any required activities (such as an independent audit). 
Furthermore, it is only at Levels 5 and 6 that information about a breach is made public.‡ Without 
transparent information about breaches, consumers are unable to influence poor door-to-door selling 
behaviour through their choice of energy supplier.  
As discussed extensively in Chapter 3, relevant regulators also have powers to impose sanctions on 
energy retailers and door-to-door selling companies. Consequently, the way in which the Energy 
Assured scheme interacts with regulators is significant. Energy Assured sanctions at Levels 3 through 
6 require that the relevant regulator is informed of the breach. This has the potential to trigger 
enforcement action by the regulator. Hence, level 3 through 6 Energy Assured sanctions might 
indirectly result in commercially significant sanctions applied by the regulator. 
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An assessment of the design of Energy Assured against the criteria for effective voluntary schemes 
suggests that it could be effective, but that much rests on its implementation. Indeed, this was the 
conclusion reached by the ACCC in granting authorisation for the scheme, but for a period shorter 
than requested: 
the ACCC considers that the realisation of public benefit will depend on the extent to which 
the key factors – consumer awareness, compliance and effective sanctions – are effective in 
practice. Given that the scheme is newly developed and therefore there is uncertainty about 
how it will operate in practice, the ACCC considers that an early review of the scheme is 
warranted. Accordingly, the ACCC grants authorisation to the scheme for three years.300 
Energy Assured has a review scheduled for early 2013, to be followed by an application to the 
ACCC for re-authorisation of the scheme. 
Energy Assured scheme in practice  
At the time of writing, the Energy Assured scheme has been in operation for almost one year, 
allowing some preliminary assessment of how the scheme functions in practice, as well as any 
observable outcomes. In a meeting with CUAC in September 2012, Anne Whitehouse, CEO of 
Energy Assured described some of the actions to date. 
With regard to sales agent accreditation, Ms Whitehouse reported that scheme members had been 
maintaining the EAL register and that around 2,700 agents were then registered nationwide.† At 
any one time, a few of these are in ‘development’ or ‘suspended’ status. Agents in ‘development’ 
status have committed a breach or failed a competency assessment and are supervised during sales 
while undergoing further training. ‘Suspended’ agents are unable to undertake sales while under 
investigation for a more serious breach. Since the establishment of the scheme, 78 sales agents 
had been de-registered nationally. De-registered agents cannot be engaged by any EAL scheme 
participants for five years, where previously their services might have been terminated by one 
retailer and then engaged by another. In a submission to the House of Representatives Standing 
Committee on Social Policy and Legal Affairs on the Do Not Knock Register Bill 2012, door-to-door 
sales company Salmat argued that potential EAL de-registration was a powerful deterrent 
discouraging sales agents from ignoring Do Not Knock stickers.301 
On monitoring, reporting and sanctions, Ms Whitehouse said that members had been meeting their 
reporting requirements under the scheme. Three warning notices had been issued in relation to 
operational issues, but as these had been complied with, no sanctions had been issued. Audits of 
each retailer are being conducted by KPMG, with individual results to be forwarded to the 
regulator.  
Outcomes 
One potential available indicator of the effectiveness of Energy Assured in terms of consumer 
outcomes is complaints data from both retailers and EWOV. There are, however, a number of 
complicating factors which make this an imperfect indicator. Firstly, as discussed at length in 
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Chapter 2, the relationship between complaints and consumer dissatisfaction/experience of 
misselling is unclear and contested – EWOV itself suggests that its complaints ‘should be viewed as 
indicative of wider dissatisfaction by a broader group of consumers.’302 Secondly, the fact that 
consumers may make a complaint to a retailer and/or the ombudsman, and that each of these has 
different methodologies for recording and reporting complaints, makes developing an accurate 
aggregate picture impossible. Finally, because several policy approaches are all in place at any 
one time, complaints trends cannot be linked to any particular approach with certainty. For 
example, at around the same time the Energy Assured scheme was being established, the ACCC 
was announcing its intention to pursue enforcement action against energy retailers should 
investigations reveal serious misconduct.303 As discussed in Chapter 3, it has since filed court 
proceedings against energy retailers and door-to-door selling companies, with this action so far 
resulting in substantial penalties on one retailer. Despite these limitations, and in the absence of 
other data, complaints trends remain crucial as an indicative picture of consumer experiences.  
In a meeting with CUAC, Energy Assured CEO Anne Whitehouse stated that since implementation 
of the scheme, door-to-door selling complaints to EWOV had decreased by around 40 per cent 
between January and June 2012. However, a closer analysis of EWOV data on transfer and 
marketing cases in Figure 5, below, suggests a more complex case trend.  
Figure 5: EWOV transfer and marketing cases quarterly since 1 April 2011 
 
 
 
Source: EWOV (2012a) De-identified Report on Marketing and Transfer Cases, p. 3. 
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Figure 5 shows that while cases declined substantially over the second half of 2011 and in January 
2012 (when Energy Assured began operation), they have since begun trending upwards. Between 
the first and second quarter in 2012, case numbers increased by 12 per cent. This pattern in 
overall marketing and transfer cases is mirrored in trends for door-to-door cases specifically, which 
decreased dramatically in the second half of 2011, but then increased by seven per cent between 
the January–March and April–June quarters.304 Positively, as of June 2012 EWOV complaints were 
substantially below June 2011 levels. CUAC will be monitoring ongoing complaints trends closely. 
Interestingly, in its report detailing these figures, EWOV noted that one retailer (‘Retailer 8’) had the 
most marketing and transfer cases in the April–June 2012 quarter, with the highest number of cases 
in five of the nine sub-categories including pressure sales and misleading marketing. Most of these 
misleading marketing cases arose from door-to-door sales. The retailer is not identified, precluding 
an assessment of whether high case numbers stem predominantly from more extensive marketing 
activity or from a higher rate of misconduct. If the latter, this may raise a question as to whether the 
Energy Assured scheme, which has not yet imposed any sanctions and has issued warning notices 
only for operational issues, is in practice able to detect and rectify noncompliance.  
Particularly given that customers are likely to complain to retailers in the first instance, retailers’ own 
complaints data is also an important source of information about door-to-door sales complaint 
levels. In discussions with CUAC, Anne Whitehouse said that member retailers’ complaint numbers 
are low at approximately three complaints per 10,000 customer contacts. 
The Energy Assured Code of Practice requires that member retailers have a complaints procedure in 
line with the applicable Australian standard.† Although this is positive, there is some cause for doubt 
about the accuracy of retailers’ management and reporting of complaints. The ESC’s most recent 
round of compliance audits, for example, uncovered a number of problems with the complaints 
reporting of Lumo305 and Origin.306 Many complaints to TRUenergy went unreported as those 
which were resolved on the first telephone call were not recorded as complaints. The auditor 
specifically found that complaints about marketing had been misclassified and therefore 
understated.307   
Future scheme developments – comparator services 
As of late 2012, EAL was in discussions with some comparator services about their intentions to 
engage in door-to-door sales and the potential extension of Energy Assured to cover such market 
participants,308 and had applied to the ACCC for a minor variation to its authorisation to allow this. 
Currently operating primarily on-line, these comparator services compare offers and make a 
recommendation to the consumer, and often facilitate the switching process.  
Compared to individual retailers’ door-to-door selling, comparator services’ use of this channel 
could potentially reduce the risk of financial detriment to consumers. Because a comparator service 
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operating door-to-door would provide information about a number of retailers’ offers, the situational 
monopoly characteristics of typical door-to-door sales transactions is eliminated or at least reduced. 
In this information environment, door-to-door sales switching seems more likely to see consumers 
moving onto better offers. Hence, extension of the Energy Assured scheme to include comparator 
service members could benefit consumers. 
However, there are a number of issues to be considered as this takes place. Firstly, comparing a 
number of offers and making a recommendation to a consumer, based on their circumstances, is 
likely to require greater knowledge and understanding on the part of sales agents. This therefore 
needs to be addressed in sales agent training. Comparison of multiple offers also introduces 
increased complexity for consumers, emphasising both the need for skilled and well-trained agents 
capable of explaining the process, and the need for careful consideration as to what written 
material and offer information should be provided to consumers in this situation.  
In 2010, CUAC conducted research into energy switching and comparator sites. The research 
found wide variance in the offers recommended by the sites, resulting from different calculation 
methodologies, difference in which retailers’ offers were included, and calculation errors.309 
Flowing from a recommendation arising from that research, CUAC, along with a coalition of public 
interest organisations, has recently released principles to support the development of a voluntary 
code of practice for price comparison and switching services. We are currently seeking the 
involvement of industry, switching service operators and government to progress the development of 
the code in the interest of improving the quality of information in the retail energy market. In 
extending Energy Assured to cover these new market participants, EAL should consider these 
principles and how they might be applied when comparator services are operating in the door-to-
door sales context.  
Energy Sure Code of Practice (UK) 
The UK’s Energy Sure Code of Practice for the Face-to-Face Marketing of Energy Supply (the Energy 
Sure Code of Practice), which served as a reference point in the development of Australia’s Energy 
Assured scheme, is a second example of a voluntary industry code regulating door-to-door energy 
sales to domestic customers.310 Established in 2002, Energy Sure has been in operation for a 
substantial period, potentially allowing for a better assessment of its effectiveness in reducing 
consumer detriment arising from door-to-door energy sales.  
Design of Energy Sure 
The stated aim of the Energy Sure Code is to promote consumer confidence in face-to-face energy 
sales and to provide consumer protection standards over and above legislated protections. In doing 
so, the Energy Sure Code focuses largely on sales agents. It sets out standards for their selection 
and training, and requires that members ensure that sales agents have passed competency testing. 
As with the Energy Assured scheme, all sales agents engaged by members must be registered on 
the Energy Sure database.  
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The Code also sets out standards for sales agents’ contact with consumers, prohibiting pressure 
sales, misleading information, misrepresentation, and conduct that exploits consumer vulnerability.  
Agents are required to call only in certain hours, leave immediately when indicated by the 
consumer, and respect No Canvassing signs and NCCZs. Provisions added in 2010 require the 
sales agent to provide an estimate of total annual charges and, in some circumstances, a price 
comparison.  
Member energy retailers are required to supply monitoring reports to the Code Manager, and are 
subject to an annual compliance audit undertaken by an independent auditor. In cases of serious or 
persistent non-compliance, material infringements that cannot be otherwise resolved, or failure to act 
on earlier warnings, the Code Manager may apply sanctions. In applying sanctions, the Code 
Manager is required to take into account compliance costs and particular circumstances. The form 
of any sanction is not specified in the Code.  
As with Energy Assured, Energy Sure does not include a customer complaints handling mechanism, 
and complaints are instead referred back to the retailer. The Code does require that retailers pay 
compensation of £250 in cases of proven forgery or fraud by a sales agent. Any other 
compensation is at the member’s discretion. 
All of the UK’s ‘big six’ energy suppliers are members of the scheme, which is maintained by the 
Association of Energy Suppliers. Unlike Australia’s Energy Assured scheme, third party marketing 
companies are not involved as members of the scheme, but retailer members are required to ensure 
that third parties engaged to conduct sales activities comply with the Code.   
Effectiveness of the Energy Sure code 
The Energy Sure Code was established at a time when consumer complaints about energy retailers’ 
sales practices had peaked at more than 1,000 per month.311 Complaints to Energywatch about 
door-to-door selling then declined as a proportion of all energy complaints. At the time, a 
spokesperson for Energywatch attributed this drop-off in complaints to a shift away from door-to-
door sales in favour of telesales.312 In 2004, describing a 70 per cent decline in complaints since 
May 2002, OFT noted that this coincided with a reduced level of marketing activity as well as 
Ofgem’s use of new enforcement powers, attributing the decline to this combination of factors.313  
According to Energy UK, the trade association for the energy industry, since the establishment of 
Energy Sure consumer complaints about sales practices have fallen by 99 per cent.314 
Unfortunately, this claim is not referenced and nor is it clear whether it refers to internal company 
complaints or complaints to an independent third party, or both. Comparison is also complicated 
by changes to institutional arrangements over the duration of the Energy Sure Code’s operation. 
Energywatch, which previously handled complaints, was disbanded in 2008. Today, consumers 
are advised to complain to their retailer in the first instance, then seek advice from Consumer Direct, 
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and finally to lodge a complaint with the Ombudsman.†315 In 2010-11 the Ombudsman reported 
that sales complaints constituted 3.8 per cent of energy complaints, of which misselling complaints 
(2.2%) were the majority.316 
Despite the apparent drop in complaints, misselling through the door-to-door channel continued to 
be a problem with Energy Sure in place. Consumer organisation Which? has described Energy 
Sure as ‘clearly ... not very effective,’ suggesting this is in part because the scheme imposes no real 
penalties on companies for misselling.317 Similarly, Consumer Focus has continued to draw 
attention to energy misselling and in 2011 initiated a campaign calling on energy retailers to 
abandon unsolicited door-to-door sales (discussed in the next section).  
Since the Energy Sure Code’s establishment, the UK energy regulator Ofgem has continued to 
uncover evidence of misselling, responding with strengthened regulations and enforcement action. 
Ofgem’s 2008 Energy Supply Probe highlighted incidents of misselling including switching without 
consent, pressure sales and misleading information about offers.  
Investigations and enforcement action by Ofgem also suggest that misselling did not cease with 
introduction of the Code. In fact, in recent years Ofgem has been vigorous in investigating 
misselling and applying penalties. In 2008 retailer npower was fined £1.8 million for failing to 
take sufficient action to prevent misselling of energy contracts, in breach of its license conditions. In 
September 2010 Ofgem launched misselling investigations into four of the ‘big six’ energy retailers, 
all of which are members of the Energy Sure Code: Scottish Power, Scottish and Southern Energy 
(SSE), EDF Energy and npower.318 With the conclusion of the investigation into EDF Energy, the 
company agreed to make payments totalling £4.5 million to customers. At the time of writing, the 
remaining three investigations were continuing. In April 2012 a further misselling investigation, this 
time into supplier E.ON, was launched.319 
Voluntarism 
As well as collaborating through voluntary industry codes of practice, individual firms may exercise 
corporate social responsibility by taking unilateral action to reduce or eliminate consumer detriment 
from door-to-door selling.   
Consumer Focus’ End of the Road campaign (UK) 
Consumer Focus is the UK’s ‘statutory consumer champion,’ a consumer research and advocacy 
body that works across the economy and has specialist expertise in energy matters.320 After a 
number of years campaigning against misselling in unsolicited door-to-door sales (referred to as 
‘doorstep cold calling’ in the UK), in 2011 Consumer Focus launched a report and campaign 
                                                          
† In distinct contrast to intake procedures of the Energy and Water Ombudsman (Victoria), the Ombudsman Service in the UK may 
accept a complaint after the company has been allowed eight weeks to resolve the issue. Consumers are also required to fill out a 
written complaint form.   
315 Consumer Focus (n.d.) How to make a complaint – You and your energy supplier. Consumer Focus: London. 
316 Ombudsman Services (2011) Energy – Sector Report 2010-11, Ombudsman Services: Warrington, p. 5.  
317 Baron, Sylvia (2012) ‘Are we opening the door to a new type of salesperson?,’ Which? website. 
318 Ofgem (2010) ‘Ofgem launches investigation into misselling and sets up hotline for consumers to report misleading energy 
sales,’ Media Release, 2 September 2010. 
319 Ofgem (2012) Ofgem launches investigation into energy sales by E.ON, Information note, 4 April 2012. 
320 Consumer Focus (2012a) ‘About us,’ Consumer Focus website. 
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which aimed to bring an end to energy door-to-door sales through a process of voluntary 
agreement with retailers.      
The report, The end of the road: Energy consumers’ experiences with doorstep sellers, documented 
the results of Consumer Focus’ most recent consumer survey on door-to-door selling. It argued that 
the practice was disliked and unwanted and was eroding the reputation of, and trust in, energy 
retailers.321 Prior to the report’s release, Consumer Focus shared a draft with stakeholders and 
attempted to reach a voluntary agreement on the cessation of unsolicited door-to-door sales, and 
SSE announced a suspension of door-to-door sales.322 The report itself called upon retailers to enact 
immediate three-month moratoriums on the practice, during which time they were to work with 
consumers and consumer groups to develop alternative ways of delivering product advice and 
information to consumers. If this did not occur, Consumer Focus noted, they would call on the UK 
regulator Ofgem to consider an outright ban on energy door-to-door sales.323 
Campaign success 
Consumer Focus’ campaign generated support from multiple areas. It was supported by other 
consumer organisations, including Which? and the Trading Standards Institute, which expressed 
dismay that after many years of campaigning, policy change, regulatory action and industry efforts 
to improve practices, energy misselling continued to occur.324 There was also support from 
politicians. For example, the House of Commons Energy and Climate Change Committee, in its July 
2011 report on Ofgem’s Retail Market Review, concluded that ‘the continued blight of misselling 
should have been taken in hand years ago,’ and called for industry itself to ‘address these problems 
immediately without waiting for either Ofgem or Government to act.’325 In this environment, the 
Consumer Focus campaign also attracted significant media coverage.326  
As shown in Table 11 below, the report’s release was quite quickly followed by the suspension or 
ending of door-to-door sales from five of the UK’s ‘Big Six’ energy retailers, with the sixth retailer 
following suit around one year after the campaign launch.  
                                                          
321 Consumer Focus (2011a) The end of the road. 
322 Consumer Focus (2011b) ‘End of the Road for Cold Call Energy Doorstep Sales’, Media release, 23 July 2011, p. 7. 
323 Consumer Focus (2011a) The end of the road, p. 7. 
324 Baron (2012) ‘Are we opening the door?’ 
325 Energy and Climate Change Committee (2011) Ofgem’s Retail Market Review – Sixth Report. 
326 For example, see: Grice, Andrew (2011) ‘MPs criticise energy firms for pushy doorstep-sales practices,’ The Independent, 25 
July 2011.  
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Table 11: Timeline of voluntary suspensions and cessation of unsolicited door-to-door selling 
Date Event 
8 July 2011 SSE announces suspension of door-to-door sales 
23 July 2011 Consumer Focus launches ‘End of the Road’ campaign 
12 August 2011 British Gas announces suspension of door-to-door sales 
7 September 2011 EDF Energy announces suspension of door-to-door sales 
11 October 2011 British Gas announces ending of door-to-door sales 
17 October 2011 npower announces ending of door-to-door sales 
21 October 2011 Scottish Power announces ending of door-to-door sales 
4 July 2012 E.ON announces proposed ending of door-to-door sales 
Sources: Consumer Focus (2012b) ‘£1.25 million SSE fine sends message to energy industry to get it right on sales – says 
Consumer Focus,’ Media Release, 4 May 2012; E.ON (2012) ‘Customer first: Reset Review truly becoming part of E.ON's 
DNA,’ Media Release, 4 July 2012.  
Consequences 
Having wound down unsolicited door-to-door sales, the UK’s big six retailers are now considering 
alternative marketing and selling strategies, and it is not yet clear what approaches will be 
developed or how they will affect consumers. Consumer organisation Which? has expressed some 
concern that some retailers may simply switch to appointment-based in-home sales, which attracts 
many of the same potential disadvantages as unsolicited door-to-door sales.327 The UK OFT’s 2004 
report on door-to-door sales noted that consumers were as likely to regret a purchase after a 
solicited visit as after an unsolicited visit.328 
A shift to appointment-based sales might even have the perverse consequence of increasing 
consumers’ perceptions of pressure to purchase. In Consumer Action’s January 2012 survey on 
door-to-door sales, respondents were asked in which of a range of possible sales scenarios they 
would feel the most pressure to buy (Figure 6). 
                                                          
327 Baron (2012) ‘Are we opening the door?’ 
328 OFT (UK) (2004) Doorstep selling, p. 9. 
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Figure 6: Consumer perceptions of pressure to buy in different scenarios 
 
Source: CALC (2012b) Door-to-Door Sales, p. 2. 
Figure 6 shows that the largest group of respondents (36%) thought that they would feel most 
pressured where there was a pre-arranged home appointment – more than the 20 per cent who 
elected unsolicited door-to-door sales as the highest-pressure scenario. While appointment-based 
door-to-door sales eliminate the ‘surprise’ factor, it appears that consumers may feel a greater sense 
of obligation towards a sales agent who they have explicitly agreed to meet with. It is yet to be 
seen whether the UK will see a shift towards appointment-cased sales, or if retailers will seize the 
opportunity to develop new ways of marketing and selling to customers. 
 
There has also been commentary on the effects of the move on switching activity. Finnish think-tank 
Vaasa-ETT in its World Energy Retail Market Rankings Report 2012 states that the energy retail 
market in the UK has seen a ‘massive fall-off in ... established activity’, attributing this to the 
discontinuation of door-to-door sales by the major retailers.329  
Consumer Action Law Centre campaign (Australia) 
Citing Consumer Focus’ campaign, in 2012 Consumer Action campaigned for energy retailers to 
cease door-to-door sales. In March, Consumer Action wrote to retailers asking them to voluntarily 
stop unsolicited door-to-door sales. Retailers did not agree to the request but, according to the Do 
Not Knock website, some agreed to meet with Consumer Action to discuss the issues.330 The 
                                                          
329 Lewis (2012) World Energy Retail Rankings 2012, p. 27. 
330 Consumer Action Law Centre, Financial Counselling Australia and Victoria Legal Aid (2012c) ‘Take Action! Sign our petition to 
end door-to-door energy marketing,’ Do Not Knock website. 
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March letter was followed, in June 2012, with the launch of an online petition repeating the call for 
retailers to abandon door-to-door sales. The petition achieved 655 signatures before its close.331  
Discussion and recommendations 
In Australia and in the UK, government legislative and regulatory requirements on energy door-to-
door sales have been accompanied by voluntary industry initiatives.  
Voluntary industry codes 
At this early stage, only preliminary comments can be made about the effectiveness of Australia’s 
Energy Assured scheme on door-to-door selling. Information provided to CUAC by Energy Assured 
suggests that some action has been taken under the scheme in relation to both sales agents and 
retailer members. While EWOV marketing and transfer complaints have increased slightly during 
2012 after a drop in 2011 prior to Energy Assured’s commencement, it is unclear what has 
caused these trends. Complaints trends will need to be followed over a longer period before even 
tentative conclusions can be drawn about the scheme’s possible impact. 
More information about the implementation and operation of the Energy Assured scheme would 
allow external stakeholders to evaluate this activity against other data, and come to conclusions 
about the effectiveness of the scheme. Provided that Energy Assured is properly implemented and 
effective, this transparency should help to build stakeholder and community confidence both that the 
scheme represents a genuine effort at industry self-regulation, and that it is resulting in benefits to 
consumers. 
Recommendation 9 
That the Energy Assured scheme increases transparency and accountability by making more 
detailed information about the scheme’s implementation and operation publicly available at regular 
intervals. This should include de-identified information about: 
 any warning notices issued and sanctions applied; 
 independent audit results; 
 complaint levels; and 
 numbers of agents de-registered and in ‘suspended’ and ‘development’ status. 
CUAC believes that the Energy Assured scheme has some potential to improve the conduct of 
energy door-to-door sellers. In contrast to the Energy Sure scheme in the UK, for example, Energy 
Assured has important strengths, such as full industry coverage and the inclusion of a sanctions 
regime, albeit limited. Now that it is in place, the Energy Assured scheme should have the 
opportunity to be fully implemented and its effectiveness evaluated. At the same time, given that the 
mere existence of voluntary industry codes can undercut other efforts to address consumer problems, 
CUAC believes that firm evidence of the scheme’s effectiveness should be required if the scheme is 
to continue after its initial three-year period.  
                                                          
331 Consumer Action Law Centre (2012a) ‘Australian energy retailers: Time’s up for energy door-to-door marketing’ on Change.org 
website. 
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Recommendation 10 
That the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission only re-authorise the Energy Assured 
scheme if there is convincing evidence that it has been effective in producing public benefit through 
the reduction of energy door-to-door misselling and associated consumer detriment.  
In this task, the ACCC would be greatly assisted by reliable data about the overall level of energy 
door-to-door selling misconduct, as discussed in Recommendation 1. Were a consumer survey to 
be administered now and when the re-authorisation application is being made, this would provide 
reliable evidence of any marked change in sales agent behaviour.  
Voluntarism 
At the present time, CUAC believes that calls on energy retailers to voluntarily abandon door-to-
door sales in Victoria are unlikely to be successful. Although Consumer Focus’ End of the Road 
campaign has enjoyed considerable success, this can probably be attributed in large part to more 
propitious conditions. The UK retail energy market is older than Victoria’s and hence, both 
dissatisfaction with door-to-door selling and disenchantment with earlier attempts to improve 
practices have had much time to develop and grow. Consumer Focus was able to harness this 
dissatisfaction and sense of weariness in its large, well-resourced campaign. At the same time, a 
stronger enforcement approach from the UK regulator may have changed retailers’ perceptions of 
the relative costs and benefits of door-to-door selling activity. In recent years, Ofgem has been 
vigorous in its enforcement efforts, launching misselling investigations into all of the ‘Big Six’ retailers 
over the past five years, and imposing large penalties in some cases. These circumstances are likely 
to have contributed to the success of Consumer Focus’ campaign where similar efforts in Victoria 
have not been successful.  
Should recent efforts, including the Energy Assured scheme, fail to substantially eliminate energy 
door-to-door selling misconduct in Victoria, CUAC sees room for a renewed campaign from an 
alliance of consumer and community organisations calling on retailers to agree to a moratorium of 
door-to-door selling in favour of other approaches. In the meantime, CUAC strongly echoes earlier 
calls for energy retailers to shift their focus to less intrusive and more consumer-centred sales and 
marketing efforts. We see substantial room for retailers to innovate in this area. For example, we 
believe retailers should consider how they might capture the benefits of face-to-face explanation in a 
way that, unlike door-to-door sales, does not create conditions in which pressure sales, misleading 
and deceptive conduct and unconscionable conduct are incentivised.  
Recommendation 11 
That, in an effort to move away from door-to-door selling, the Energy Retailers Association of 
Australia take a leadership role encouraging and supporting its to develop alternative, innovative 
sales and marketing approaches that are better aligned with consumer preferences. 
At the time of writing, CUAC was in the process of developing a retailer rating scheme designed to 
offer consumers simple, summarised information about the non-price characteristics of different 
energy retailers, such as regulatory compliance and customer service. Based on the findings of 
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CUAC and others’ energy consumer surveys, as well as our interactions with consumers and 
community organisations, CUAC believes that information about which retailers do and do not use 
door-to-door sales, and the manner in which they do so, is of much interest to consumers. Hence, 
we will consider the ways in which such information might be incorporated into our retailer rating 
scheme. For consumers who feel strongly about door-to-door sales, as many do, easy access to this 
information may influence choice of energy retailer and offer.  
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6. THE FUTURE 
Over a decade of retail competition, door-to-door selling has occupied a somewhat paradoxical 
place in the energy market. On the one hand, it has been one of the most important avenues by 
which consumers have participated in the retail market. On the other, it has fuelled consumer and 
community dissatisfaction with, and distrust of, energy retailers, with flow-on effects for overall 
consumer confidence in the market. 
With this report, CUAC has surveyed the range of policy approaches that can be employed in the 
effort to minimise the consumer detriment associated with this sales channel. Based on our review of 
the evidence, we have identified areas in which our current approaches appear to be working, 
and areas where improvements can be made to further reduce detriment.    
While we believe there is room for further minimisation of consumer detriment, we also see the 
shortcomings of door-to-door selling as one manifestation of a more fundamental issue with 
Victoria’s retail energy market. Discussing energy door-to-door and telesales in its Review of the 
Effectiveness of Competition in the Electricity and Gas Retail Markets – Victoria, the AEMC quoted 
a representative of a new retailer who claimed: 
...unless you bother someone, then you’re kidding yourself. They’re just not going to come 
looking for you.332 
In CUAC’s view, ‘bothering’ consumers is not a desirable or sustainable model for ongoing and 
effective consumer engagement in the energy market.  
While Victoria’s energy customer switching rate is the world’s highest, in large part attributable to 
door-to-door sales activity, this high level of churn is not necessarily an indication that consumers are 
participating effectively in the market, nor that it is operating in their best interests. In a complex 
retail energy market, consumers need – but do not currently have – simple, reliable and non-
coercive ways of engaging effectively and making decisions that are in their own interests. We 
believe that we are seeing increasing recognition that a high switching rate is not the be all and 
end all of energy market competitiveness. A shift away from energy door-to-door sales in favour of 
approaches that align with consumer preferences as to how they receive marketing information 
would, in all likelihood, mean a drop in customer switching rates. At the same time, however, if this 
participation is of a higher quality, energy market competitiveness need not suffer. The missing link 
is the analysis of consumers’ decisions: whether they are in consumers’ own best interests and 
resulting in substantial savings, thereby driving down prices.   
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APPENDIX A – ORIGIN ENERGY 
DO NOT KNOCK STICKER 
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